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Abstract
This thesis is an examination of the secondary register phenomenon. Also known afc 
“second” or “international” registers, they exist alongside the national register of a 
particular flag state, but are subject to a different level of regulation. This study 
situates the development of secondary registers within ongoing debates about 
globalization and state sovereignty. It also develops a classification system for 
secondary registers based on whether they are controlled by a parent state or an 
autonomous offshore jurisdiction. This thesis compares the regulatory regimes and 
crewing costs on different secondary/national register pairs using port-state control 
data and seafarer nationality patterns. It also conducts an in-depth case study of the 
Isle of Man ship register to determine the processes by which it developed, as well as 
how it interacts with the UK and other state and non-state actons. The results of 
these investigations suggest that offshore is not necessarily synonymous with 
deregulation, that the national scale maintains its relevance and that there is a 
particular need to ground theoretical discussions in empirical analyses. This thesis 
further argues that Jessop's “competition state” possesses the greatest explanatory 
power with regard to the Isle of Man ship register, but that broader claims require 
further research.
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INTRODUCTION
“A ship is a bit o f terra firma cut off from the main; 
it is a state in itself; and the captain is its king. ” ,
— Herman Melville, White Jacket, 1850
While much has changed about the seafaring tradition since Melville’s time, 
the idea of a vessel as “terra firma,” a fragment of territory sailing far from its 
mainland, endures. Indeed, it is an old concept that has been reinforced through 
modem international law. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas formally 
codified this notion of a ship having a nationality, being bound by and subject to the 
jurisdiction of a particular state through the process of registration (Article 5(1)).
In the half-century since the Geneva Convention was adopted, the merchant 
shipping industry has undergone a substantial transformation. As in other industries, 
increased economic competition over the past half-century has encouraged 
shipowners to seek ways to reduce costs. Given the considerable effect that the 
choice of register has on a vessel’s operating expenses, “flagging out” from 
traditional maritime states, which generally require adherence to relatively strict 
(and, therefore, expensive) regulatory standards, was a logical option for shipowners 
trying to cut costs; open registers, also known as “flags of convenience” were ready 
to meet this demand, offering lower fees, decreased levels of regulation, and other 
financial benefits (Ready 1998).
As shipowners left the national registers of traditional maritime states for 
open registers en masse, these states responded with various economic and political 
incentives to try to retain their vessels. One such incentive was the creation of
secondary registers in the mid-1980s.1 The idea behind these registers was that they 
would exist alongside the state’s national register, compensating for the high levels 
of costly regulation to the greatest extent possible under a state’s political climate. 
Specific characteristics of these registers differ; for example, the initial advantage fo r ' 
shipowners registering on Norway’s international register, NIS, was the ability to 
evade the costly nationality restrictions associated with the Norwegian national 
register (Ready 1998). Meanwhile, a newspaper article from 1992 cites the benefit 
of Denmark’s international register “setting up [DIS] has made Danish shipowners 
believe that shipping has a future.. .in Denmark, the positive climate it has promoted 
has led to . . .  greater maritime activity than we would otherwise have seen” (Brown- 
Humes 1992). Thus, while secondary registers may offer different benefits for 
shipowners, and, it must be noted, were created for different reasons and through 
diverse processes, the initial objective of most secondary registers was to retain 
national shipowners who might otherwise “flag out” to open registers.
This aim of this thesis is to examine the secondary register phenomenon, both 
in the context of the international shipping industry, and with regard to its 
implications for debates about globalization and state sovereignty.
To this end, the first two chapters set the foundation for the study by 
providing a theoretical framework and methodological underpinning with which to 
approach the data collection and analyses. Chapter One explores broad debates 
about the role and authority of the state in a globalized world, and provides an 
overview of the history of the modem shipping industry. Chapter Two provides a
1 It should be noted that there are critical differences in the strategies and functioning of secondary 
registers established by their parent states as opposed to those that are created by an autonomous, 
offshore territory. This important analytical distinction ls addressed more fully in Chapter Two.
com prehensive introduction to the group of secondary registers considered in this 
thesis, and develops a system by which to classify them for later analysis.
Chapters Three and Four examine two key considerations -  regulatory 
regime and crewing costs -  that can affect shipowners’ decisions to “flag out.” ' 
Chapter Three uses port state control data as a proxy for the regulatory regimes 
present on different flag states, while Chapter Four employs seafarer nationality 
patterns on different registers as a means to assess crewing costs. Both chapters 
compare values for individual secondary and national register pairs (for example, the 
Denmark national register and DIS), and across different registry types (for example, 
secondary, national, and open). These comparisons enable a determination to be 
made, not just about how these variables differ between a secondary register and its 
national counterpart, but also where secondary registers fit into the registry system as 
a whole.
Chapters Five and Six contain an in-depth exploration of one secondary ship 
register, the Isle of Man. This case study contains a historical analysis of the process 
by which the Manx ship register developed, and explores the evolution of the 
relationship between the Isle of Man and the UK, as well as other state and non-state 
actors. Chapter Seven draws together the results of these disparate research 
methods, and attempts to explain their implications for the international shipping 
industry, as well as the globalization debate more broadly.
CHAPTER ONE 
Globalization, States, and Secondary Registers
1,1 Introduction
Globalization is a frequently debated and highly contested topic. A 
significant amount of academic discourse is centred on questions of whether, how, 
and die extent to which globalization is occurring. While globalization and its 
related themes are complex subjects, this thesis is foremost an empirical examination 
of secondary registers, which are the product of state-based actions stemming from 
the consequences of international economic competition. As such, this chapter only 
briefly outlines the nature and characteristics of globalization and the debates 
surrounding it in order to introduce subsequent questions regarding the role of the 
state and state autonomy in a globalized world. Different accounts of the modem 
state are grouped into three categories -  “strong state” theories, “weak state” 
theories, and those that see the state reinventing itself in the face of globalizing 
forces -  in order to serve as a framework by which to understand the secondary 
register phenomenon.
Individual definitions of globalization vary -  and are occasionally 
contradictory -  but most involve the notion of the compression of physical distance. 
Scholte (2005) identifies five broad definitions of globalization. First, as 
internationalization, referring to exchange between states. Second, as liberalization, 
usually focusing on the lifting of trade barriers and capital regulations but also 
including state-sponsored facilitation of cross-border movement in any capacity. 
Third, as universalization, through which experiences and objects are transmitted
throughout the globe. Fourth, as westernization, “a dynamic whereby the social 
structures of modernity. . .are spread the world over, normally destroying pre­
existent cultures and local self-determination in the process” (16). Fifth, as 
deterritorialization, which “entails a reconfiguration of geography, so that social ‘ 
space is no longer wholly applied in toms of territorial places, territorial distances, 
and territorial borders” (16).
Depending on which definition of globalization is being employed, various 
financial, organisational, and social factors are cited as symptoms of globalization’s 
reach, causes of its development, or both. These are generally factors that have 
developed or manifested themselves in last century. For example, following World 
War II, trade barriers were reduced and national economic policies were liberalised, 
causing an increase in global economic integration. Furthermore, technological 
advances have facilitated communication across increasingly greater distances and 
allowed for more efficient production and transport methods, affecting social, 
cultural, and economic spheres. In addition, there has been a proliferation of 
international organisations and supranational decision-making bodies. These are just 
a few of the dimensions that are referenced by those engaged in the globalization 
debate.
These tangible developments give rise to some of die most contested aspects 
of globalization. One aspect concerns globalization’s reach and effects (Strange 
1995) -  is it occurring uniformly across different parts of the world and in different 
arenas? Another aspect that is debated is globalization’s periodisation (Scholte 
2005). Is it a completely new, discrete phenomenon, unique to the 20th century? Is it
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a collection of processes that has been unfolding in a linear fashion, and, if so, has it 
reached its zenith? If not, is it a cyclical trend where the developments outlined 
above represent only the most recent recurrence?
. f
While these issues are too extensive to be fully discussed here, within the 
ongoing debates about the definition and nature of globalization, there is a specific 
and complex dialogue taking place regarding the role of the state. For many 
commentators, globalization has raised questions of the state’s vitality and 
autonomy. Or, as Scholte (2005) phrases it, “how, if at all, has globalization 
changed the institutions that execute regulatory functions and/or the ways that they 
operate?” (132). It is the varied answers to this question that are focused on in this 
chapter.
It is generally accepted that the state, which is traditionally seen as the 
primary actor in the international system, is at minimum composed of territory, a 
population, and some kind of administrative authority. Although today’s welfare 
state is associated with an array of institutions, socioeconomic functions, and the 
provision of other services, the authority of governments over their territory is rooted 
in the principle of sovereignty.
There are two core facets of the concept of sovereignty, as it is understood 
today. A state is presumed to have internal sovereignty if it has supreme authority 
over matters within its borders. External sovereignty means the non-interference in a 
state’s affairs by other states, which implies that a state is recognised as an 
autonomous entity (Biersteker 2002). In today’s anarchic system2, the modem
2 This thesis adheres to International Relations convention in which die phrase “anarchic system” is 
used to refer to the lack of an overarching, global authority.
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sovereign state operates as both an “arena of collective action” for and by its citizens, 
as well as a “source of credible commitments in the international system” (Cemy 
2000,21). This sovereignty is delineated by physical benders that create order out of 
what would otherwise be anarchy and create a “social contract” between a state and ? 
its citizens that allows the former to be “understood as a conscious agent located at 
the centre of the body politic wielding absolute power and authority” (Camilleri and 
Falk 1992, 238). This definition and conceptualization of sovereignty as supreme 
authority over its borders is at the heart of the state-globalization debate.
Before one can begin a discussion of globalization’s effects on state power, it 
is worth further examining what scholars mean when they talk about sovereignty, 
and the changes in the institution that are manifest today. The concept of 
sovereignty is traditionally traced back to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, a set of 
treaties that ended the Thirty Years War, with the idea of “Westphalian sovereignty” 
signifying a state’s absolute jurisdiction over its territory (Sorensen 1999, 591). It is 
acknowledged, however, that the Westphalian notion of sovereignty, despite serving 
as the foundation for the concept as it exists today, has never been a practical reality. 
Pointing to the ramifications of the Great Depression for many states’ domestic 
economies and Cold War political allegiances as examples of the kinds of constraints 
imposed by the international system, Barkin explains that “this ideal form has never 
existed historically, states have never had either the ability or the authority to engage 
in completely autonomous domestic policy” (Barkin 2001, 43). Biersteker echoes 
this, citing states’ hypocrisy in intervening in others’ domestic affairs as he notes, 
“the Westphalian ideal of sovereign non-intervention has always been just that: an
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ideal” (Biersteker 2002, 162). Thus with regard to both the internal and external 
aspects of sovereignty, states have never had absolute authority.
With this caveat in mind, many scholars have examined whether this idea of 
sovereignty has been continuous, or whether there has been a change in the nature of ’ 
the institution. Although a full discussion of this debate is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, it should be mentioned that there are some elements and expressions of 
sovereignty that are relative to changing times and a dynamic international system. 
This has led some, such as Castells (2000), to argue that sovereignty is an empty 
concept. Others, however, put forth a different interpretation. Sorensen suggests 
that “there is a stable element in sovereignty which marks the continuity of that 
institution. That stable element is the constitutive core of sovereignty: constitutional 
independence possessed by states which have territory, people, and government” 
(Sorensen 1999, 594). Beyond this durable foundation, sovereignty, as well as the 
state itself, is “defined, and redefined, by the rules, actions and practices of different 
agents, including in the case of states, by themselves” (Biersteker 2002, 157). Thus 
the character of the sovereign state is in part based on how it is reproduced in action.
As Wendt phrases it, “the sovereign state is an ongoing accomplishment of practice, 
not a once-and-for-all creation of norms that somehow exist apart from practice” 
(Wendt 1992,413).
One important evolution of practice involves the transformation of the way 
states operate in the international arena, and, in particular, they ways in which they 
engage with each other. Over the past half-century, there has been a significant 
increase in inter-state cooperation through multilateral activities (Barkin 2001).
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Examples of these activities include the proliferation of hi- and multi-lateral treaties, 
international organisations such as the United Nations, economic or military 
alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and supranational institutions 
like the European Union.
This evolution of practice also includes changes in the way that states 
compete. Strange suggests that “the nature of the competition between states in the 
international system has fundamentally changed,” noting that “in the past states 
competed for control over territory and the wealth-creating resources within 
territories, whether natural or man-created. Now they are increasingly competing for 
market shares in the world economy” (Strange 1995, 1). In other words, territorial 
colonialism has given way to a new kind of economic competition as states now 
fight to attract and retain industry and investment.
As states have engaged in this increased level of international cooperation 
and new kind of competition, they have necessarily altered their behaviour, along 
with their economic and political strategies. This has raised new questions about the 
extent to which the state remains a sovereign entity, and, subsequently, whether and 
how this affects their role as salient actors in the global system.
1.2 States and Globalization
While it is clear that major changes have occurred in the international system 
over the past century as economic globalization has taken hold, the implications of 
these changes are the subject of much debate. The changing role of the state, in 
particular, is the subject of a large body of scholarly work that is centred on the 
question of what, precisely, is driving the processes of globalization. This research
6
can be divided into three broad theoretical categories. The first category sees 
globalization as dictating the policies of states, thereby resulting in a weakening, or a 
“hollowing out,” (Held 1995) of the state’s absolute authority. The second holds the 
opposite position, arguing that the state continues to be a strong entity, as it to some 
extent creates the conditions that enable globalization to occur without its authority 
being diminished in the process. The third category takes a different approach to the 
state sovereignty-globalization debate, either by trying to find a middle ground 
between the two ideas previously mentioned or by reframing the debate in different 
terms.
1.2.1 “Weak State” Theorists
For those who suggest that globalization has resulted in a weakening of the 
institution of sovereignty, the fundamental issue is that global forces—political, 
economic, and social -  are encroaching upon and eroding away the power of the 
state. As Camerilli and Falk phrase it, “it is as if global processes and institutions 
are invading the nation-state and as a consequence dismantling the conceptual and 
territorial boundaries that have traditionally sustained the theory and practice of state 
sovereignty” (1992, 98). The key issue here is that although states continue to 
operate as though they still maintain centralized authority, their policies are 
increasingly driven and determined by a need to remain economically competitive. 
Authority, therefore, resides with the transnational corporations (including banks, 
accounting, and law firms) states are trying to entice and keep, as well as the 
international institutions and non-governmental organizations that set the global 
rules.
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Not all theorists agree on the extent to which this is happening. Some, such 
as Strange (1995), characterise the state as a “defective” institution, suggesting that 
in the contemporary world, the ability of a state to make and enforce specific policies 
has been weakened. It is important to note that for Strange as well as others, this 
does not necessarily render states “obsolete” -  at least not yet. She acknowledges 
that “collectively they are still the most influential and therefore critical sources of 
authority in the world system.” (Strange 1995, 2). She contends, however, that as 
individual actors, states “are increasingly becoming hollow,” that, despite “outward 
appearances unchanged, the inner core of their authority in society and over 
economic transactions within their defined territorial borders is seriously impaired” 
(Strange 1995, 2). Camilleri and Falk concur, noting “the emergence of a complex 
yet relatively integrated world system which encompasses, and in part operates 
through the state system, but whose logic and modus operandi are no longer 
subordinate to the will or organizational priorities of sovereign jurisdictions” (1992, 
99).
Other theorists take a less compromising approach, suggesting that the state 
no longer has any real role to play. As Ohmae puts it, globalization has made the 
state “an unnatural, even dysfunctional, unit for organizing human activity and 
managing economic endeavour in a borderless world. It represents no genuine, 
shared community of economic interests; it defines no meaningful flows of economic 
activity” (1993, 78). From this perspective, the state is more than merely defective 
or hollow -  in the context of the new global economy, it is essentially worthless. In 
its place, Ohmae envisions a region state composed of areas that possess “in one or
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another combination, the essential ingredients for successful participation in the 
global economy” and differ from the traditional nation-state in that “they gladly 
sidestep the bunting and hoopla of sovereignty” in exchange for being able to 
effectively channel economic activities (Ohmae 1996, 81).
For these “weak-state/strong-globalization” theorists, institutions such as 
international organisations and other multi-lateral endeavours represent a diffusion of 
state authority, as power is increasingly spread out among other actors ranging from 
local governments to international organisations. Thus, Strange argues that state 
authority has “leaked away, upwards, sideways, and downwards. In some matters, it 
seems even to have gone nowhere, just evaporated” (Strange 1995, 1). Still, if 
globalization is a trend that is outside of state control, as these scholars argue, then 
this “formal or implicit transfer of authority” through this and other kinds of 
“institutional innovation” is one of states’ only options if they wish to retain any 
relevance at all.
As states seek to retain their relevance, many implement national economic 
policies that have international implications, which “strong state” theorists point to 
as a sign of state control. In response, “weak state” theorists such as Camilleri and 
Falk would suggest that “state intervention in the economy and various forms of 
mercantilism need not therefore be interpreted as expressions of national 
sovereignty. They are just as likely to reflect the dynamic of the world market and 
the interests and priorities of transnational organizations” (Camilleri and Falk, 1992: 
84). In other words, it cannot necessarily be assumed that states are acting 
independently of market and other forces in their domestic economic activities. For
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Strange, offshore industries in particular merely represent the inability of states to 
control their firms as opposed to serving any kind of state-motivated economic 
strategy (Strange, 1994).
1.2.2 “Strong State” Theorists
In contrast to these accounts, there are a number of scholars who see the 
process of economic globalization as reaffirming state authority rather diminishing it. 
Those who subscribe to this camp see the state as remaining strong in the face of 
globalization, either due to the functioning of state policies to resist globalization’s 
effects, or because these policies in fact enable the processes of globalization to 
occur in the first place. While it could be argued that despite creating the conditions 
in which globalization could thrive, states have since lost control, “strong state” 
theorists see the state as continuing to maintain its authority.
As with the “weak state” theorists, there is variation in how “strong state” 
theorists see the state functioning in relation to, and in some cases, engaging with, 
the forces of globalization. Those who argue that the state is able to act defensively 
against the undesired effects of globalization suggest that the state can insulate its 
economic polices and practices to such a degree that it can control the level of 
international economic integration to which they are subject, and therefore retain 
their status as sovereign entities. Hirst and Thompson, for example, suggest that 
“national governments can still compensate for the effects of internationalization and 
for the continued volatility of the financial markets, even if they cannot unilaterally 
control those effects or prevent that volatility” (1999, 220). In addition to 
compensating for the forces of globalization, states are able to “opt out” of global
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economic structures should they choose to; when they do not, it is “not out of 
weakness, but out of a conscious consideration of the tradeoffs” (Barkin 2001, 45- 
46). Thus regardless of whether state power may have weakened over the past 
century, the state itself “remains a pivotal institution” (Hirst and Thompson .1999, 
256).
There are also those who argue that globalization could not have occurred 
without the active participation of the state, in effect suggesting that states, to some 
extent, control the globalization process rather than the other way around. These 
theorists include Helleiner, who contends that through liberal national economic 
policies, the prevention of international financial crises, and the employment of 
relatively weak controls on financial movements, the state was in fact responsible for 
setting up an environment in which global economic integration was able to occur 
(Helleiner 1995). For Helleiner and others, such as Gilpin, “although economic 
globalization has been a factor in whatever diminishment of the state may have 
occurred, ideological, technological, and international political changes have had an 
even more powerful influence” (Gilpin 2001, 22). Even this acknowledgement of a 
possible decline in the role of the state, however, does not affect the extent to which 
Gilpin and others see it as maintaining its position as a central actor that affects how 
the international system develops. As Gilpin phrases it, “the functioning of the 
world economy is determined by both markets and the policies of nation-states. . 
.States set the rules” (Gilpin 2001, 24).
From this perspective, multilateral endeavours such as international 
institutions and organizations are not seen as interfering with state sovereignty. As
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Barkin explains, “this is because, in addition to creating policy constraints, 
multilateralization and globalization are also reinforcing the role of the sovereign 
state as the central actor in both domestic and international politics” (Barkin 2001, 
45). This position is augmented by evidence suggesting that international 
commitments do not cause states to behave any differently than they would without 
them (Downs et al 1996).
1.23  Finding a Middle Ground?
There is generally a clear division between those who see the processes of 
economic globalization as weakening the state and those who view these processes 
as reaffirming the centrality of the state in the international system. Those on either 
side of the divide are looking at the same set of economic processes -  increased 
internationalization of national economies through activities such as foreign direct 
investment, international trade, and the facilitation of the activities of multinational 
corporations -  but disagree on the state’s ability to control what is happening. 
Perhaps more importantly, at least for this study, these two perspectives are looking 
at relatively recent changes in state practice -  such as increased cooperation between 
states and individual states’ domestic economic policies -  and coming to 
significantly different conclusions about what these developments represent and their 
consequences for states, both now and in the future.
There is, however, a third category of theorists who seek a middle ground 
between the “strong state” and “weak state” accounts of the state-globalization 
debate, either by trying to reconcile the two positions or approaching the question 
from another perspective. Rather than see the state as “hollowing out” or withering
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away, these scholars instead argue that the state is being reinvented and
reimaginined, in effect redefining what it means to be a sovereign entity. Following
Barkin’s argument that “it is misleading to create a specific definition of sovereignty
and then speak of the institution getting stronger or weaker in a general sense,” they
“focus not on how [sovereignty’s] strength is changing, but how its meaning is
changing” (Barkin 2001, 46). To a large extent, this involves re-examining the
traditional idea of boundaries as they relate to sovereignty, and what it means for
states to be in control over what happens within them.
Hobson and Ramesh are among those who offer a way to reconcile the strong
state/weak state dichotomy presented earlier. In their view, the positions taken by
those engaged in the standard globalization debate is an oversimplification of the
complex relationship between states and the processes of globalization (Hobson and
Ramesh 2002, 7). Their solution is a position termed “structurationist,” borrowed
from Giddens (1984), which envisions a “spatially promiscuous state” (Hobson and
Ramesh 2002, 10). In their definition, the spatially promiscuous state
enables -  intentionally and unintentionally -  the convergence and integration 
of the global, regional, national and subnational realms. This is significant 
because it reveals that states and the global structure are not mutually 
antagonistic (as in the conventional debate), but are co-constitutive and in 
fact promote the reproduction of each other” (Hobson and Ramesh 2002, 10).
In other words, neither the state nor the global system is weaker due to the existence
of the other. In fact, just the opposite is true, which problematises traditional
accounts of sovereignty given the extent to which they emphasise conventional
notions of borders. By envisioning reciprocally productive relationships across these
various realms, Hobson and Ramesh provide a means of synthesizing the two
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perspectives presented earlier, thereby presenting an alternative way in which to 
frame the role of the state within the larger globalization debate.
Yet Hobson and Ramesh acknowledge that as they converge, these realms 
inevitably place “constraints” upon each other, potentially limiting what can be 
accomplished by a given actor or at a certainly policy level. In order to cope with 
these limitations, Hobson and Ramesh suggest that the state can employ both exit 
and adaptive strategies in order to minimize the effects of forces beyond its control, 
or to find a way to make them work to the state’s advantage. These strategies then 
enable the state to reform or otherwise alter the structure or operations of other 
realms. Practical examples of these kinds of strategies would include working 
through international agreements as well as the kinds of economic practices 
discussed earlier, such as enabling offshore industries.
Another way of phrasing this adaptive strategy is offered by Jessop, who 
proposes the idea of the emerging “competition state.”3 As he describes it, “the 
competition state prioritizes the pursuit of strategies intended to create, restructure or 
reinforce -  as far as it is economically and politically feasible to do so -  the 
competitive advantages of its territory, population, built environment, social 
institutions and economic agents.” (Jessop 2002, 96) Although he acknowledges 
“the challenges to the primacy of the national state,” he argues that “it still has key 
roles in organizing the global economy, the global polity and an emerging global 
civil society. In other words, the national state is being reimagined, redesigned and
3 The notion of the “competition state” was first developed by Cemy (1990), however Jessop’s use of 
the phrase differs.
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reoriented in response to these challenges rather than withering away” (Jessop 2002
9).
Palan (2003) employs a slightly different terminology. He argues that states
practice “sovereign bifurcation,” in which some areas are deliberately regulated.more
stringently than others, as a competitive strategy. Focusing on the rise of offshore
industries including tax haves, banking centres, and shipping, he contends,
the state is not disappearing or withering away; rather it is the nation-state -  a 
particular historical formation that emerged in the early nineteenth century -  
that is in decline. A different ideal-type form of state, more adept at handling 
globalization and even more capable of surviving the relative decline of the 
territorial principle is replacing it (Palan 2003, 182).
In other words, by engaging in practices such as the bifurcation of sovereignty, the
state remains a relevant actor capable of responding to and managing the forces of
globalization.
The theories presented by Hobson and Ramesh, Jessop, and Palan are 
examples of “alternative” approaches to the traditional state-globalization debate. 
These three perspectives, combined with the “weak state” and “strong state” 
arguments presented earlier, provide an overview of the current accounts of the 
state’s role in a globalized world. True “weak state” and “strong state” theorists 
envision a zero-sum conception of power between the forces of globalization and the 
state, while the others present fundamentally different ways to conceptualize the 
issue. Although each of these perspectives is helpful in terms of providing a 
framework from which to examine the role of the state, since this study involves the 
examination of state policy choices -  what is motivating them, how they are 
implemented, and what their implications have been -  as opposed to a broader
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question of the net weakening or strengthening of state power, the third set of 
approaches is more useful because it allows for a more nuanced account of state 
action in a globalized world.
1.3 Sovereignty and Shipping
In addition to its effects on the role of the state, globalization also has the 
potential to profoundly affect the nature of a state’s industries. Faced with increased 
international competition, firms frequently look to reduce costs (including those 
associated with regulatory requirements) by moving to wherever it is cheapest to 
produce. If industrialized states care to retain these industries, they in turn must 
make policy choices more favourable to such firms or find other ways of inducing 
them to stay. That state policies could potentially be dictated by business’ ability to 
go wherever production would be least costly is characteristic of the issues at the 
core of the debate over the changing role of the state in a globalized world. 
Ultimately the dispute is one about sovereignty -  have states’ decision-making 
abilities been subsumed by increasingly internationalized market forces or is the state 
still in control? Or, to approach the question differently, has there been a 
reconfiguration of state power and sovereignty amid the forces of globalization?
One industry which has been strongly affected by changes in the economic 
landscape but has not received much attention, empirically or otherwise, is that of 
international shipping. Global by both definition and practice, one look at the recent 
history of the shipping industry reveals a fiercely competitive sector in which the 
advantages conferred by being “located” in a particular state can make a significant 
difference in a firm’s economic survival. States, for their part, have been
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increasingly engaged in the creation of policies aimed at either attracting shipowners
whose vessels are currently registered with foreign flags or encouraging domestic
tonnage to stay. The apparent looseness of the connection between the state and its
ships makes shipping an ideal context in which to examine the relationship between
state sovereignty and globalization.
To explain further, ships are required by international law to have a national
identity, which is represented by the flag flown by the vessel and whose laws it is
subject to. This national identity is gained by registering the vessel in a particular
state.4 The “flag state,” in turn, has sovereign jurisdiction over that ship and all
others on its register, and is responsible for ensuring their compliance with the state’s
domestic and international laws (Ready 1998). This concept of a ship requiring a
nationality has existed for at least two-hundred years (DeSombre 2006), hut was first
codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, which states
Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for 
the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships 
have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There 
must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship; in particular, the 
State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, 
technical and social matters over ships flying its flag (Convention on the 
High Seas 1958, Article 5(1)).
The straightforward language of this law belies the ambiguity contained within this
concept of a “genuine link.” Attempts to set a more precise definition outlining the
legal connection between a ship and its flag state have failed (McConnell 1985).
One such attempt is contained in Article 10 of the United Nations Convention on
Conditions for Registration of Ships (1986), which establishes the idea of requiring
an economic link, stating that “the state of registration, before entering a ship in its
4 The requirements to register a vessel vary by state, as is discussed in Chapter 3.
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register of ships, shall ensure that the shipowning company . . .  is established and/or 
has its principal place of business within its territory”. The 1986 Convention has yet 
to receive enough ratifications to enter into force (United Nations Convention on 
Conditions for Registration of Ships 1986).
Key flag states that oppose further defining the concept of a genuine link in 
international law do so on the grounds it would interfere with states’ sovereign right 
to determine which entities they recognize as their own nationals (McConnell 1985). 
This argument reinforces the notion that, regardless of its register, “the vessel is not 
simply a rights bearer, it is also, in a significant way, a part of the state itself-it is 
effectively embraced by the flag-state as an extension to the sovereign domain” 
(Winchester and Bailey 2007, unpublished). This concept of a ship as a piece of a 
state’s sovereign territory, coupled with vessels’ inherent mobility, is a critical 
dimension of the discussion on shipping and sovereignty.
1.3.1 The Advent of Open Registers
The connection between a ship and its state of registry has evolved 
significantly over the past century. Until the 1920s, a vessel’s home state was 
usually the country in which the ship’s owner claimed citizenship, as the policies of 
embedded maritime states’5 ship registers invariably required that the owner of any 
vessel registered there be a national. Following World War I, however, two U.S. 
vessels transferred to the Panama register in order to serve alcohol on board, as this 
was banned by American Prohibition laws (Stopford 1997). This trend intensified 
after World War II, when American shipowners re-flagged their vessels in Panama
5 The term “embedded maritime states” refers to countries that have historically maintained a strong 
fleet of ships. This terminology is drawn from The Global Seafarer (ILO 2004).
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and Liberia in order to avoid the relatively high taxes associated with the U.S. 
register (Stopford 1997). A proliferation of open registers, which reduced or 
removed the requirements common to most national registers that there be an 
obvious connection (normally ownership) between the vessel and the state, followed. 
These open registers, or “flags of convenience”6 as they came to be known, have 
primarily attempted to attract owners through four kinds of incentives: lower labour 
costs, reduced taxes, decreased safety and environmental regulation, and freedom 
from intervention by state government (Ready 1998). In exchange for these benefits, 
which have the potential to significantly reduce a ship’s operating costs, the owner 
pays a registration fee to the state.
Stopford has defines an open register as one that has “been set up with the 
specific aim of offering shipowners a registration service, often as a means of 
earning revenue for the flag state” (1997, 434). Figure 1.1, below, shows the growth 
of selected open registers (as measured by gross tonnage) from 1948-2004.
6 The general phrase “flag of convenience” stems from the fact that open registers tend to attract 
shipowners who use them for convenience purposes, rather than because they have a particular 
connection to the flag state. However, proper usage of the term, “Flag of Convenience,” (FOC) refers 
to a label conferred on a flag state by the International Transport Federation, the international 
umbrella organisation for seafarers. The concept of a “genuine link,” as described previously, is a 
central component of the definition of an FOC, but states must also fulfill several other requirements -  
ranging from collective bargaining agreements for seafarers to previous safety history -  in order to 
avoid being labeled an FOC (ITF 1999b). FOCs can also be established by the ITF at the request of a 
state’s national seafarers’ unions or on a ship-by-ship basis (ITF 1999b).
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The open registry system has had a profound impact on the nature of 
international shipping. Just over half of the world fleet, as measured by tonnage, was 
registered with FOCs as of 1998 (ITF 1999a). While there is a history of vessels 
registering in states other than that of the owner’s origin, the motivation behind 
today’s vessel movements tends to be based on economic interest, as opposed to 
moving for political or military reasons as was previously the case (Alderton and 
Winchester 2002). For those states operating open registers, this system has proved 
relatively profitable. Panama, one of the first open registers, benefited from 
registration and tonnage fees, which accounted for 5% of the country’s revenue for 
1995 (Palan 2003, 53). As more states have turned to open registers as a source of 
revenue, competition for vessels has become more intense, forcing states to adjust 
their taxation and regulatory policies accordingly. It is this continuing trend that has 
led Carlisle (1981) to suggest that these open registers have essentially allowed their 
sovereignty to be auctioned off at whatever price shipowners are willing to pay.
1.3.2 Secondary Registers and the Competition State
Over the past half-century, the national registers of embedded maritime states 
have watched the size of their fleets decline as their vessels relocate to places where 
it is cheaper to operate in order to remain viable in the face of international economic 
competition. Indeed, as of 1997, 55% of the tonnage owned in traditional maritime 
countries was operating out of flag of convenience registers, used most frequently by 
shipowners in the United States, United Kingdom, Greece, and Japan (Follow the 
Flag of Convenience 1997).
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In an effort to fight this phenomenon of “flagging out” while still enabling their 
shipping companies to be economically competitive, embedded maritime states have 
adopted a number of legislative measures ranging from tax incentives for shipowners 
and financial assistance in the form of government subsidies to relaxing nationality 
requirements for crews and allowing bareboat chartering, a practice by which a ship
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is leased out for a specific period of time during which it is permitted to fly a 
different flag (Ready 1998).
Perhaps the most radical response traditional maritime states have had to, 
open registers, however, has been to develop secondary7 ship registers that exist 
alongside the established primary register. In general, the purpose of these registers 
is to reduce the regulatory requirements and costs associated with the national 
register, thereby offering “many of the advantages of flags of convenience, but 
nonetheless retaining a link between beneficial ownership or management and the 
national flag” (Ready 1998, 29). The aim is to “is to minimize the loss of tonnage 
from a flag by effectively encouraging a shipowner to remain under the auspices of 
that State while benefiting from a number of enticements” (ILO 2004, 31-32). These 
“secondary” registers are frequently referred to as second or international registers. 
While a precise distinction between the two terms does not exist, second registers 
tend to be physically located on a state’s offshore territory while international 
registers operate within the boundaries of the state. A list of secondary registers 
along with their parent states appears in Table 1.1. Some of these registers, such as 
TAFF and DIS, can be considered “designer” (Ready 1998) registers in that they 
were specifically created by states in the 1980s and 1990s in order to address the 
number of vessels flagging out. Others, including the UK’s secondary registers, 
have existed for far longer but were restructured in this period in order to meet the
7 These registers are generally referred to as “second” and/or “international.” This terminology can be 
confusing, however, as there is no established or consistent distinction made between these two terms. 
Therefore, the term that has been selected for use in this study to refer collectively to registers of this 
type is “secondary.” This label is not meant to suggest that these registers are inferior to national or 
open ones; rather, it implies that they have derived to some extent as a result of the structure of their 
parent state, and that they exist alongside and in addition to their national counterparts.
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requirements of international maritime conventions. A full account of these registers
and their development is given in Chapter 2.
Table 1.1: Established Secondary Registers
Parent State Secondary Registers
Brazil Registro Especial Brasileiro
China Hong Kong
Macao
Denmark DIS
Faeroe Islands
Faeroe Islands (FAS)
Finland Aland Islands
France French Antarctic Territory (TAFF)
Wallis and Futuna Islands
Germany GIS
Italy Second register
Netherlands Netherlands Antilles
New Zealand Cook Islands
Norway NIS
Portugal Madeira (MAR)
Spain Canary Islands (CSR)
Turkey International register
United Kingdom Anguilla
Bermuda
British Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands
Channel Islands
Falkland Islands
Gibraltar
Isle of Man
Turks and Caicos
*As at December 2004. Source: Lloyd's Register Fairplay Ltd 2005. 
Source: ILO 2004.
These secondary registers are an important feature of today’s maritime 
industry, but they have not yet been addressed in any significant way. Using the 
framework of the state-globalization debate presented previously, the secondary 
register phenomenon can be understood in several ways. “Weak state” theorists
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would argue that these registers represent a challenge to state autonomy by forcing 
governments to engage in a regulatory “race to the bottom” as they lower their 
standards in order to attract and retain vessels, as they are competing with open, 
registers to maintain a strong fleet. At the same time, the very existence of these 
registers -  along with tax havens, Export Processing Zones, and other offshore 
industries that are at least tacitly accepted by industrialized states -  demonstrate that 
shipowners represent the kind of “footloose” firms that are able to evade national 
regulation and therefore remain beyond their home state’s oversight.
“Strong state” theorists, on the other hand, would charge that far from 
undermining state sovereignty, second and international registers instead serve to 
reaffirm it. In establishing a secondary register, traditional maritime states 
demonstrate that they can effectively utilize their authority to relax the state’s 
existing rules and regulations in a way that is recognized and permitted by both the 
citizens of that state and other actors in the international system. Furthermore, these 
theorists could contend, it was the policies and actions of these states that enabled 
open registers to become successful in the first place.
Those advocating the third approach would argue that secondary registers 
represent a reconfiguration of state sovereignty. Hobson and Ramesh might suggest 
that these registers represent an adaptive strategy, designed to minimize the effects of 
open registers on the national fleet. Jessop would claim that the creation of a 
secondary register is an attempt by the state to maintain its competitive advantage in 
the shipping industry. For Palan, these registers, particularly if located in an offshore
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jurisdiction, could be a clear bifurcation of state sovereignty. In any event, in the 
creation of these registers, the authority of the state is maintained, if reconstituted.
Most of the existing research on international shipping focuses on open, 
registers and their implications both for embedded maritime states and the shipping 
industry as a whole. Recent research, for example, has demonstrated that open 
registers are specializing in their acceptance of and adherence to international 
environmental, labour, and safety standards depending on the amount of tonnage 
they are trying to attract (DeSombre 2002). This echoes other studies of the 
regulatory environment of various flag of convenience registers that note great 
variation in the type and extent of regulation that occurs within the group of states 
categorized as FOCs (see, for example, Alderton and Winchester 2002). Noting that 
the main regulatory differences lie between recently created open registers and more 
established ones, Alderton and Winchester conclude that “these new entrants 
exercise sovereignty only to negate it,” as they engage in a race to the bottom, 
hampering regulatory efforts by other maritime nations (Alderton and Winchester 
2002c).
Previous research focusing on globalization and state sovereignty within the 
context of international shipping is even more limited. Notable exceptions include 
DeSombre’s Flagging Standards (2006), which examines regulatory standards on 
open registers and the effects non-state actors have on the international shipping 
industry. Winchester and Bailey (mimeo, 2007) examine interactions between states 
arising from maritime trade. They suggest that “what appears to be the arbitrary 
resolution of inter-state conflict is upon analysis underpinned by the concepts of
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state, sovereignty, and territory” concluding that “the traditional account of 
sovereignty still possesses extensive explanatory value even under conditions of 
extensive globalization” (Winchester and Bailey mimeo, 2007).
1.3.3 Conclusions
This chapter has, by grouping and evaluating different accounts of state 
authority in a globalized world, provided a framework through which to approach 
specific questions about the international shipping industry. Accounts of the state- 
globalization debate can be grouped into three categories: “weak state” theorists who 
see globalization as subsuming state sovereignty, “strong state” theorists who argue 
that state authority is maintained or reaffirmed, and a third approach, which 
perceives state sovereignty as being reconfigured in various ways. It is this third 
approach, with its ability to provide for subtle analysis, which is employed in this 
thesis.
Beyond the sovereignty debate, there are unanswered questions regarding 
secondary registers that this study hopes to address. While there is a dearth of 
research on the international shipping industry and ship registers generally, there is a 
particular lack of information about embedded maritime states’ secondary registers. 
What characteristics of a second or international register have made it sufficiently 
attractive for shipowners to register there? Are they, like open registers, filling a 
particular niche in the market for vessels? In providing a separate -  and lower -  set 
of standards on the secondary register than the national one, are traditional maritime 
states that have secondary registers contributing to a global “regulatory race to the 
bottom,” or are they providing their vessels with the opportunity to remain
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economically competitive while maintaining higher standards than they would be 
held to on many flags of convenience? An exploration of the creation and 
functioning of second and international registers, as outlined in Chapter Two, will 
provide not only a more comprehensive picture of international shipping, but also 
inform the state-globalization debate.
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CHAPTER TWO 
An Introduction to Secondary Registers
2.1 Introduction
For the competitive state, second and international registers have the potential 
to be an important economic and political tool. By offering an alternative to the 
crewing, regulatory, or tax requirements associated with the primary national 
register, the state has a means by which to tiy to compete in an economically 
unforgiving sector without sacrificing protectionist economic policies or 
international commitments. The motivation behind the creation of the first 
secondary registers, TAFF and NIS, was to stem the flow of ships moving from the 
national register to flags that had more flexible, and therefore less costly, crewing 
arrangements (Ready 1998). Therefore, France and Norway structured their 
secondary registers to allow a greater percentage of seafarers to be foreign citizens 
than was permitted on their respective national registers.
Indeed, most secondary registers rely on relaxed rules regarding the 
nationality of crew members to attract shipowners. However, there is considerable 
variation in the extent to which these crewing requirements are loosened. For 
example, TAFF originally stipulated that one-quarter of the crew had to consist of 
French nationals. NIS, on the other hand, required only that the shipmaster be 
Norwegian. Other sources of variation in secondary registers include whether the 
register is based in the mainland boundaries of the state or on an offshore territory,
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or, indeed, whether the register is set up by the state or an autonomous government 
within the territory itself.
Despite these differences, limited efforts have been made to classify 
secondary registers beyond separating them from “national” and “open” register 
types. Winchester and Alderton (2003) include most secondary registers in their 
Flag State Audit, evaluating the regulatory capacity of thirty-seven flag states, but, as 
mentioned previously, reproducing their methods for the missing states would be too 
time-consuming. Ready (1998) outlines the development of the different secondary 
registers and lists different and lists registration requirements and provisions for 
some, but does not attempt to classify them. Bemfeld (2004) divides secondary 
registers into “international registers,” “second registers,” and “effective second 
registers” based on the process by which international laws are applied and 
beneficial ownership statistics, but the study’s methodology is weak and excessive 
attention is paid to the actions taken by parent states, at the expense of 
acknowledging actions taken by autonomous territories that oversee their own flags.
Given the important differences in characteristics among secondary registers 
and the dearth of previous research on this register type generally, it is both 
necessary and useful to provide background information and establish a system of 
classification that can be employed in later analyses. To this end, this chapter 
provides an introduction to the history, structure, and characteristics of the cases 
examined in this study, and attempts to highlight systematically key sources of 
variation within the registers. These sources include: the body responsible for 
overseeing the administration of the register, the location in which the register is
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based, the level of openness of the register in terms of which nationalities are 
permitted to register vessels there, any crewing restrictions regarding nationality 
requirements for seafarers on a register’s vessels, and the nature of the a secondary 
register’s relationship to its national counterpart.
• Administration: A secondary register can be administrated by the 
parent state, by the government of the offshore territory on which it is 
located, or by a private company.
• Location: Secondary registers can be based on a state’s offshore 
territory or within the boundaries of the mainland state itself.
• Openness: Registers can limit registration to vessels owned by 
individuals of or companies incorporated in the flag state, or a 
specified group of states, such as the EU. If a vessel is jointly owned, 
then majority ownership is determined by a particular number of 
shares in a vessel, which is commonly set at 31 out of a vessel’s 64 
shares. If a flag state allows registration only to vessels owned by its 
citizens, then it is considered to be “closed.” Where there are some 
citizenship requirements, such as majority ownership of a vessel by 
citizens of the state or the EU, then the register is considered “partly 
open.” Registers that allow owners of all nationalities are “open.”
• Crewing Restrictions: The crewing restrictions on individual registers 
range from requiring that all seafarers on a vessel be citizens of the 
flag state to permitting seafarers of any nationality. For the purposes 
of this study, a register is classed as having “few” crewing restrictions
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if the nationalities of only several seafarers are specified (i.e. the 
shipmaster and first mate) and “some” if these restrictions are more 
extensive.
• Relationship to the National Register: A secondary register can either 
supplement a national register or be in competition with it for vessels.
• Other: This section also includes information for each register on 
what it was created, what types of vessels it allows, and other details 
such as whether it was created in conjunction with any other 
economic initiatives and how it has performed since its creation. 
Such information is noted, but not classified.
2.2 Denmark -  DIS
The Denmark International Ship Register (DIS) is run from Copenhagen by the 
Danish Maritime Authority (DMA), which also oversees Denmark’s national 
register. DIS was created in 1988 by the Danish Parliament, and is governed by the 
Danish Merchant Shipping (Masters’ and Seamen’s) Consolidation Act (Winchester 
and Alderton 2003). Vessels under 20GT, fishing vessels, and pleasure yachts are 
not permitted (DMA [no date]c). DIS allows vessel registration by citizens and 
companies of Denmark and any EU member state, although foreign owners must 
have a legal representative physically based in Denmark (DMA [no datejc). Ships 
registered on DIS are obligated to uphold all Danish national laws and international 
obligations (DMA [no dateja). DIS requirements previously stated that the 
shipmaster was to be a Danish citizen, but this requirement was removed in 2004 
(Draper 2004).
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Figure 2.1: Gross Tonnage of Denmark National and DIS Registers
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Source: Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay Ltd. 1981-2005.
The DIS register’s mandate, according to the Danish Maritime Authority ([no 
dateja), is to serve “as a supplement to die ordinary Danish Register of Shipping to 
improve the international competitiveness of the Danish merchant fleet”. Data on 
the size of the two registers (see Figure 2.1) supports this, as it appears that the 
majority of early tonnage on DIS transferred from the Danish national register. 
Thus, DIS was designed to be an extension of the Danish national register catering to 
internationally trading vessels. One of the major advantages of DIS is that the 
salaries of seafarers on its vessels are not taxed, which is enough of a savings benefit 
that shipowners can afford to employ a combination of Danish nationals and foreign 
seafarers and still remain competitive (Joshi 1998). Although DIS has not been 
branded a Flag of Convenience by the ITF (ITF [no date]), the Danish Shipowners’ 
Association has engaged in negotiations with national Danish unions regarding the 
terms of employment for foreign seafarers. As a result of these discussions, in
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March 2000 the standard work week for Danish crews was reduced from 44 to 40 
hours and the duration of a single voyage was limited to a six-month maximum 
(McMichael 1998).
2.3 France -  TAFF Register8
France’s secondary register, the French Austral and Antarctic Territories 
(Terres Australes et Antartiques Francoises -  TAFF), also known as the Kerguelen 
Islands register, was established by decree of the French government in 1986 (Ready 
1998). The TAFF register was administrated by a division of the French department 
of state, Direction du Transport Maritime, des Ports et du Littoral, and based in 
Paris (Winchester and Alderton 2003).9 Although only solid and liquid bulk carriers 
were initially allowed on TAFF (Ready 1998), the register was opened to all 
internationally trading vessels in 1993 (Winchester and Alderton 2003). TAFF 
ownership requirements stipulated that 50% of a vessel’s shares be held by French or 
EU nationals, and all vessels were required to be managed by a French company 
(Winchester and Alderton 2003). The majority of international laws ratified by 
France applied to TAFF; while this included the main IMO and ILO conventions, 
approximately half of the ILO conventions ratified by France were not extended to 
TAFF (Hamon and Dubois 1999). Crewing requirements stipulated that 25-35% of 
the crew must be French citizens, which includes either two or four officers, 
depending on the type of vessel (Spurrier 2000).
8 Since the French International Register (RIF) replaced TAFF in 2005, all information here is based 
on TAFF’s registration requirements as of 2004, unless otherwise stated.
9 The Kerguelen Islands, part of France’s territorial claim to Antarctica, are mostly uninhabited.
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Figure 2.2: Gross Tonnage of France National and TAFF Registers
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Source: Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay Ltd. 1981-2005.
The TAFF register was created as a response to French shipowners’ desire to 
reduce their operating expenses, particularly given the relatively high cost of 
employing French seafarers (Ready 1998). From its inception, TAFF was the 
subject of much debate by French union and industry officials over this and other 
issues. For example, the fact that the register, designed explicitly to allow French 
owners to crew their vessels with foreign seafarers, was created by government 
decree formed the basis of an official complaint by a seafarers’ union. This 
ultimately resulted in France’s Council of State forcing the French government to 
legitimise the register through legislation (Kerguelen Move Annulled 1995). 
Additionally, the TAFF register was not recognised by the EU, which meant that 
vessels on the register did not have access to EU cabotage.10 Although the TAFF
10 Cabotage trade is the right to trade between two ports within the same country or, in the case of the 
EU, economic area. It is likely that the EU failed to recognise the TAFF register because it 
represented a furthering of France’s territorial claim in Antarctica. According to the 1959 Antarctic
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register was never branded an FOC, the French International Register (Registre 
International Franqais -  RIF), which replaced TAFF in 2006, received this 
designation by the ITF in 2005 (Spurrier 2005). RIF has more flexible crewing 
requirements than were available on TAFF, requiring that only the shipmaster and 
one other officer be French citizens, although 25% of the crew must be nationals of 
EU countries (RIF [no date]a). All internationally trading vessels, with the exception 
of some passenger ships, are allowed to register in RIF, and are subject to all French 
domestic laws and international obligations. RIF vessels have access to EU cabotage 
(RIF [no datejb).
2.4 Germany -  GIS
The German International Shipping Register (GIS), which is also known as 
the International Ship Register (ISR), was established in 1989 and is run from 
Hamburg by the German Federal Shipping Authority (Winchester and Alderton 
2003). Only German-owned vessels are permitted to register on GIS; ships on the 
German national register can be listed additionally on GIS if they trade 
internationally (Ready 1998). While GIS vessels are subject to the same domestic 
and international regulations as those on the German national register (Winchester 
and Alderton 2003), there are major differences in the crewing requirements of the 
two registers. GIS vessels over 8,000 GT must employ a minimum of five German 
seafarers, although wages for foreign crew members are determined by collective 
bargaining agreements between shipowners and the crews’ national unions (Fromme
Treaty, which freezes all member states’ territorial claims to the continent, the only acceptable use of 
the land is for scientific or research purposes (Antarctic Treaty 1959). France has ratified this treaty, 
and using the Kerguelen Islands as the location of its register is therefore considered a violation of the 
agreement.
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1991). These wages rates are generally significantly cheaper than those of German 
seafarers, and offer a significant cost savings to shipowners over the German 
national register, where all crew members receive German rates of pay and full 
benefits, regardless of nationality (Edelgard 1993). GIS has been designated a Flag 
of Convenience (ITF [no date].
Figure 2.3: Gross Tonnange of German Register (Including GIS)
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The GIS register was created order to attract German shipowners who might 
otherwise flag out to open registers, and as Figure 2.3 shows, the establishment of 
the register in 1989 did reverse the decline in the German fleet.11 Further fluctuations 
in the size of the register coincide with government subsidies to the shipping 
industry, which were introduced in 1998 (Fromme 2002) and again in 2003 
(Berkenkopf 2003). Indeed, in the latter year, the subsidies were negotiated by 
German shipowners, who promised to re-flag their vessels on GIS (Luttmer 2005).
11 Tonnage figures for the German national register and GIS are not listed separately.
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Germany
2.5 Netherlands -  Netherlands Antilles
The Netherlands Antilles register is run by the Directorate of Shipping and 
Maritime Affairs (Directie Scheepvaart en Maritieme Zaken -  DSMZ), the maritime 
administration of the Netherlands Antilles government, in Cura9ao (DSMZ [no 
date]d). Vessels registered in the Netherlands Antilles “have the Netherlands 
Antillean nationality but fly the flag of the Kingdom of the Netherlands” (DSMZ [no 
date]c). The Netherlands Antilles has had some oversight of its vessels since the 
1950s (DSMZ [no dateja), and the register is part of the islands’ broader “portfolio” 
of economic offshore activities (Winchester and Alderton 2003, 333). It was only in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, that significant organisational and 
legislative changes were made to the Netherlands Antilles register that would make it 
more attractive to foreign shipowners (Gray 1993). To register a vessel in the 
Netherlands Antilles, a shipowner must be a citizen of or company based in the 
Netherlands Antilles or an EU state, or utilize a local trust company (Winchester and 
Alderton 2003). The Netherlands Antilles register has no nationality requirements 
for crews on its vessels; although the shipmaster is supposed to be Dutch, foreign 
seafarers are permitted to hold this position (Winchester and Alderton 2003).
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Figure 2.4: Gross Tonnage of Netherlands National and
Netherlands Antilles Registers
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Source: Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay Ltd. 1981-2005.
One stated objective of the Netherlands Antilles Directorate of Shipping and 
Maritime Affairs is “to have a quality shipping register. . .with an increasing number 
of ships” (DSMZ [no datejb). The Netherlands Antilles register is in direct 
competition for vessels with the Netherlands national register, and the nearly parallel 
trends in the size of the two registers (see Figure 2.4) reflect this fact. Lower taxes 
and more flexible crewing requirements than the Dutch national register made the 
Netherlands Antilles attractive to shipowners in the early 1990s (Henley 1991) and 
the introduction of a bareboat charter legislation and expanded registry staff in the 
mid-1990s were designed to continue to attract owners (McLaughlin 1995). 
However, the introduction of a tonnage tax regime in the Netherlands in 2000 caused 
many shipowners to re-flag from the Netherlands Antilles to the Dutch national 
register, which threatened the sustainability of the former, nearly forcing it to close
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(Adriaens 2000). The Netherlands Antilles register has been designated a Flag of 
Convenience (ITF [no date]).
2.6 Norway -  NIS
The Norwegian International Ship Register (NIS) was created in 1987 
through the NIS Act (Skipsregistrene 2005). NIS is based in Bergen and is run by 
the Norwegian Maritime Directorate alongside the national register (Winchester and 
Alderton 2003). Self-propelled passenger and cargo ships, hovercraft, drilling 
platforms and other movable installations can all be registered on NIS 
(Skipsregistrene 2005). The sole ownership requirement is that non-Norwegian 
owners must appoint a Norwegian representative and engage the services of a 
company based in Norway to oversee some aspect of vessel operation, such as 
manning, maintenance, or marketing (Skipsregistrene 2005). All domestic laws and 
international obligations that apply to the Norwegian national register also apply to 
NIS (Skipsregistrene 2005). Ratings on NIS vessels must be citizens of countries 
that are members of the IMO, while officers must be nationals of states on the IMO 
White List (Skipsregistrene 2005).12
12 States on the IMO White List are deemed to be fully compliant with the provisions of the 1995 
amendments to the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping (STCW), which sets international standards for seafarer training (IMO 2002).
Figure 2.5: Gross Tonnage of Norway National and NIS Registers
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The primary factor in shipowners leaving the Norwegian national register in 
the 1980s (see Figure 2.5) was the flag’s relatively costly crewing restrictions (Ready 
1998). NIS was designed both to compensate for national flag’s crewing 
requirements and to attract maritime-related business to Norway, hence the 
requirement that foreign owners utilize a Norwegian corporation to operate their 
vessels (Ready 1998). In the wake of NIS’ declining tonnage from 2002-2004, the 
Norwegian government issued a white paper recommending that the tonnage tax 
system be revised and that NIS vessels be granted access to Norwegian cabotage 
(Speares 2004), although it is unclear whether these measures were ever 
implemented. NIS has not been branded a Flag of Convenience, although the ITF 
and its national Norwegian affiliates threatened to designate it as such as part of a 
broader campaign against secondary registers in the mid-1990s (Guest 1995).
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2.7 Portugal -  MAR
Created in 1989 by Portuguese government decree No. 96/89, the 
International Ship Register of Madeira (MAR) is based in Funchal, Madeira, an 
autonomous region of Portugal (Winchester and Alderton 2003). MAR is 
administered by the Sociedade de Desenvolvimento da Madeira, a company selected 
by Madeira’s Regional Government to oversee the island’s international business 
activities, although it is ultimately controlled by the Portuguese Ministries of 
Department and the Sea (International Business Centre of Madeira 2006). There are 
no nationality restrictions on ownership of MAR vessels, although a local 
representative must be appointed if the vessel’s shipping company is not based on 
the island (International Business Centre of Madeira 2006). Madeira is 
automatically subject to all international conventions ratified by Portugal 
(Winchester and Alderton 2003). Registration requirements state that fifty-percent 
of the crew, including the shipmaster, must be citizens of European or Portuguese­
speaking states (including Russia and Ukraine), although it is noted that this 
requirement can be removed “whenever it is duly justified” (International Business 
Centre of Madeira 2006, 14).
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Figure 2.6: Gross Tonnage of Portugal National and MAR Registers
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Although MAR is directly overseen by the Regional Government of Madeira, 
Portugal exerts a “strong influence” on any actions taken with regard to the register 
(Winchester and Alderton 2003, 282). MAR was established as one component of 
Madeira’s International Business Centre, as the island was already set up as a Free
I
Trade Zone. The register’s initial mandate was to help compensate for the number 
of Portuguese shipowners flagging out to open registers, further develop Portugal’s 
maritime industry, and drive economic growth (Decree 96/89 1989). As Figure 2.6 
shows, MAR did not experience significant growth in its first years of operation, and 
the register was initially deemed “a disaster” (Poole 1992). However, ongoing 
changes to the register, including opening it to Portuguese and EU cabotage in 1997 
(Fromme 1998), and a gradual relaxing of crews’ nationality requirements in 1993 
and again in 2005 (Changes 2005) helped reverse this trend.
13 The other components, implemented in 1988, are a free trade zone, offshore finance centre, and 
other international business services (Murphy 1995).
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2.8 Spain -  Canary Islands
The Canary Islands Special Register of Ships (CSR) was established in 1992 
by the Law on Ports and Merchant Marine Act (Act 27/92) (General Directorate of 
the Merchant Marine 2007). CSR is based in the ports of Santa Cruz de Tenerife and 
Las Palmas de Gran Canaria on the Canary Islands, and is part of the Canary Islands’ 
free trade zone, although the register is run by the Spanish government’s Ministry of 
Development (General Directorate of the Merchant Marine 2007). Vessels must be 
over 100GT in order to be eligible to register on CSR, and foreign ownership of 
vessels is permitted provided a representative is permanently based in the Canary 
Islands (General Directorate of the Merchant Marine 2007). All international 
conventions ratified by Spain are also applicable to CSR (Winchester and Alderton 
2003). Nationality restrictions on CSR vessels stipulate that the shipmaster and first 
officer must be Spanish, and that at least 50% of the rest of the crew must be Spanish 
or citizens of EU states (General Directorate of the Merchant Marine 2007). 
Previously, exceptions to the latter condition were permitted if a shipowner’s 
“economic viability” was threatened (Winchester and Alderton 2003, 95); it is
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unclear whether this is still allowed.
Figure 2.7: Gross Tonnage of Spanish and CSR Registers
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CSR was created not only to reverse the mass flagging-out that was occurring 
on the Spanish national register, but also to draw foreign vessels from other states 
(Tinsley 1992). Although a Canary Islands secondary register was not a sudden 
development -  the Spanish shipowners’ association, Asociation de Naveiros 
Espanoles, lobbied unsuccessfully, for the creation of an additional register in 1986 
(Figaredo 1993) -  CSR’s growth was slow (see Figure 2.7), and by 1994 the register 
listed only five vessels (Tavner 1994). This lack of interest from shipowners may 
have been due in part the register’s crewing costs; in 1996, it was found that 
maintaining a vessel on CSR, taking full advantage the opportunity to have a 50% 
non-EU crew, was less cost-effective than employing a fully Spanish crew on a 
foreign flag (Second Register Aiming to Be More Competitive 1996). By the late 
1990s, however, concessions in the form of reduced tax and social security payments
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(Fromme 1997b), and the opening of CSR to Spanish cabotage (Register Hopes 
Unfulfilled 1995) helped to attract greater numbers of vessels. CSR has been 
designated an ITF Flag of Convenience, but it was removed from the list in 2002 
(ITF [no date]).
2.9 United Kingdom -  Category 1 Red Ensign Registers
The registers of the United Kingdom and its overseas territories and crown 
dependencies are, collectively, known as the Red Ensign Group. Included in this 
group are the registers of Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Guernsey, St. Helena, Isle of Man, Jersey, 
Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos (Red Ensign Group 2005). While these registers 
generally operate autonomously from the UK (although the extent to which this is 
the case varies by register), they cannot be administered in such a way that 
contravenes UK law and their vessels are considered to be British ships and fly the 
Red Ensign flag, or a variation thereof (Red Ensign Group 2005). This connection to 
the British register has distinct advantages, including access to a well-developed 
maritime legal system, technical support from the UK’s Maritime and Coastguard 
Agency, and protection from the British navy in times of crisis (Blaxill 1991).
The UK’s 1988 Merchant Shipping Act (which was later incorporated into 
the 1995 Merchant Shipping Act) divides these secondary registers into two groups, 
Category 1 and Category 2, based on the tonnage, size, and vessel types that can be 
registered (Merchant Shipping Act 1988). There are no limits on the tonnage, type, 
or length of vessels on the Category 1 registers, which are Bermuda, Cayman 
Islands, Gibraltar, and Isle of Man (Red Ensign Group 2005). In addition, a
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Category 1 designation requires adoption and implementation of specific IMO 
Conventions, including LOADLINE, SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW, and TONNAGE, 
as well as ILO Convention 147 on Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) 
(Winchester and Alderton 2003). Category 1 and Category 2 Red Ensign states meet 
yearly to review any policy changes (Red Ensign Group 2005).
2.9.1 UK — Bermuda
Although the Bermuda register has been in existence since 1789 as a British 
Register of Ships it was not until 1974 that it took on its present form (Government 
of Bermuda 2007b). The Bermuda register is based in Hamilton, Bermuda, and is 
administered by the Department of Maritime Administration, which is an 
independent division of the island’s Ministry of Transport (Government of Bermuda 
2007a). Ownership requirements stipulate that a vessel must be at least half-owned 
by British or Irish nationals, or companies incorporated in the UK or any of its 
overseas territories. Crewing restrictions state that masters on strategic ships 
(including passenger ships, product tankers, and ro-ro vessels) must be nationals of 
the UK or its dependencies, Ireland, an EU or NATO state, or Norway; there are no 
nationality requirements for junior officers or ratings (Winchester and Alderton 
2003).
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Figure 2.8: Gross Tonnage of United Kingdom National and
Bermuda Registers
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The increase in Bermuda’s tonnage in the late 1980s (see Figure 2.8) 
coincides with its being granted Red Ensign Category 1 status (Ormes 1991). 
Officials on the Bermuda register, however, argued that the UK’s requirement that 
the shipmaster and first mate be British citizens, a condition which also applied to 
the Bermuda register, discouraged shipowners, which could explain the slow growth 
(Ormes 1991). It is less clear what caused the register’s tonnage decline in the early 
1990s and subsequent gains a decade later. More recent growth can be attributed to 
“high value” vessels like liquefied natural gas carriers and passenger ships (Register 
Attracts 13 Newbuildings as Tonnage Leaps lm Tons in a Year 2006). The Bermuda 
register has been designated by the ITF as a flag of convenience (ITF [no date]).
2.9.2 Cayman Islands
The Cayman Islands ship register has been in existence since 1906, but it was 
not granted Red Ensign Category 1 status until 1991. The register is based in
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Georgetown, Grand Cayman and owned by the Maritime Authority of the Cayman 
Islands, but operated by the private company Genesis Trust Company Marine 
Department (Winchester and Alderton 2003). Vessels on the Cayman Islands 
register must be at least 50% owned by nationals or corporations of the UK, EU, or 
overseas territories; corporations are additionally required to maintain a “place of 
business” in one of these states. There are no nationality requirements for crews 
(Cayman Islands Shipping Registry [no date].
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Despite the Cayman Islands’ long history as a register, it was not until the 
islands adopted the UK’s 1998 Merchant Shipping Act that it was able to manage its 
vessels according to the standards of the UK and international maritime law (Blaxill 
1991). Gaining Red Ensign Category 1 status in 1991 does not appear to have 
attracted a significant amount of tonnage (see Figure 2.9); indeed, this may have 
initially had a deleterious effect as the register removed a number of ships from its 
flag for “persistent non-compliance” with safety and labour standards (Landells
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1991). The register began actively marketing itself in 1994, and originally focused 
on attracting European shipowners, including vessels owned by Norway or managed 
in the UK (Gray 1997). Cayman Islands are listed as Flag of Convenience (ITF [no 
date]).
2.9.3 Gibraltar
The Gibraltar ship register is run by the Gibraltar Maritime Administration, 
under Gibraltar’s Ministry of Maritime Affairs (Gibraltar Maritime Administration 
2007). All vessels except nuclear-powered ships and fishing vessels are allowed on 
the register (Fromme 1996a). Ownership of vessels on the Gibraltar register is 
permitted by British, Irish, and EU nationals, and companies of EU states that either 
have a place of business in Gibraltar or appoint a local representative (Gibraltar 
Maritime Administration 2007). There are no nationality requirements for seafarers 
serving on Gibraltar vessels (Gibraltar Maritime Administration 2007).
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Like the Cayman Islands, the Gibraltar register also decreased in size after 
international maritime conventions were extended to the island from the UK in 1988 
(see Figure 2.10); many vessels willingly left the register to escape the new 
restrictions, while others were expelled for not complying with regulations or tax 
payments (Truscott 1991). Following disputes with UK maritime administrators, 
Gibraltar voluntarily relinquished its status as Red Ensign register under the 1988 
Merchant Shipping Act in 1992, which limited the vessels that could join the register 
to ships under 150 GT, including yachts (Fromme 1997a). The register was re­
introduced in 1996, with Category 1 status, following a lengthy negotiation process 
with the UK regarding vessel surveys (Fromme 1996a). Gibraltar is unique among 
the UK’s secondary registers in that it is part of the EU, allowing its vessels access to 
EU cabotage, which, coupled with the island’s fiscal advantages, makes it 
particularly attractive to shipowners (Special Report -  Gibraltar: Buoyant Shipping 
Register Boosts Trade 2000). The ITF lists Gibraltar as a Flag of Convenience (ITF 
[no date]).
2.9.4 Isle of Man
The Isle of Man ship register is run by the Manx Marine Administration14, a 
division of the island government’s Department of Trade and Industry. The register, 
which is based in Douglas, took on its present form in 1984 (Isle of Man Ship 
Registry 2007e). It is open to all vessel types except passenger ships (Isle of Man 
Ship Registry 2007b). The majority of a vessel’s ownership must be comprised of 
individuals citizens or companies of the UK, EU, or EEA states; or a limited 
partnership based in a prescribed state, including Australia, Bahamas, Canada,
14 The Marine Administration changed its name to the “Isle of Man Ship Registry” in February 2007.
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China, India, Japan, Liberia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Russia, Singapore, 
South Africa, United Arab Emirates, or the United States (Isle of Man Ship Registry 
2007d). Any company that has its primary place of business in the Isle of Man is 
also permitted; and all vessels must be controlled or managed by an Isle of Man 
company (Isle of Man Ship Registry 2007c). There are no nationality requirements 
for crews of vessels on the Manx register, but officers must hold a certificate of 
competency from the UK or another approved state (Isle of Man Ship Registry 
2007a).
Figure 2.11: Gross Tonnage of United Kingdom National and isle
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While the Isle of Man register is a member of the Red Ensign Group, Manx 
maritime administrators claim, “we are independent from the UK and do not see 
ourselves as a second register. . .We are an international British register and are not 
in the same league as second registers” (Ward 1997, 6). It is also interesting that the 
Isle of Man shipping register is designed as a loss-leader, intended to attract finance-
and shipping-related business to the island rather than draw a profit itself (Isle of 
Man Register Proves Its Worth 2006). The development of the Isle of Man ship 
register, particularly as it relates to that of the UK national register, is discussed in- 
depth in later chapters.
2.10 Towards a System of Classification
As these descriptions of secondary registers show, there is a great deal of 
variation among these secondary registers. Some, like NIS, were established in the 
1980s following losses to the national register. Others, such as the UK’s secondary 
registers, have been in existence for over a century but reformed their ways of 
operating in the last few decades. They are based onshore, offshore, and, until 
recently, in Antarctica, and their mandates vary from attracting foreign vessels to 
retaining national vessels to attracting and retaining shipping-related financial 
business. Table 2.1 summarises the key characteristics of these registers.
Table 2.1: Summary of Cases Characteristics
Secondary
Register Administrator Location Openness*
Crewing
Restrictions*
Relationship to 
National Register FOC
TAFF Parent state Offshore Partly open Some Supplements N
MAR Parent state Offshore Open Some Supplements N
CSR Parent state Offshore Partly open Some Supplements N
DIS Parent state Within state Partly open Few Supplements N
GIS Parent state Within state Partly open Some Supplements Y
NIS Parent state Within state Partly open Some Supplements N
Netherlands
Antilles Territory Offshore Open None Competes with Y
Bermuda Territory Offshore Partly open Few Competes with Y
Gibraltar Territory Offshore Partly open None Competes with Y
Isle of Man Territory Offshore Partly open None Competes with N
Cayman
Islands
Territory but 
privately 
operated Offshore Partly open None Competes with Y
* Based on SIRC methodology. Source: Winchester and Alderton 2003. 
**As of 2007. Source: ITF [no date].
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For the purposes of this study, which is concerned with sovereignty and state 
action in a globalized world, it is most logical to classify registers based first on 
whether they are primarily controlled by the parent state or the offshore territory. 
Such a distinction accounts for variation in other register characteristics, as decisions 
made about the register, including openness, crewing restrictions, and whether to 
engage in union negotiations (which partially determine ITF Flag of Convenience 
status). From there, it is further necessary to distinguish between registers that are 
located within the mainland boundaries of a state and those that are offshore. Thus 
the final list of registers by category is as follows: Controlled by register territory: 
Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Isle of Man, and Netherlands Antilles. 
Controlled by parent state and located within mainland boundaries o f state: DIS, 
NIS, and GIS. Controlled by parent state and located on offshore territory: CSR, 
MAR, and TAFF.
Figure 2.2: Classification of Secondary Registers
Location of register
On offshore territory
Registry territoryParent state
Who controls register
Within mainland 
boundaries of state
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2.11 Conclusions
This chapter provides an overview of the history and structure of the different 
secondary registers included in this study. Information about particular 
characteristics of these secondary registers was collected with the goal of providing a 
useful context from which to interpret findings from the evaluation of regulatory 
regimes and crewing costs conducted in the following two chapters. These 
characteristics provide the basis for a classification system of secondary registers that 
can be employed in future analyses.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Regulatory Regimes and Port State Control
3.1 Introduction
Over the past century, there has been an increase in both international 
economic competition among industries and the international regulatory framework 
designed to manage them. Given a modem state’s potentially conflicting interests of 
maintaining competitive, and therefore economically viable, industries and its role in 
setting international regulatory standards, there are those who are concerned that 
states might be engaged in a regulatory “race to the bottom” in terms of a downward 
harmonisation of regulatory standards (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000).
These competing interests are particularly felt in the merchant shipping 
industry. Over the past half-century, and particularly with the advent of the Inter- 
Go vemmental Maritime Consultative Organisation in 1948, which would become 
the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), there has been a steady increase in 
the number and scope of international conventions directed at maritime safety and 
environmental issues (Kasoulides 1993). This study has previously explained how 
shipowners are generally free to choose the flag state on which to register their 
vessels. Stop ford (1997) notes that the extent to which a register complies with 
maritime safety conventions is one of four main factors that can affect a shipowner’s 
decision. Certain costs, such as equipment and fees for vessel surveys, can 
potentially be avoided by flagging on a register with a relatively low level of 
regulation, as the register will either not have ratified certain international safety 
conventions or does not (or lacks the capacity) to enforce them. Ultimately, as a
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report by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development determined, 
“considerable scope exists for shipowners to determine the operating standards of 
their vessels and to deliberately avoid compliance with international rules and 
standard,” resulting in financial benefits (OECD 1996, 9).
The principal body responsible for regulating a vessel is the flag state in 
which that vessel is registered (Stopford 1997). It is well known that the extent to 
which safety standards are enforced on open registers varies (Kasoulides 1993). 
Less, however, is known about the regulatory regimes present on secondary 
registers. Generally, secondary registers are bound by a similar level of regulation as 
their national counterparts, as they are subject to the same international conventions 
and comparable, if not identical, domestic legislation (Winchester and Alderton 
2003). Alderton and Winchester (2002) found that second and international registry 
states have on average ratified 55% of IMO conventions, which is only slightly 
below the 61% ratified by national registers’ embedded maritime states. What is less 
clear is whether and how the level of enforcement of these conventions differs 
between secondary registers and their national counterparts. Since there is no 
consistent application of international regulations by flag states or classification 
societies, which frequently conduct vessel surveys both prior to and after a ship has 
joined a register, port state control is now seen as a critical “policing mechanism” for 
the shipping industry, which. . .[acts] as a ‘safety net’ for the flag states” (OECD 
1996, 23).
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This study uses inspection and detention data from the Paris port state control 
MOU as a proxy for the regulatory regime present on a given flag state.15 The first 
section of this chapter outlines the effectiveness of port state control (PSC) as a 
regulatory regime, while the second and third sections use previous research to 
develop hypotheses regarding the regulatory regimes present on secondary registers. 
The fourth section examines these hypotheses by comparing the level of regulation 
on individual secondary registers to their national counterparts, while the fifth 
section looks at how secondary registers compare to the other flag states inspected by 
the Paris PSC regime. The sixth section compares the detention rates of different 
register types, while the final section looks at the results of these comparisons more 
broadly.
3.2 Regulatory Regimes and Crewing Costs
Port state control, as a way of regulating substandard shipping, is not without 
its deficiencies. Oz9ayir (2004) notes that the determination to detain a ship is 
somewhat subjective, as it is determined by a port state control inspector’s 
judgement as to the severity of the vessel’s deficiencies. Bloor et al (2006) identify 
further shortcomings in the port state control system through their observations of 
the PSC inspection process at ports in India, Russia, and the UK. The authors found 
that consistent application of PSC practices across countries is made difficult by 
differences in institutions and cultures. They note that “this form of inconsistency is 
systematic rather than simply idiosyncratic. Different national inspection regimes 
will command different reputations in terms of trust and perceived competence”
15 Please see Appendix G for an explanation of the port state control inspection process and the 
different MOU bodies.
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(Bloor et al 2006, 548). Although the authors do not extend their argument to this 
point, it is possible that shipowners could target their vessels to different regimes 
based on these inconsistencies as a way to gain potentially more lenient inspections.
Nevertheless, previous research has shown port state control to be an 
effective tool in addressing substandard shipping. Payoyo (1994) provides an early 
evaluation of the port state control regime in his study of the Paris MOU’s 
enforcement of specific international conventions. He found PSC to be a “qualified 
success” in reducing substandard shipping, noting that PSC has helped to identify 
more precise areas in which substandard shipping is occurring, and that it is an 
effective tool in enforcing certain existing international regulations. Cariou et al 
(2007) concluded that the number of deficiencies detected on a vessel falls by 63% 
between its first inspection and subsequent ones.
Knapp and Franses (2006) evaluate the effect port state control inspections 
have on the probability that a vessel will have a serious casualty such as loss of the 
ship, loss of life, or serious pollution. Based on data from nearly 200,000 port state 
control inspections conducted over six years, the authors found that states whose 
vessels are subject to port state control inspections do better than states whose 
vessels are only inspected by their flag state, and that detained vessels are more 
likely to have casualties as compared to vessels that are inspected but not detained 
and vessels that are not inspected. Knapp and Franses (2006) note that a vessel’s 
flag state is not the only factor to affect the probability of it suffering a casualty; ship 
type, age, and tonnage (which, they note, correlates with ship type) also affect it.
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3.3 Previous Research
DeSombre (2006) uses port state control data prominently to evaluate flag 
states’ regulatory regimes specifically in the context of secondary registers. In the 
course of her broader investigation of the effects of globalization on maritime 
environmental, safety and, labour standards, she uses time-series data from the 
published annual reports of three port state control bodies -  the Paris MOU, Tokyo 
MOU, and U.S. Coast Guard -  to compare the regulatory levels of different registers. 
Her analysis, however, is limited by the reporting methods of the port state control 
bodies. As noted in Appendix G, only data for the Netherlands Antilles and the 
UK’s secondary registers (Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, and the Isle of Man) 
is listed separately from that of their national counterparts. For the rest of the 
secondary registers, including NIS, DIS, Canary Islands (CSR) and Portugal (MAR), 
the published data on inspections and detentions combines vessels on both the 
secondary and national register. This thesis seeks to fill this gap in the research by 
using the vessel identification information collected as part of each inspection to 
determine whether a particular vessel is flagged on the national or secondary register, 
and group this data accordingly.16
Still, DeSombre’s study gives a useful indication of the relative regulatory 
environment of the secondary registers listed. She finds that secondary registers are
16 Because of the differences (outlined in Appendix G) between the total number of inspections and 
detentions between the published PSC data and the data that was collected from the inspection 
database directly, the latter is used for analyses throughout this chapter, including for those secondary 
registers (Netherlands Antilles, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, and Isle of Man) for which 
published data is available. Those flag states that had fewer than five inspections in a given year were 
removed from analysis. A full listing of both the published and collected port state control data for 
individual flag states can be found in Appendix C.
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likely to have higher detention rates17 than their respective parent states’ national 
registers for all years and across all three MOUs studied (2006). She notes that 
although these detention rates for secondary registers are sometimes higher than the 
regional average for a particular MOU, they are well below the level at which they 
would be “black-listed” and therefore targeted for additional inspections in the future 
(2006, 101).
3.4 Hypotheses
Based on the findings by DeSombre (2006), it would be expected that the 
detention rates for the secondary registers not included in her study (NIS, DIS, CSR, 
MAR, and TAFF) will follow a similar pattern to those that are. It is therefore 
hypothesised that these secondary registers’ detention rates for the Paris MOU are 
higher than those of their respective national registers, but that they are generally 
below the regional average for a given year. Given the connection that has been 
found between the results of port state inspections and the probability of vessel 
casualty (Knapp and Franses 2006), and the differences in casualty rates for vessels 
on different register types (Alderton and Winchester 2002), it is expected that the 
average detention rates for secondary registers as a group is less than that of open 
registers, but higher than that of national ones.18 Whether there are differences 
among secondary register sub-groups (those that are controlled by an offshore
17 In this thesis, as well as DeSombre’s (2006) study, detention rate refers to the percentage of 
inspected ships that are detained, while detention ratio refers the detention rate divided by that year’s 
average detention rate for the MOU. The latter measure standardises flag states’ relative detention 
rates across different years and port state control regimes, which facilitates comparison of their 
performance. A detention ratio value that is greater than “1” indicates that a register’s vessels were 
detained more frequently than that year’s average for that particular PSC regime, while a value less 
than “1” indicates that a register’s vessels were detained less frequently than the average.
18 A full listing of registers and their categories can be found in Appendix B.
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territory and those that are controlled by the parent state, whether located on- or off­
shore) remains to be seen.
3.5 Comparison of Detention Rates on National and Secondary Register Pairs
This section compares the detention rates of secondary registers with that of 
their respective national counterparts. Figure 3.1, below, shows the difference, in 
percentage points, between the detention rates of each secondary and national 
register pair. For example, the graph shows that in 2004, the Isle of Man register’s 
detention rate was .4 percentage points higher than the UK’s, meaning its vessels 
were detained more frequently. In 2005, however, the Manx register’s detention rate 
dropped below that of the UK, to .38 percentage points lower.
As Figure 3.1 illustrates, the 2004 and 2005 PSC data confirms the primary 
hypothesis that secondary registers are detained more frequently than those on the 
parent state’s national one. The exceptions are the Bermuda register in 2004 and the 
TAFF register in 2005, which have the same detention rate as their parent states, and 
the Bermuda and Isle of Man registers in 2005, which have lower detention rates 
than their parent states. Interestingly, there is considerable variation in the detention 
rates among the UK’s secondary registers. Bermuda and the Isle of Man’s detention 
rates for both years are much closer to that of the UK’s than the Cayman Islands or 
Gibraltar. While this could indicate different levels of regulation present on the 
different flag states, it could also be due to the fact that the UK’s various secondary 
registers tend to attract different types of vessels, and some vessel types are more 
likely to be inspected than others. Additionally, the detention rates for Norway and 
NIS, one of the register pairs with the most robust set of data (152 inspections for
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Norway and 780 for NIS), are relatively similar. This could suggest that a similar 
level of regulation is enforced on the two registers.
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It is difficult to discern whether there are any differences among detention 
rates of secondary registers based on the broad categories outlined in Chapter Three. 
The group of secondary registers controlled by their parent state (DIS, TAFF, NIS, 
and CSR) have, for the most part, higher detention rates than their national 
counterparts. Since these registers are, technically, bound by the same safety 
regulations and surveyors as their national counterparts, these results could indicate 
differences in characteristics of the vessels flagged on the secondary register versus 
the national one.
For those secondary registers controlled by an offshore territory, there is 
greater variation in the relative difference in detention rates among
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secondary/national register pairs. While this could again reflect the type of vessel 
found on a particular flag, the different deviations in detention rate between the UK 
and its secondary registers might point to either different levels at which regulations 
are enforced or different strategies employed by the registers with regard to their port 
state control records. The Isle of Man, for example, “’places great emphasis on the 
monitoring of port state control performance’” in determining which vessels to 
accept on to its register (Revamped Isle of Man Looks to Aim Even Higher 2007).
3.6 Detention Rates of Secondary Registers Compared to the Regional Average 
While a comparison of the detention rates of secondary registers to that of 
their respective national ones is useful in examining the extent to which a regulatory 
regime is consistent across a state’s jurisdiction, this measure does not give a sense 
of how the level of regulation on secondary registers compares to other flag states 
generally. This section uses the Paris MOU’s regional average detention rate19 
(which was 5.84% in 2004 and 4.67% in 2005) as a benchmark by which to gauge 
how individual secondary registers compare to the other states evaluated by the Paris 
MOU regime for the given years by analysing the detention ratios of the secondary 
registers.
19 Each MOU has its own regional average detention rate, which is determined by taking the total 
number of detentions as a percentage of the total number of the vessel inspections conducted by that 
MOU’s member states in a particular year. For example, in 1999, Paris MOU states carried out 
18,399 inspections, resulting in 1,684 detentions; thus the Paris MOU’s regional average detention 
rate was 9.15% for that year.
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Figure 3.2: Detention Ratio of Secondary Registers 2004 and 2005
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Detention ratio data further confirms the hypotheses outlined previously. As 
Figure 3.2 shows, for both 2004 and 2005 the detention rates for all secondary 
registers were well below the regional average. The single exception was Gibraltar, 
which in 2004 had a detention rate .41 percentage points higher than the regional 
average. In 2005, Gibraltar’s detention rate dropped below the regional average.
These results are interesting for two reasons. First, they indicate that there is 
generally a higher level of regulation present on secondary registers than flag states 
on average. Second, they suggest that secondary registers, like open registers 
(DeSombre 2006), consciously manipulate their fleets in order to achieve a certain 
detention rate. After exceeding the regional average detention rate in 2004, Gibraltar 
actively worked to reduce it, removing ten frequently detained vessels from its 
register over the course of 2005 (Reyes 2005). It is not clear whether this move 
resulted from pressure from the UK or was done of Gibraltar’s own accord, but it 
does suggest that port state control records matter to some flag states, and that these 
records can be employed as a strategic tool.
3.7 Average Detention Ratios by Register Type
The previous two sections examined the regulatory regimes of individual 
secondary registers in the context of their respective parent states and as compared to 
the flag states covered by the Paris MOU. However, the port state control data can 
also be used to more broadly explore the relative levels of regulation on different 
types of registers. Figure 3.3, below, shows that the average detention rate for 
secondary registers is below the regional average for both 2004 and 2005, which is 
expected given the results of section 3.6. It is notable, however, that while the 
detention rates for those national registers that have secondary counterparts are 
below the regional average (see Appendix C), the mean detention rate for all national 
registers is above the regional average. This difference could be explained by the 
characteristics of vessels registered on different flags; if national registers are left 
with older vessels or types that attract a greater number of inspections, perhaps 
because the shipowners have no incentive to move or because no other register will 
accept the vessel, then their detention rates would be higher.
Overall, this comparison of detention ratios by register type runs counter to 
the hypothesis about the role of secondary registers in the broader registry system. 
While it is anticipated that open registers would have a higher average detention rate 
(and, therefore, a higher detention ratio), than either secondary or national registers, 
it is not expected that secondary registers would collectively have the lowest average 
detention rate of the three register types. These results lend further support to the 
idea that open registers have the lowest level of regulation as compared to other 
register types, but indicate that the regulatory environment may, in fact, be better on
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some secondary registers than national ones, and that more subtle analysis is required 
in making broad claims about regulatory standards on different groups of registers.
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3.8 Conclusions
This chapter has used port state control detention rates as a proxy for level of 
regulation enforced on a register. In evaluating the regulatory regimes of secondary 
registers as compared to national ones, the general hypothesis was confirmed as it 
was found that vessels on secondary registers are detained more frequently than 
those on their respective national counterparts. In assessing the level of regulation of 
secondary registers to those of all flag states covered by the Paris MOU inspection 
regime, it was found, as expected, that vessels on secondary registers are detained 
less frequently than the regional average. This supports the view that secondary 
registers, taken together, are subject to a more stringent regulatory regime than most 
flag states. In comparing regulatory levels for different register types, however, it
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was found that vessels on secondary registers are, on average, detained less 
frequently than vessels on either national or open registers, which is not what would 
be anticipated. Drawing more specific conclusions than these from the data is 
difficult given the complex association between the characteristics of vessels flagged 
on different registers and the effect that these characteristics have on port state 
control inspection results. However, these results provide an important comparative 
measure between several secondary and national register pairs that is not found in 
any known published sources. They also add to a picture of secondary registration 
which is far more complex than had been hitherto supposed.
Generally, these results demonstrate that although vessels on secondary 
registers are detained more frequently than those on their respective national 
counterparts, the level of regulation on secondary registers is higher than that of most 
flag states. This has particular importance for accounts that have stressed the 
potential for global economic competition to cause a downward harmonisation of 
state standards, as these findings suggest that the presence of secondary registers in 
the registry system is resulting in a higher overall level of regulation than would be 
present if these registers did not exist. If shipowners flag out to secondary registers 
instead of open ones (or, indeed, some national ones), then the regulatory standards 
to which the vessel is held are likely to be higher.
More interesting, perhaps, is the way that port state control appears to have 
been co-opted as a strategic tool by some flag states. While causal relationships are 
difficult, if not impossible, to discern, it makes sense that for those states whose 
national and secondary register inspection data is grouped together (DIS, NIS, CSR,
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MAR, and TAFF), the parent state would want to reduce (and have sufficient control 
over the register to force such a reduction) the detention rate of vessels on its 
secondary register in order to minimise the chance that all vessels on both flags 
would be targeted (although if the detention rate is sufficiently low so as not to be 
targeted, the parent state may not care). It is perhaps paradoxical, then, that some 
secondary registers, particularly Bermuda and Isle of Man, that are controlled by 
offshore territories and whose data is listed individually, have such low detention 
rates compared to their national registers. That some of these secondary registers, 
for example, the Isle of Man and Gibraltar, appear to be using their port state control 
records strategically and permit or disallow vessels on their registers accordingly, 
seems to represent a kind of “competition micro-state.” Whether the motivation to 
reduce or maintain a low detention rate comes from the secondary register or the 
parent state, however, is difficult to determine, and is an issue that is explored further 
in the case study in Chapters Five and Six.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Crewing Costs and the Global Labour Market
4.1 Introduction
Within the context of the globalization debate, there is a small, yet no less 
significant, discourse regarding the division and geographies of labour. Framed 
initially as the “New International Division of Labour” by Frobel, Heinrichs, and 
Kreye (1980), these arguments reframe the notion of comparative advantage to 
reflect employers’ outsourcing of jobs for less-skilled workers in response to 
increased global competition (Castree et al, 2004). Although the evidence of Frobel 
and his colleagues is based on changes in production and in manufacturing, their 
arguments can be related to the development of secondary registers by embedded 
maritime states. This comparison is facilitated by one of Frobel et al’s case studies: 
in it, they suggest that Federal Germany was facing “a dilemma which is determined 
by the conditions of the world market for labour and production sites. It is, quite 
simply: either lower real wages and social benefits, low enough to make [the state] 
an attractive site for the valorisation of capital once again, or continuing high 
unemployment” (Frobel et al 1980, 167). As with shipowners who leave national 
registers for the lower costs of open ones, these authors cite foreign investment and 
relocation of production as the consequence of a situation where “the survival of 
more and more companies can only be assured through the relocation of production 
to new industrial sites, where labour-power is cheap to buy, abundant and well- 
disciplined; in short, through the transnational re-organisation of production” (Frobel 
et al, 1980, 15).
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That geography influences patterns of employment and economic activities, 
which in turn shapes the forces of globalization (and vice versa), is a central 
principle for those who argue that it is necessary to have a more sophisticated 
account of labour that takes into account scalar relations. “Scale” can be defined as 
the “middle term between space and place” relating to “whether and how local. . 
.scale events and actions reverberate across space (and vice versa)” (Castree et al 
2004, xii). In this context it is appropriate to speak of processes of “rescaling” in 
terms of “changing [of] scale(s) of action, and the blending of scales to produce new 
geographical scales and places” (McGrath-Champ 2005, 328). As applied to the 
changing nature of work and employment, rescaling literature treats heavily the idea 
of a spatial division of labour, and the forces, processes, and institutions which shape 
it. One aspect of this division of labour present in today’s merchant shipping 
industry relates to the geographical split between low-skilled jobs and 
managerial/research/development jobs (Massey 1995). This is embodied in the 
divide between the geographical source of “skilled” officers and relatively 
“unskilled” ratings crewing vessels on most registers, which is at once both discrete 
and shifting. Thus rescaling arguments provide a context in which to understand and 
interpret findings regarding the nationality patterns of crews on vessels of different 
flag states.
Working from this theoretical foundation, this chapter begins by discussing 
labour costs generally and explains why the cost of employing a particular crew is 
directly linked to the nationalities of that crew’s seafarers. Then, comparisons in 
seafarer nationalities between national and secondary registers are made, first by
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exploring typical crew compositions according to conventional wisdom, and then by 
looking at data on seafarer nationalities broken down by seafarer rank and home 
region.
4.2 Labour Costs
Overall, labour costs are one of the most expensive aspects of maintaining a 
shipping vessel. Indeed, seafarers’ wages are the key variable cost for shipowners. 
A recent report examining the costs associated with running a vessel found that crew 
salaries are a ship’s single greatest flexible expense, accounting for an average of 
34% of total operating costs (Shipping Industry Group 2002). Taking into 
consideration other labour-related expenses, such as expenditures for provisions or 
medical care, this figure increases to 40%, and, for some types of ships, even higher.
Many shipowners argue that labour costs have become prohibitive on closed 
national registers,20 which typically require relatively large crews of mostly national 
seafarers who must be paid comparatively high wages, in addition to payments for 
social security and other taxes.21 These requirements, shipowners argue, leave 
vessels unable to compete with open registers, whose crews can potentially be 
smaller and paid at a lesser rate (Stopford 1997). Thus comparisons of crew size and 
wage rates, two variable elements of labour costs that depend strongly on a vessel’s 
flag, are worthy of exploration in the context of the secondary register phenomenon.
A recent study evaluates average crew sizes of ships on different types of 
registers. The 2006 publication by Winchester et al (2006) uses crew lists collected 
from 3,969 vessels as part of the 2003 SIRC Global Labour Market Survey to
20 Please refer to Appendix B for a list of registers and their categories.
21 See, for example “Shipowners Play a Waiting Game,” Lloyd’s List, 2000.
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analyse both the total number of crew members as well as officer and rating groups 
separately in order to determine whether crew levels are affected by the size of the 
vessel or the kind of register it is flagged on. Since minimum crew sizes are 
established by the governments of individual flag states, and often determined by an 
agreement between a shipowner and the register’s regulatory body (Boisson 1999), 
higher crewing levels on equivalent vessels could logically be seen as an increased 
commitment to safety and seafarer welfare by the register (or the shipowners on it).
Overall, the study found that the flag of a ship does have an effect on the size 
of the crew, with some results confirming common perceptions regarding conditions 
on secondary registers as compared to national or open ones. For example, the study 
found that larger crews and greater numbers of ratings are carried by small tankers 
flagged on a national register than those on a secondary register (although open 
registers have the biggest average crews). For smaller ships (1,000-2,999gt) and 
large ships (>100,000gt), this pattern holds for officers as well.
Other results from the study, however, run counter to the conventional 
wisdom of the registry spectrum. The report found that the smaller-sized categories 
of tankers and dry cargo vessels on open registers have larger average crew sizes and 
greater numbers of ratings than on those on secondary registers. In fact, secondary 
registers frequently had the lowest average crewing levels when compared to 
national and open registers. Taken together, these results suggest secondary registers 
cannot automatically be presumed to have a more stringent regulatory environment 
with regard to safety and seafarer wellbeing than open registers. The study’s 
findings also provide support for the idea that these broad register categories obscure
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important differences within register types. Whether an analysis of wage rates on 
different registers will result in the same diverse set of conclusions is the subject of 
the rest of this chapter.
43 Previous research
This thesis is not the first to analyze patterns of seafarer nationalities based 
on lists of crew members. This method of researching the seafarers’ labour market 
was pioneered in Lane’s Crewing the World's Merchant Fleet (1996), which 
examines nationality and age compositions of crews using data collected in 1992 and 
1993 data from 1,070 vessels. Among the report’s findings are a confirmation of 
the significance of Filipino seafarers in the global labour pool and an observation as 
to Russia’s increasing role as a labour source for non-Russian-owned vessels. In his 
commentary, Lane also notes the existence of “inter- and intra-regional preferences” 
that seem “to be a residue of historic imperial associations” (Lane, 1996, 34). He 
cites examples of only finding Indonesian seafarers on Dutch ships and West 
Africans on British ones. Additionally, he comments on the regional associations, 
including an Egyptian-Greek grouping and preponderance of Polish seafarers on 
German and Norwegian vessels. These geographical connections are an important 
precursor to the kinds of patterns that emerge in this chapter based on data collected 
a decade later.
Although the study does not specifically compare secondary registers with 
open and national ones (instead including them in the “flags of convenience” 
category, as appropriate), it does allege that, despite that the Manx, DIS, and
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Luxembourg22 flags more or less reflecting their links to national registers, the 
employment of national seafarers is becoming less of a priority for secondary 
registers.
Building on this pilot study, the Seafarers’ International Research Centre 
published a report based on crew lists collected over the period 1997-2000 (Lane et 
al. 2002). Although the majority of the report is focused on creating a profile of 
seafarers serving on cargo ships internationally (rather than on a profile of the 
nationalities on various flags), one component is an examination of crew 
compositions according to regional nationality. Looking at all vessels on secondary 
registers, the report finds that seafarers on vessels with single nationality crews tend 
to be overwhelmingly from OECD or Far East states. Of crews with two 
nationalities, approximately one-third of vessels have seafarers from a single region 
(mostly from the Far East), and where they are from multiple regions, the senior 
officers are almost always OECD nationals while junior officers and ratings are from 
a mix of regions. This trend holds true for vessels with more than three nationalities 
serving on board as well (Lane et al. 2002), which suggests that secondary registers 
have not wholly joined their open counterparts in replacing national seafarers with 
cheaper foreign ones at all crewing ranks.
Additionally, data listed in the report for a sample of secondary registers 
show slightly different crewing patterns among the Cayman Islands, DIS, and NIS 
registers. For instance, nearly 70% of senior officers on the Cayman Islands register 
are from either OECD or Eastern European states, while over half the register’s
22 Luxembourg was effectively considered to be Belgium’s second register from the mid-1990s until 
2003, when the Belgian flag was revived (Lloyd’s List, 2004).
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junior officers are from the latter. DIS, on the other hand, is crewed mainly by 
senior and junior officers from OECD states. NIS’ senior officers are a more diverse 
group, with 36% from OECD states, 31% from the Far East, and 18% from Eastern 
Europe, but over half of the register’s junior officers are from the Far East. Patterns 
of ratings’ nationalities on the three registers also vary, but most are from Eastern 
Europe and the Far East (Lane et al. 2002).
Tying many of these trends together is The Global Seafarer (ILO 2004), 
which reports the continuation of several patterns noticed in the early 1990s (Lane 
1996), including inter- and intra-regional preferences for certain nationalities and 
crewing relationships based on historical associations. The report does note, 
however, that “nationality choices are more likely to be made on the basis of 
availability and price than on sentiment or cultural familiarity” (ILO 2004, 72). On 
the subject of secondary registers specifically, The Global Seafarer observes that 
“crewing patterns . . .  are similar to those found in the other major European second 
registers of Norway (NIS), Denmark (DIS), and Germany (GIS) and these, in turn, 
are very similar to those found aboard the ships of the FOC fleets” (ILO 2004, 71). 
This is despite the nuances mentioned above regarding secondary registers’ crewing 
patterns.
The remainder of existing literature that addresses the issue of crewing and 
secondary registers -  a relatively small category — also employs the three broad 
categories of register types without empirically examining them for potential 
disparities. For example, in their treatment of secondary registers, Selkou and Roe 
(2004, 103) refer to second and international registers as “a sort of halfway house to
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Open Registries,” designed to allow shipowners the reputation of a national register 
with the reduced costs of an open one.
4.4 Hypotheses
Based on previous research, it is possible to lay out several hypotheses 
concerning secondary registers and seafarer nationalities. Overall, it is presumed 
that shipowners on secondary registers are substituting national for foreign labour to 
the greatest extent that the register’s regulations will allow. Therefore, it is expected 
that the proportion of nationals employed on a secondary register will be less than 
that of a national register and greater than that of an open one. It is also expected 
that, for all registers, the crew ranking most likely to be made up of non-nationals are 
ratings, followed by junior officers, then senior officers.
In comparing secondary and national register pairs, it is probable that the 
latter employs a greater percentage of nationals across all crew rankings, with non­
nationals more likely to come from EU or OECD states, than its secondary 
counterpart. However, it is likely that analyses of individual registers will reveal a 
complex set of results about how secondary registers compare to each other as well 
as to their parent registers, which are obscured when evaluating the registers as a 
group. As for exploring the source of non-national labour, it is likely that the dataset 
will reflect existing bends such as an increase in seafarers from Southeast Asia and 
Eastern Europe, particularly at the junior officer level, and may show some of the 
regional and historical associations noted by Lane (1996).
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4.5 Examples Seafarer Nationalities on Different Register Types
The broad proposition that secondary registers represent a middle ground 
between national and open ones is supported by the Seafarers Database. For 
illustrative purposes, Table 4.1, below, shows the position and nationality of each 
member of a 10-person crew on a general cargo ship. One vessel each was selected 
from the “national” and “open” register categories, as well as the so-termed 
“international” and “second” register groups. Although the latter two are classified 
in the same “secondary” register category for all analysis in this thesis, they are listed 
separately here to demonstrate the variety of crew compositions that can occur. All 
crew listings are drawn from the SIRC Global Labour Market Survey (2002).
T a b l e  4 . 1 : S e a f a r e r  N a t i o n a l i t i e s  o n  D i f f e r e n t  R e g i s t e r  T y p e s
National R egister "International" R egister "Second" R egister Open Register
No. Position Nationality Position Nationality Position Nationality Position Nationality
1 Shipmaster Finnish Shipmaster Lithuanian Shipmaster Dutch Shipmaster Ukrainian
2 Sr Officer Finnish Sr Officer Lithuanian Sr Officer Croatian Sr Officer Ukrainian
3 Sr Officer Finnsh Sr Officer Lithuanian Sr Officer Filipino Sr Officer Ukrainian
4 Sr Officer Finnish Sr Officer Norwegian Sr Officer Danish Jr Officer Polish
5 Jr Officer Finnish Jr Officer Russian Sr Officer Polish Rating Polish
6 Rating Finnish Rating Lithuanian Jr Officer Polish Rating Polish
7 Rating Finnish Rating Lithuanian Rating Polish Rating Polish
8 Rating Finnish Rating Russian Rating Polish Rating Ukrainian
9 Rating Finnish Rating Lithuanian Rating Polish Rating Ukrainian
10 Cadet Finnish Rating Lithuanian Rating Polish Rating Ukrainian
As this table shows, these crew compositions suggest what would be
expected for each register type based on previous research. The vessel on the 
national register, in this case Finland, is crewed by its own citizens. Ships on 
secondary registers NIS and Isle of Man, on the other hand, employ more non­
nationals from lower-wage economies. For the vessel on NIS, this replacement of 
nationals with foreigners occurs quite clearly at the ratings level; one Norwegian 
officer is retained. On the Manx ship there are no British nationals, although the
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shipmaster and a senior officer are from high-wage EU states. The remainder of the 
crew is mostly comprised of Polish seafarers, who can be paid lower wages than 
their Western European counterparts. The vessel on the Bahamas register consists 
entirely of Ukrainian and Polish citizens. The extent to which these ‘illustrative’ 
cases represent the crewing patterns on secondary registers is discussed in the 
following sections.
4.6 Comparison of Seafarer Nationalities by Register Type23
Moving to a direct analysis of data from the 2002 Global Labour Market 
Survey, the assumptions regarding crew nationalities found on each register type 
provide a basis from which to predict how broader crewing patterns might look. If 
these assumptions are correct, then it is expected that the similar strategies adopted 
by states -  secondary registers with relaxed nationality requirements for crews -  
would result in similar effects. In other words, crewing patterns on second and 
international registers should be converging, both in terms of the percentage of 
nationals employed as well as origin of the foreign labour supply, while diverging 
from that of their parent states’ national registers.
23 Given the way in which the SIRC Global Labour Market database is set up, two kinds of measures 
are used in this chapter. One measure considers the overall patterns found on individual registers or 
register types, and this looks at characteristics of all seafarers in the database sample of a particular 
register and is expressed as a proportion of a flag state’s total crew. The second measure considers 
patterns on individual vessels of a register; this measure is useful because it can indicate how 
shipowners use different registers. In this case, the Global Labour Market database has ascribed a 
primary nationality for each of three crew rankings (senior officers, junior officers, and ratings), and 
the measure is expressed as a proportion of vessels on a particular flag state.
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Figure 4.1: Average Percentage of Nationals Crewing Each 
Register Type
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Results from this sample’s data on overall crew nationalities reflect what 
previous anecdotal and empirical research have suggested: open registers have few, 
if any, nationals crewing its vessels; national registers tend to have nationals as a 
majority of their crews; and second and international registers fall somewhere in- 
between (Figure 4.1). Once again, however, these broad categories obscure 
important variations within the register groups. For example, Lebanon, an open 
register, has nationals making up 9% of the register’s crews (n=100), while some 
national registers, including Luxembourg (n=400) and Saudi Arabia (n=120), are 
crewed entirely by foreign nationals. For secondary registers, which are the focus of 
this thesis, the proportion of nationals on each register’s crews range from 1.8% 
(Gibraltar, n=325) to 48% (DIS, n=l,388) (mean = 16%, SD = 17.5 percentage 
points).24
24 In this data sample, vessels on CSR, Spain’s secondary register, are crewed entirely by nationals. 
This unusual effect may be due to the limited number of cases in the dataset (n=5), which is why CSR
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This spread of values of the average percentage of nationals on secondary 
registers suggests that the effects of reduced nationality restrictions for crews are 
converging to some extent, but not as much as would be expected based on existing 
literature. Although this initial analysis is relatively superficial, it does hint at the 
complexity of the trends that are likely to come out in more detailed breakdowns of 
the seafarer nationality data. The following sections explore seafarer nationalities on 
various secondary registers by crew rank and by home region of the seafarer, 
opening a window into the role these under-researched registers play in the global 
labour market for seafarers.
4.7 Seafarer Nationality by Crew Ranking
This section examines seafarer nationalities on secondary registers according 
to rank. This breakdown is necessary due to the segmented nature of the labour 
market for seafarers. To explain further, crew members fall into one of two 
categories: officers or ratings. The former group, which is split into senior and 
junior officers, includes positions such as shipmaster and engineers, while the latter 
consists of able (AB) and ordinary (OS) seamen, cooks, wipers, oilers, and fitters. 
The training, skills, and educational level required to be an officer are greater than 
that of ratings, and trainee officers (known as cadets) tend to enter the field directly 
at that level, rather than starting as a rating and working their way up through the 
ranks. These strict hierarchical divisions of labour are a common feature of the 
majority of merchant vessels (ILO 2004). Overall, officers tend to be paid more than 
ratings, although wages vary among different ranks within each group as well (ILO
is excluded from all subsequent analysis. No data are available for MAR, Portugal’s secondary 
register.
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2004). Additionally, officers’ contracts tend to be for shorter periods of time and 
allow for longer leave periods than those of ratings.
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, however, crew rank and contract 
length are not the only determinants of seafarer’s pay. The seafarer’s country of 
origin also plays a major part; as the Global Seafarer points out, “contracts as well as 
wages are stratified by nationality and this applies to all ranks” (ILO 2004, 116). 
These stratifications mean that the cost of hiring a seafarer for a specific position can 
vary widely depending on their nationality. Thus, in order to accurately understand 
the way in which shipowners are using a state’s secondary register and what cost- 
benefits are being derived from it, it is necessary to analyse the nationalities of senior 
officers, junior officers, and ratings separately as seafarer ranking serves as an 
additional proxy for cost.
Figure 4.2: Comparison of Nationals Crewing Secondary and 
Parent Registers
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Considering all crew rankings together, Figure 4.2. shows the overall 
percentage of nationals crewing vessels on each secondary register alongside that of
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its parent register. Denmark and France are the only two states for which the 
percentage of crew that is national is greater for the second or international register 
than the parent one. For the rest of the states, the national register has a higher, 
proportion of the crew that is national than does the second/international flag. 
However, the extent to which this is the case varies. These variations are more 
clearly expressed in Figure 4.3 below, which shows the deviation of the secondary 
register from its parent one. Here the data is expressed in terms of difference of 
percentage points between the two registers, rather than as a difference in absolute 
crewing numbers, as this facilitates comparison of the differences in crewing patterns 
between the secondary register and its national counterpart. For example, while 
Figure 4.2, above, displays the percentage of nationals crewing vessels on the 
Denmark national register and DIS as two separate bars, Figure 4.3, below, 
illustrates this data as a difference of ten percentage points between the Denmark and 
DIS registers, with DIS vessels employing a greater percentage of nationals.
Figure 4.3: Difference in Percentage Points of Nationals In Crew 
Between Parent and Secondary Register
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The chart above indicates the differences that exist in overall crew 
compositions between the secondary/parent register pair across the range of cases 
that fall into this register group. All results are statistically significant, except for 
that of the France-TAFF comparison.25
At minimum, then, these results lend support to the argument that second and 
international registers cannot be treated analytically as entirely similar entities, and 
that there are important differences among individual registers that can and should be 
explored. For example, DIS and NIS, which are frequently classified together as 
international registers, have entirely different relationships with their parent registers 
with regard to crewing patterns (nearly 10 percentage points more nationals and 
close to 70 percentage points fewer, respectively).
It is important to note that the previous two figures, which compare the 
percentage of nationals on secondary registers to that of their parent registers, use 
individual seafarers as the unit of analysis, meaning that the data shown represents 
values for the register as a whole (ie. of all the seafarers on Norwegian-flagged 
vessels, 80% are Norwegian nationals). For the remainder of the section, the unit of 
analysis is the individual vessel within a fleet, meaning that the figures refer to the 
composition of seafarers within a given crew on the register. For example, in Figure 
4.4, below, all ships on the Norwegian national register have primarily Norwegian
25 A significance level of 95%, the standard acceptable level of significance, is used for this test and 
all subsequent tests. Results for this and subsequent chi-square tests in this section can be found in 
Appendix D.
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senior officers, while approximately 5% of vessels on the NIS register have senior
0/\officers that are mainly of other nationalities.
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Figure 4.5: Difference in Percentage Points of Vessels with 
Primarily National Senior Officers Between Parent and 
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26 The determination as to whether a vessel was crewed by national or non-national seafarers at a 
particular crew ranking was made according to the dominant nationality on board each vessel. For 
example, if a vessel is crewed by ten seafarers -  two national senior officers, one national junior 
officer, four non-national ratings, and two national ratings -  then the vessel is considered to be 
primarily “national” for senior officers, “non-national” for junior officers, and “non-national” for 
ratings. In the case of a vessel having equal numbers of seafarers of a given nationality, one was 
chosen at random.
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Figures 4.4 and 4.5, above, examine seafarer nationalities on secondary and 
national register pairs for senior officers only. Statistical tests reveal significant 
results for all states except Denmark-DIS and France-TAFF. All cases, including 
these two, show that there are fewer vessels with a majority of national senior 
officers on the secondary register than on the national one, with a difference in 
percentage points ranging from 30 (UK-Isle of Man) to nearly 70 (Netherlands- 
Netherlands Antilles) (mean = -50.9, SD = 11.7). This result supports the notion that 
shipowners use secondary registers as a means by which to employ non-national 
labour, thereby saving costs.
These graphs also reveal important distinctions about senior officers on the 
United Kingdom’s secondary registers. Although all four registers differ from the 
British register by approximately 30-50 percentage points, Figure 4.4 reveals that 
while the Bermuda and Cayman Islands registers have similar compositions of senior 
officers (~9% national), Isle of Man has over 20% national but Gibraltar’s are 
entirely foreign. Interestingly, these differences could partially be explained by 
geography: the Isle of Man’s proximity to the United Kingdom might make it more 
attractive for British seafarers or the shipowners employing them than Bermuda or 
the Cayman Islands. In this way, geography could be seen as continuing to assert 
itself in a globalized world. Also, Gibraltar has greater status within the European 
Union than the other three territories, and it is possible that the non-national labour is 
coming from EU states, which would represent a kind of “upscaling” of the national 
to the supranational. The source of registers’ non-national labour, including 
Gibraltar’s, is explored in later sections of this chapter.
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Figure 4.6: Percentage of Vessels with Primarily National Junior 
Officers on Parent and Secondary Register
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Figure 4.7: Difference in Percentage Points of Vessels with 
Primarily National Junior Officers Between Parent and 
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Primary nationalities of junior officers crewing vessels on different registers 
are shown in Figures 4.6 and 4.7. Denmark-DIS and France-TAFF, the only states to 
show a greater percentage of nationals on the parent register than on the secondary 
one, are also the only two states not to pass statistical tests for significance.27 As 
Figure 4.7 shows, for all other states, the secondary register has a lower percentage
27 This may be due to the low numbers of cases for these two registers.
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of vessels with mostly national junior officers than does the parent register, again 
supporting the idea of secondary registers as more permissive with regard to crewing 
than their parent ones.
Additionally, a comparison of parent registers in Figures 4.4 and 4.6 reveals 
that, across the board, the percentage of vessels with primarily national junior 
officers is lower than that of senior officers by approximately 10-20 percentage 
points. This result could reflect the decline in national seafarers capable of filling 
these positions, forcing shipowners to find foreign labour, a situation that has been 
noted with some alarm by BIMCO and those in the shipping industry. (BIMCO/ISF 
2000; Hand 2005). It could also be a manifestation of the level of economic 
competition in the shipping industry, where shipowners want to remain on national 
registers but still must find ways to cut costs. In either case, this replacement of 
national with non-national labour would occur at the junior officer level suggests that 
ratings are already being supplied by foreign regions (see Figure 4.8 below), and that 
the preference many shipowners have for senior officers from OECD states (ILO 
2004) may not be possible to maintain as there will not be enough OECD junior 
officers moving up through the ranks to replace retiring senior ones (Lane 2002).
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Figure 4.8: Percentage of Vessels with National-Only Ratings 
Crews on Parent and Secondary Register
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Having examined crew nationalities at the senior and junior officer levels, 
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 are concerned with those vessels containing ratings groups that 
consist entirely of nationals. Statistical tests reveal significant results for all states 
except Denmark-DIS, France-TAFF, and Norway-NIS. All states have a lower 
percentage of national-only ratings groups on the secondary register than on the 
national one. One important caveat with regard to these results, however, is that
while there appears to be a difference of between 5 and 10 percentage points 
between most second/international registers and their parent registers (Figure 4.9), 
this disparity appears to be more significant than it actually is for all register pairs 
except NIS-Norway. As Figure 4.8 shows, secondary registers with crews of 
national-only ratings are practically non-existent except for DIS; other than the 1% 
of vessels on NIS, vessels on all other secondary registers have mixed or foreign 
ratings groups. What these results show, then, is that any substitution of national 
labour for foreign labour at the ratings level has already occurred, for both secondary 
and parent registers.
4.7.1 Discussion
Taken together, these analyses of crew compositions by seafarer rank confirm 
a number of the hypotheses regarding the global labour market for seafarers. In 
examining seafarer nationalities at individual crewing levels, the category of senior 
officers has both the highest percentage of nationals on the parent register, as well as 
the greatest disparity in percentage between national and foreign national crews 
within individual registers. This suggests that national labour is indeed being 
maintained at the senior level, at least on the parent registers.
For junior officers, the percentage of vessels on parent registers with 
primarily national seafarers is slightly lower than that of senior officers. However, 
this figure is still above 40%, while on the secondary registers it is lower than 15% 
(excluding Denmark and France). These results indicate that, as with officers at the 
senior level, junior officers are also being protected to some degree on the parent 
register, but substituted on the secondary one. Nationals-only ratings groups are
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more or less absent on all registers, including parent ones. There is also almost 
complete replacement of nationals with theoretically lower-paid non-nationals for the 
lower-skilled ratings jobs, with the position of junior officers moving in the same 
direction. This could result in further restructuring of the labour market for seafarers 
as higher-skilled and better-paid positions become available to seafarers who were 
previously unable to access them due to protectionist policies.
Finally, these results indicate that more attention needs to be paid to the 
differences that exist among secondary registers, both as a group as well as in terms 
of their relationship to a parent register. This is particularly true of the United 
Kingdom’s four second registers, which are similar only at the ratings level. Also, 
out of all the second and international registers, NIS has the greatest disparity 
between it and its parent register on all but one crewing level, which puts it in a 
markedly different category than DIS, which has crewing patterns that more closely 
resemble its parent register. From a broader perspective, these results reveal the 
various ways in which secondary registers are being used by shipowners to remain 
competitive in the face of increased economic competition. This lack of convergence 
suggests the need for more subtle analysis of secondary registers, demonstrating that 
state strategies for dealing with the processes of globalization can develop in 
multiple ways and have different consequences even if they seem identical at the 
outset.
4.8 Seafarer Nationality by Region
Having compared the proportion of national to foreign seafarers on secondary 
registers to that of their parent states, it is logical to investigate further the source of
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non-national labour. Are European registers merely opening employment 
opportunities to other EU states? Or are nationals of high-wage states being replaced 
by foreign nationals from those countries with low wages? Given the fact that non­
national crew members are paid based on a wage scale negotiated in their home 
states (with the exception of those vessels bound by ITF collective bargaining 
agreements, as mentioned earlier), it is necessary to pinpoint the origin of vessels’ 
foreign labour in order to get an accurate sense of the way in which shipowners are 
reducing labour costs.
There are several ways an analysis of home regions of a register’s crews can 
be framed. Returning to the account by Frobel and his colleagues of The New 
International Division of Labour (1980), they specifically identify two shifts of 
relocation of production:
1) from the United States to Western Europe and Latin America; from
Western Europe to Southern Europe; and from Japan to South Korea and
Taiwan; and
2) to Eastern Europe, South America, Central Africa, and South Asia.
While moving the location of production is slightly different from a shipowner 
looking to a new source of labour, both have the same effect of potentially allowing 
a company to cut costs drastically while at the same time promoting the kind of 
uneven development cited in rescaling arguments.
For the purposes of this analysis, seafarer nationalities are broken down by 
home region based on the system used by Lane et al (2002). The authors’ regional 
classifications are useful because they separate out key areas of the global labour
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market for seafarers (such as Eastern Europe and East Asia), but are also simple 
enough to be able to identify trends and potentially have enough cases to meet the 
requirements for the application of statistical tests. Also, using a similar 
classification system also facilitates comparisons between the 2002 dataset used in 
this thesis and the ones used by Lane et al. The authors group seafarers’ home 
countries into five regions: OECD, Eastern Europe, Far East, South Asia/Middle 
East, and Latin America/Africa. In order to provide a more detailed analysis, South 
Asia can be separated from the Middle East and Latin America from Africa. 
Additionally, since this thesis is more concerned with national versus non-national 
labour than issues related to multinational crews, the OECD category is collapsed 
into three separate groups to allow for the identification of patterns based on EU 
membership: national, non-national European Union, and other OECD states. 
Because EU classification is being used as a proxy for labour costs, only “old EU” 
states are included in the “Non-National EU category,” as these have traditional 
high-wage European economies.28
28 The list of “old” EU states includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. A full list of 
states and their analytic categories for this chapter can be found in Appendix E.
Figure 4.10: Seafarer Nationalities Grouped According to Region
by Register Type
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Figure 4.10, above, shows the home regions of seafarers crewing each type of 
register. The graph demonstrates that national registers are primarily crewed by then- 
own citizens, with additional, but considerably smaller, proportions of seafarers 
coming from Eastern Europe, the Far East, and Southern Asia. On the other hand, 
aside from the difference in the percentage of national seafarers noted earlier in this 
chapter, secondary and open registers tend to mirror each other, with the majority of 
their seafarers originating from Far Eastern and Eastern European states. It should 
also be noted that none of the three register types draw much of their foreign labour 
from non-national EU or other OECD countries.
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Figure 4.11: Regional Nationalities of Officers by Register Type
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The two charts separating officers (4.11) and ratings (4.12) show that a main 
difference between secondary and open registers is in the retention of national 
officers. On open registers, the majority of these jobs appear to go to nationals of 
Far Eastern states. In terms of ratings, secondary and open registers are looking 
equally to the Far East as a source of labour, but also, Eastern Europe, although to a 
lesser degree. Shipowners on national registers, on the other hand, do not appear to 
have significantly tapped into the Eastern European labour market, employing 
officers and ratings from this region at roughly equal, and relatively low, levels (7% 
and 8%, respectively). Having noted these broad trends regarding seafarer 
nationalities on different register types, the following sections move into a discussion 
of the differences in seafarers’ home regions on individual secondary and national 
register pairs.
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Figure 4.12: Regional Nationalities of Ratings by Register Type
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4.8.1 Denmark -  DIS
The Danish national register and DIS have similar patterns with regard to the 
source of non-national labour. As Figure 4.13, below, shows, the two registers 
mirror each other, with non-national crew members coming almost entirely from 
non-EU and non-OECD states. For both registers, Far Eastern states are the home 
countries of most non-national crew members (44% for Denmark and 31% for DIS). 
Of the rest, the Danish national register is fairly split between Eastern European and 
South Asian seafarers (8% each), while DIS has primarily the former (16%).
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Figure 4.13: Officer Nationalities by Region on Denmark and
DIS Registers
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Figure 4.14: Ratings Nationalities by Region on Denmark 
and DIS Registers
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Breaking down seafarer nationality regions into those of officers and ratings, 
as in Figures 4.13 and 4.14 above, reveal similar patterns between the two registers. 
On both, national seafarers are principally employed as officers, and there are 
relatively low proportions of Danish ratings (6% on Denmark and 5% on DIS). The 
few non-nationals serving as officers are mainly citizens of Far Eastern states, while 
ratings are split between the Far East and Eastern Europe. This disparity between
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home regions of non-national ratings is the only major difference between the two 
registers in terms of crewing. For Denmark, 80% of non-national ratings are from 
the Far East, while only 14% are from Eastern European states. DIS’ non-national 
ratings are divided slightly more evenly, with 62% from the Far East and 32% from 
Eastern Europe. The reason for this difference is uncertain. It could relate to 
individual preferences of shipowners on each register, but making such a 
determination would require further analyses of shipowner behaviour.
Taken together, the above data implies that owners on the Danish national 
register and DIS are employing almost identical strategies with regard to crewing. 
This is not what is expected from the general hypothesis that secondary registers 
exist to provide greater relief from costly aspects of shipping than the national 
register. In this instance, however, both registers retain high levels of nationals at the 
officer level while looking to specific non-OECD and non-EU regions to find 
cheaper foreign labour for lower-skilled positions. This situation suggests that there 
is a limit to the porosity of the Danish national labour force, although it will be 
interesting to whether the removal of the requirement that there be a Danish 
shipmaster affects this.
4.8.2 France -  TAFF
Like Denmark and DIS, the French national register and TAFF have 
comparable patterns in terms of crew nationality. As the graph below demonstrates, 
less than half of the crew members on either registers are not French nationals, and 
only a small percentage (0% on the national register and 4% on TAFF) are from EU 
states other than France. A significant proportion of the non-nationals on the
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national register come from Far Eastern states (61% of crew), while TAFF’s 
primarily originate from Eastern European states (36% of crew). It is also interesting 
that the Far East and Eastern Europe are the only sources of the French register’s 
non-national labour, while TAFF’s are from a wider variety of regions. Thus, 
although the two registers may look similar in terms of overall national versus non­
national composition, their shipowners are employing labour from different sources.
Figure 4.15: Officer Nationalities by Region on France and 
TAFF Registers
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Figure 4.16: Ratings Nationalities by Region on France and
TAFF Registers
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The graphs above, examining seafarer nationality regions separated by rank, 
show the extent of the differences that exist between the two registers. On the 
national register, non-national officers are mainly from Far Eastern states, with a 
smaller proportion from Eastern Europe (49% and 5% of total officers, respectively). 
The composition of officers is reversed on the TAFF secondary register, where 31% 
of the officers are from Eastern Europe and only 4% from the Far East. A similar 
pattern emerges in looking solely at ratings; close to 80% of the national register’s 
ratings originate from Far Eastern states, while the rest are split between French 
nationals and nationals of Eastern European countries. On TAFF, the greatest 
individual source of non-national ratings is Eastern Europe, although the Far East, 
Africa, and, to a lesser extent, non-national EU and South Asian states, provide 
labour as well.
Overall, it seems that the French national register and TAFF are analogous 
with regard to their overall crew compositions, which, again, is not what was 
hypothesised. Both France and TAFF have a comparable proportion of national to
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non-national seafarers at both crewing levels, and neither is looking to other EU or 
OECD states as a source of foreign labour. This suggests that shipowners are 
utilising the two registers in a similar way, reducing costs by employing mostly non­
national ratings and over a third non-national officers. However, the contrast of 
labour sources, with the national register looking primarily to the Far East and the 
secondary register to Eastern Europe, is unusual, particularly because it occurs across 
both crewing levels. This could point to general trends in the preference of 
shipowners on the French national versus TAFF register, but it may also represent 
the growing role of Eastern Europe in training and providing seafarers to the global 
market.
4.8.3 Netherlands — Netherlands Antilles
As noted earlier in the chapter, the main difference between the Netherlands 
national and Netherlands Antilles registers is the proportion of nationals employed: 
36% on the national register and 6% on the secondary one. In examining the origin 
of non-national seafarers, this divergence continues. As with many of the other 
parent-secondary register pairs, both the Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles 
registers are crewed by a minimum of non-national seafarers from EU states, and 
even fewer from OECD countries. Instead, shipowners on the national register look 
to the Far East and, to a lesser extent, Eastern Europe, as a source of labour (36% 
and 18% of total seafarers, respectively). The opposite is true of vessels on the 
Netherlands Antilles register, of which 59% of seafarers are from Eastern European 
states and 28% from the Far East.
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Figure 4.17: Officer Nationalities by Region on Netherlands
and Netherlands Antilles Registers
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Figure 4.18: Ratings Nationalities by Region on Netherlands 
and Netherlands Antilles Registers
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In examining nationalities of officers and ratings separately, the data 
highlights some key differences between the two registers. As Figure 4.18, above, 
shows, officers on the national register are chiefly Netherlands nationals, although 
Eastern Europeans make up approximately 25% of the group. On the Netherlands 
Antilles register, officers are mainly from Eastern Europe (67%), with a lesser 
percentage from the Far East (16%). There is a clear division in the source of ratings
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between the two registers as well. On the national register, ratings are primarily 
from Far Eastern states (65%) with barely a tenth of the group from Eastern Europe. 
On the Netherlands Antilles register, on the other hand, Eastern Europeans make up 
over half of the ratings group, while 30% are from the Far East.
On the whole, the data show that shipowners on the Netherlands and 
Netherlands Antilles registers are employing slightly different crewing strategies 
with regard to seafarer nationality. Those on the Netherlands national register are 
clearly protecting national jobs at the officer level, while looking to the Far East for 
ratings. Those on the secondary Netherlands Antilles register are employing 
primarily Eastern Europeans at both crewing levels, with a lesser proportion from 
Far Eastern states. As such, this case supports traditional hypotheses; shipowners on 
the national register retain high-level jobs for nationals, looking to foreign sources 
for less-skilled labour, whereas vessels on the secondary register have a greater 
percentage of non-nationals serving as both officers and ratings. Like the 
France/TAFF comparison, however, what is most interesting in examining the 
Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles registers is the contrast in the source of non­
national labour, which has not been considered a major issue in the literature.
4.8.4 Norway — NIS
There is a large disparity between the proportion of nationals employed on 
the Norwegian national and NIS registers. Like many of the other register pairs, 
non-national seafarers on these registers are not from high-wage EU or OECD states, 
but rather from other world regions. Shipowners on the Norwegian national register 
are drawing non-national labour almost evenly from Far Eastern and Eastern
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European states (7% and 12%, respectively). NIS, on the other hand, is primarily 
composed of crew members who are nationals of Far Eastern states, with lesser 
percentages from Eastern Europe and South Asia.
Figure 4.19: Officer Nationalities by Region on Norway and NIS
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Figure 4.20: Ratings Nationalities by Region on Norway and 
NIS Reaisters
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Examining officers and ratings separately, more detailed patterns emerge. It 
is clear that where shipowners on the Norwegian national register employ non­
national officers, they are almost exclusively from the Far East region. Non-national
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ratings on the national register, however, are almost evenly split between being 
nationals of Eastern European and Far East states. On NIS, across both crewing 
levels, the majority of non-nationals employed are from Far Eastern states, with 
lesser numbers of seafarers from Eastern Europe and Southern Asia.
Overall, patterns of crewing on Norway and NIS clearly support traditional 
hypotheses regarding the role of secondary registers: the former is the safeguard of 
national jobs, while the latter allows shipowners to reduce costs by employing 
foreign labour. This case, however, is more interesting for what it reveals about 
striations of labour within individual registers than comparisons between them. On 
the Norwegian national register, a reliance on the Far East for non-national officers 
is standard practice; what is unusual is that non-national ratings are almost as likely 
to be from Eastern Europe as from the Far East. This result could be due to the 
relatively low percentage of non-national ratings on the register; since most of the 
ratings are nationals, and costs therefore high regardless, perhaps it matters less what 
the source of non-national labour is. On the secondary NIS register, a greater 
percentage of nationals are employed as officers than ratings, but, interestingly, the 
pattern of home regions of non-national labour is essentially the same for both 
officers and ratings. Also worth noting for NIS is the proportion of seafarers from 
Southern Asia, particularly at the officer level, and that the register has not embraced 
Eastern Europe as a labour source to the same extent as many of the other secondary 
registers.
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4.8.5 United Kingdom -- Secondary Registers
Aside from noticeable differences in the proportion of nationals employed, 
which was discussed in the previous section, the United Kingdom and its four 
Category 1 Red Ensign registers look similar in terms of the source of their non- 
national labour. As shown in Figure 4.21, below, on all registers, non-national 
labour is overwhelmingly rooted in Eastern European and Far Eastern states, with 
less than ten-percent of non-national labour from other EU or OECD states. 
Shipowners on the UK’s national register continue the pattern found on other 
national registers, using mostly Far Eastern non-national seafarers and a lesser 
percentage of those from Eastern Europe. Gibraltar, conversely, has a greater 
percentage (nearly 60%) of Eastern Europeans crewing its fleet, but fewer seafarers 
from the Far East (less than 30%). Shipowners on Bermuda and Cayman Islands 
employ approximately the same proportions of Eastern European to Far Eastern 
seafarers (about 48% and 38%, respectively), while the Isle of Man has slightly 
lower levels of Eastern Europeans on its vessels.
Figure 4.21: Officer Nationalities by Region on United Kingdom 
and Selected Red Ensign Registers
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Exploring officer and rating nationalities separately, figures 4.21 and 4.22, 
below, show that shipowners on the UK are looking to Eastern Europe and the Far 
East equally for officers, but overwhelmingly to the latter for ratings. Seafarer 
nationalities on the remainder of the Red Ensign registers follow a consistent pattern: 
non-nationals at the officer level are mostly from Eastern European states, while 
those at the ratings level are more closely split between being from Eastern European 
or Far East states. Bermuda and Isle of Man both have greater percentages of ratings 
from the Far East than Eastern Europe, while the opposite is true of Cayman Islands 
and Gibraltar. Another interesting observation is that Gibraltar has the highest 
proportion of officers from other EU states (14%).
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Figure 4.22: Ratings Nationalities by Region on United 
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While the UK’s national register more or less conforms to expectations in the 
employment of foreign nationals, particularly in terms of the percentage of ratings 
from the Far East, the most surprising result of the comparison of crewing patterns
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on the UK and other Red Ensign registers is the fact that there are so many 
similarities among the UK’s so-called secondary registers, despite the many 
variations in how each is set up and run. However, the few differences that do exist 
are also telling. For example, Gibraltar and Cayman Islands are nearly identical in 
the nationality breakdown of their ratings, but diverge in terms of their officers, 
which are overwhelmingly from Eastern European states (which the other Red 
Ensign registers seem to draw from the Far East). This difference could be due to 
Gibraltar’s unique status among Red Ensign secondary registers as a full member of 
the EU, which may allow for relatively easy access to the Eastern European labour 
market. EU participation would also explain the proportion of EU officers employed 
on Gibraltar’s fleet.
4.9 Discussion
Overall, the breakdown of seafarer nationalities by home region and at 
different crewing levels reveals key trends about the source of labour on national and 
secondary register vessels, as well as how shipowners are using these two register 
types. As noted in the previous section, there is clear divergence between the 
national and secondary registers in terms of the proportion of nationals employed, 
which would be expected given conventional arguments regarding secondary 
registers. However, a closer examination of seafarer nationalities shows that this 
divergence continues with regard to seafarers’ home regions. Where shipowners on 
national registers employ non-national seafarers, they tend to be from Far Eastern 
states (mainly the Philippines), particularly at the ratings level. Secondary registers,
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on the other hand, tend to be crewed by greater percentages of Eastern European 
seafarers.
One explanation for this phenomenon is that seafarers from states that have 
recently joined the recently joined the EU, Poland and Croatia, in particular, are 
perceived to be better-educated due to these countries’ seafarer training processes, 
and are therefore more desirable to shipowners (Wu and Veiga 2004). From this 
perspective it could be claimed that shipowners on these registers are cutting costs in 
other areas but wanting to ensure quality in their crewing component, although this 
claim is made suspect by contradictory reports citing low skills and poor training 
among Eastern European seafarers. Another possibility is that shipowners on 
secondary registers are more flexible or more aware of new sources of labour (and 
therefore have an easier time adapting to them) than their counterparts on national 
registers.
While this divergence on seafarer nationality is commonly seen in these 
register pairs, the data reveals several notable counter-examples. The Danish and 
DIS registers, for example, show nearly identical crewing strategies on the part of 
their shipowners in terms of both the proportion of national to non-national labour, 
as well as the source of the latter. Additionally, both rely more heavily on the Far 
East than Eastern Europe for officer- and ratings-level seafarers, making DIS an 
exception to the trend discussed above. At the other end of the spectrum is the 
Norway-NIS comparison, and the differences between to the two registers in both the 
percentage of non-national seafarers employed as well their home regions. In the 
middle, both the presence and absence of differences between register pairs is
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noteworthy. For example, the fact that seafarers on the TAFF register are from a 
wider variety of regions than that of France, or that the UK’s secondary registers 
converge to the extent that they do, would not necessarily have been expected based 
on previous research.
4.10 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the nationality of seafarers crewing vessels on 
secondary and national register pairs, explicitly considering seafarer rank and home 
region. Results of the data confirm some of the broad hypotheses outlined earlier. 
First, the sample shows that shipowners on both national and secondary registers are 
looking to foreign labour, at least as a source of ratings. That relatively few of these 
non-national seafarers (on any register type) are from high-wage European Union or 
OECD states shows that these owners perceive this as a cost-cutting manoeuvre. 
That many registers, both national and secondary, have relaxed or abandoned 
nationality requirements for their vessels’ crews over the past few decades shows 
that this is an issue on which states are willing to compromise. Secondly, European 
seafarers appear to figure prominently in shipowners’ choice of crews. Whether due 
to EU membership (in the case of Gibraltar, which is unique among the UK’s 
secondary registers in being a member of the EU), easier access to the market for 
Eastern European labour than that of the Far East, or internalized preferences by 
shipowners for European seafarers, the fact that Eastern European seafarers are so 
prevalent, particularly at the officer level, exemplifies the shift that has occurred in 
the labour market for seafarers.
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One particularly interesting result from this chapter shows that the divergence 
of crewing patterns on the different secondary registers, whether controlled by the 
parent state or the offshore territory, show that similar strategies (in this case, the 
relaxation of nationality requirements for crews present on nearly all secondary 
registers), do not necessarily have the same consequences. Furthermore, the lack of 
consistent convergence or divergence in crew nationalities among secondary and 
national registry pairs more broadly suggests the need for more subtle analysis when 
examining secondary registers as a group. This is particularly true of the UK’s 
secondary registers, whose shipowners all appear to be employing crews of differing 
nationality patterns.
Additionally, the data reaffirms the extent to which the labour market for 
seafarers is global. The variations in the source of non-national labour, both between 
parent-secondary register pairs as well as among them, show that seafarers on all 
registers are drawn from across the globe. Certain patterns do emerge, and as Lane 
acknowledges, “the labour market may be fluid, but it is not characterised by large 
and rapid inflows and outflows over short time periods” (Lane 1996, 36). This 
suggests that the prevalence of Far Eastern (particularly Filipino) and Eastern 
European seafarers may continue, but also that, should a new source of labour 
become available, shipowners, may be willing to replace these groups.
One way of thinking about the results of this data is by reframing the 
theoretical perspective of rescaling so that the national is not treated either as 
irrelevant or assigned primary importance, but rather regarded as one scale amongst 
others (Mansfield 2005). Contrary to those theorists who assert that globalization
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undermines the explanatory value of the national scale, it still appears to be relevant, 
as the data shows that shipowners on national registers (and, to a lesser extent, 
secondary ones) are retaining some national seafarers, if only at the officer level. 
This, however, could result from various factors including national legislation 
requiring a minimum number of national seafarers (which might be motivated by a 
desire to retain experienced seafarers to ensure the survival of on-shore shipping- 
related business), preferences by ship management companies (which could be based 
anywhere), pressure from domestic or international seafarers’ unions, or, indeed, a 
combination of these, and other, forces acting upon one another. For example, the 
presence of Eastern European officers can be understood not only as a “scaling up” 
of a supranational region resulting in register requirements that might specify a 
particular EU crewing component, but also by identifying what characteristics make 
Eastern European seafarers attractive to shipowners (be they English language skills, 
training and education, or geographical proximity to Western Europe) and the forces 
that affect them.
While identifying seafarer nationalities (and their associated costs) on 
different registers is helpful in conveying a sense of how different registers are 
utilised by shipowners, there are limits to its capacity to provide explanations. 
Mansfield stresses this point, noting that while the kind of empirical analysis 
conducted in this chapter is useful, it frequently “erases the possibility of 
multidimensionality and ends up reasserting an either/or situation in which one scale 
or set of scales must be dominant ” (2005,468). In order to understand the 
particular group of forces acting across multiple, interdependent scales, that i n f o rm
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and initiate the practices of individual secondary registers, it is necessary to carry out 
detailed analyses of secondary registers in their respective contexts. To this end, the 
next two chapters present a case study of a particular secondary register, that of the 
Isle of Man.
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CHAPTER FIVE
“Is Douglas really any less British than Cardiff? ” :29 
A Case Study of the Isle of Man Ship Register
Part I
5.1 Introduction
In an increasingly competitive, globalized world, embedded maritime 
nations, faced with the potential loss of their national shipping industries to more 
fiscally advantageous open registers, have sought ways to retain them. For many of 
these states, second and international registers have been an important economic 
strategy. But while on the surface registers in this category appear similar, the 
previous two chapters have shown that, in the strategies employed by both the states 
and the shipowners, this similarity is deceptive. In relation to both the regulatory 
environment on board vessels and crewing strategy, it has become clear that these 
registers cannot be grouped into one analytic category; what is required is a more 
sophisticated analysis.
These issues are important because the differences between secondary 
registers and their respective parent states help us to understand them in the context 
of the broader registry spectrum and what implications they might have for the 
merchant shipping industry generally. But what these points fail to address is the 
nature of the relationship between a second register and its home authority. What is 
therefore needed is an in-depth historical analysis to examine the nature of the 
relationship that exists between these two entities and to trace how that particular
29 Asked by Captain D. GT Greenhalgh, then managing director of Celtic Pacific Shipping Ltd, in a 
Letter to the Editor published in Lloyds List (1991).
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relationship developed. These are the kinds questions that need to be addressed if 
these registers are to be analysed adequately and their role as “offshore” entities 
accurately assessed.
This chapter and the one that follows explore in detail the Isle of Man ship 
register. One of four Category 1 registers30 in the Red Ensign Group (REG), the 
collective body of the United Kingdom’s secondary registers, the Isle of Man has 
worked to position itself strategically both among British registers and within the 
global registry system as a whole. The first section of this chapter explores the way 
that the Isle of Man ship register resulted from the conditions created by the UK’s 
shipping crisis in the 1970s and a desire on the part of the island to diversify its 
emerging economy.
5.2 From Fishing Boats to 50,000-Ton Tankers: The Development of the Isle
of Man Ship Register
Secondary registers, including that of the Isle of Man, are frequently 
characterised as having been created by embedded maritime nations to provide their 
shipping industries with a fiscally advantageous “national alternative” to open 
registers (Stopford 1997, 437). But while the Isle of Man ship register does benefit 
British shipping, contrary to what might be expected, it was not developed as a 
conscious policy effort by the United Kingdom. Instead, it was the unusual 
constitutional relationship between the UK and the Isle of Man, coupled with the 
latter’s development as an offshore financial centre, that set the foundation on which
30 The Red Ensign Group is divided into Category 1 and Category 2 registers. Category 1 registers 
are permitted to register vessels of any size, and include the Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, and 
Isle of Man registers. Category 2 registers are restricted to registering commercial vessels weighing 
less than 150 GT and pleasure vessels weighing less than 400 GT (The Red Ensign Group, 2005).
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a register could be built. This section describes the conditions that led to the Manx 
register’s creation.
5.2.1 Constitutional Relationship between the Isle of Man and United
Kingdom
Located in the middle of the Irish Sea, the Isle of Man is a Crown 
Dependency of the United Kingdom. Like the two other Crown Dependencies 
Jersey and Guernsey, the Isle of Man is internally self-governing. According to the 
UK’s Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA), which oversees and liaises with 
the Crown Dependencies, Isle of Man, Jersey, and Guernsey are seen to be ‘“British 
Possessions’ but not ‘colonies’” (Dept for Constitutional Affairs, 2002). The island 
has its own Parliament, known as the Tynwald, but legislation developed there must 
be given Royal Assent by the island’s Lieutenant Governor, who functions as the 
Queen’s representative. As the Isle of Man normally confers with the DC A when 
legislation is in the early stages of being drafted and laws generally address local 
Manx issues, the DCA says that it would be “wholly exceptional” for Royal Assent 
not to be given to a piece of legislation (Dept for Constitutional Affairs, 2002). The 
UK is responsible for all of the Isle of Man’s external affairs, including defence and 
international agreements, as well as the general “good governance” of the island.
The extent to which the Isle of Man is self-governing has gradually increased 
over the past half-century. Pearce (2003), who suggests that the Isle of Man is 
effectively a British colony, notes that “the Westminster Parliament, though 
acknowledging no restriction on the spheres in which it can (if it sees reason) 
legislate for the Island, has in practice adopted a policy of self-restraint over ‘internal 
affairs’” (2003, 374). In other words, this measure of freedom from the UK seems to
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result more from the absence of the UK’s hand in determining policy than any 
conscious move by the Isle of Man to gain greater autonomy. This argument was 
echoed in interviews with officials both in the Isle of Man and the United Kingdom; 
it appears that there are a wide range of issues, both shipping-related and not, on 
which the United Kingdom could rule for the island, but chooses not to.
What enables this flexible relationship between the British and Manx 
governments is the lack of any formal underlying constitutional foundation. As the 
DCA notes,
the constitutional relationship of the Islands with the United Kingdom is not 
enshrined in a formal constitutional document. It is rather the outcome of 
historical processes and accepted practice. . .and the Islands are known to be 
particularly sensitive to the need to obtain their consent, in accordance with 
democratic principle, to any decision taken in the United Kingdom which has 
legal implications for them (Dept for Constitutional Affairs 2002).
Essentially, the relationship between the UK and the Isle of Man works precisely
because it is a working relationship. The UK has a responsibility to consider Manx
opinion when legislating on matters relevant to the island, not because of there are
laws requiring it to do so but rather due to established custom and political principle.
Similarly, the Isle of Man must defer to UK authority on issues that are international
in scope. But the Isle of Man could, with the support of its populace, declare its
independence from the UK, which would not have the power to stop it. The UK,
however, could not and would not dissociate itself from the island. As one Manx
government official explained, the UK “don’t want us to fail. They wouldn’t want to
be responsible for the island going under” (Interviewee #6).
Since there is no codified text laying out the UK’s specific responsibilities to
and powers over the island, ambiguities can arise when legislation passed by the UK
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Parliament affects the Isle of Man. In these situations, which frequently involve 
international issues, it is acceptable for the UK to become directly involved in 
internal Manx lawmaking. For example, if an international convention is extended 
to the Isle of Man,31 the UK expects the island to comply with all of the convention’s 
requirements and amend or update national Manx laws accordingly. Should the 
Manx government fail to do so (a situation which has not yet been tested) the UK 
could retract the island’s participation in the convention or seek to force the island’s 
compliance. As the party ultimately responsible to the international organisation 
making the convention and for the island’s external affairs, the UK has the authority 
to pursue such a course of action.
It is less clear whether the UK can legislate on behalf of a Crown 
Dependency on individual international issues in cases where the convention was 
extended to the Isle of Man unsolicited. This issue has recently arisen as a result of 
the European Court of Human Rights’ rulings regarding homosexuality. Although 
the Crown Dependencies are not members of the European Union, the UK extended 
to them the EU’s Convention on Human Rights in 1953 (Department for 
Constitutional Affairs [no date a]). The Court found in Dudgeon v UK (1981) that 
legislation criminalising consensual sexual acts between men was a breach of Human 
Rights Convention Articles 8 and 14, while in Sutherland v UK (1996) the Court 
found that it was illegal to have a higher age of consent for gay men, but these
31 As a Crown Dependency, the Isle of Man cannot sign and ratify international agreements in its own 
right. The United Kingdom, as steward of all of its Crown Dependencies’ external affairs, serves as 
negotiator and signatory to individual conventions, and must ratify a convention before it can be 
extended to territories like the Isle of Man. Prior to 1951, Crown Dependencies were automatically 
included in any convention or international agreement ratified by the UK. Since that time, Crown 
Dependencies have been allowed to decide whether or not to have individual treaties extended to them 
by the UK (Department for Constitutional Affairs 2002)
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rulings were not received favourably in the Isle of Man or Jersey. The former 
eventually legalized homosexuality, although, as one Manx government official 
explained, it was not entirely voluntary: “there’d been some quite impassioned 
arguments on both sides, and it was felt that, ultimately, if  the Isle o f Man didn ’t 
legalize, the UK might do it for us ” (Interviewee #6). Jersey continued to contest the 
issue until it changed the law in 2007 (Sexual Offences (Jersey) Law 2007). It is 
unclear whether the UK could have passed legislation on this issue on Jersey’s 
behalf, had it not complied, or whether the UK has lost the effective power to do so 
through custom and practice.
These examples illustrate the vague nature of the formal relationship that 
exists between the United Kingdom and its Crown Dependencies, including the Isle 
of Man. Although it is unlikely that any shipping-related issue could challenge the 
established Manx-British constitutional link, it is important to recognize both the 
relationship’s flexibility and its limitations. On matters concerning the island alone, 
the British government has little reason or authority to interfere beyond fulfilling its 
duty to give Royal Assent to Acts of Tynwald. Thus given the nature of the 
relationship between the Isle of Man and the UK, the latter would have been unlikely 
to attempt to prevent the island from developing its ship register in the 1980s. Where 
Manx legislation has international implications, however, the UK has far more 
influence, as it is responsible to the rest of the world for the Isle of Man’s activities. 
As a result, shipping is an area on which Manx and British government departments 
tend to collaborate, although the overlapping realms of authority can also produce 
tensions.
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5.2.2 Development of the Isle of Man as an Offshore Financial Centre
Given its status as a Crown Dependency, the Isle of Man has, for the most 
part, stood apart from the economy of mainland Britain and been free to develop 
with relatively few restrictions. Thus, while the Isle of Man benefited from the 
general liberalisation of the United Kingdom’s financial policies, particularly those 
made under the Thatcher government (1979-1990), the island had already begun 
developing its own financial centre prior to this time. The island’s fiscal control 
body, at that time known as the Manx Finance Board, expanded its executive powers 
in 1961, and it quickly lowered the rate of income tax to 21.25% (which took it 
beneath the level of the UK’s) and eliminated the tax’s surcharge (Home Office 
1998), making the island more attractive to outside investors. By 1982, the financial 
services sector provided approximately a quarter of the island’s total income, and 
offshore banking was its biggest industry (Hall 1982a). It seems that much of this 
revenue originated outside of the UK; the Isle of Man’s treasurer at the time is 
quoted as saying that non-UK business grew faster than UK-related business as a 
result of exchange controls being removed in 1979 (Hall 1982a).
Despite this early growth, the Isle of Man did not become a strong competitor 
for offshore business activities until the mid-1980s. Although the financial centre 
was marketed on the island’s “political stability and financial probity”(Hall, 1982, 
13), the “spectacular” collapse of its Savings and Interest Bank in 1982 set its efforts 
back considerably (Solly, quoted in Cobb 2001, 16). The following year, a Financial 
Supervision Commission was established as part of a government overhaul of the 
sector in order to renew investor confidence as well as the island’s reputation (Cobb
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2001). Additionally, worries persisted that foreign exchange controls would be 
reinstated by the UK or that the Bank of England might use its authority to inspect 
the bank accounts of those investing on the island (Riley 1982). These concerns 
appear to have lessened over the late 1980s and 1990s; between 1996 and 2001, the 
financial sector grew by 80% (Economic Strategy 2004). Today, with the continuing 
support of the Manx government, finance constitutes approximately 35% of the 
national income (Economic Affairs Division 2006). The Isle of Man ship register 
plays a part in this, drawing shipping related business to the island’s banking and 
legal services.
5.2.3 The British Shipping Crisis of the 1970s
While the Isle of Man offshore finance centre expanded, British shipping was 
experiencing a crisis. Generous government subsidies and tax breaks through the 
1960s had encouraged shipbuilding worldwide, and the closure of the Suez Canal in 
1967 created the need for additional shipping services. These circumstances led to 
an overabundance of inexpensive vessels reaching the market in the late 1970s (ILO 
2004). At the same time, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) reduced its oil production in 1973 and 1978, driving prices up and causing 
serious problems for the international shipping industry.
Additionally, the excess supply of vessels resulted in lower freight rates for 
all types of ships (ILO 2004). Political events, including the reopening of the Suez 
Canal in 1975 (through which many of the newly built large oil tankers could not 
pass), compounded these effects. Futhermore, the direct costs associated with 
operating ships increased as oil prices went up, which reduced companies’ profit
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margins (Hope 1990). With little government support in the form of the subsidies or 
tax breaks that were available in the years before the Thatcher government, these 
high prices led many UK shipowners to move to open or secondary registers, which 
led to a haemorrhage of the British fleet (see Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1: Gross Tonnage on U.K. Register 1970-1990
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5.2.4 Creating a Legislative Framework for a Manx Ship Register
One of the consequences of this upheaval in British shipping was the 
establishment of the Isle of Man ship register in its current form in the mid-1980s. 
Like other British overseas territories and crown dependencies, the Isle of Man did 
keep a register of ships prior before this period.32 Created in the late 1700s by the 
UK’s Merchant Shipping Act (1786), for most of the twentieth century, the Isle of 
Man functioned as a branch of the UK register. As it is explained in one of the 
Tynwald debates in the late 1970s, “Manx ships [were] registered as part of the 
United Kingdom register maintained by the Customs and Excise on behalf of the
32 . . .It is interesting to note that Jersey and Guernsey both also developed offshore industries, but neither 
made significant moves into the shipping market.
121
Board of Trade and Industry” with the Manx Harbour Board having its “own 
register.. .built up by our own personnel, of all the Manx fishing boats,” which at the 
time numbered approximately 70-80 vessels (Mann 1978, 156). According to one 
former Manx marine official, at the time the vessels registered on the island were 
“the local steam packet, local coastal company ships, a few barges, a few tugs. 
Nothing spectacular” (Interviewee #15). At that point a Manx merchant shipping 
industry, consisting of ocean-trading vessels controlled and maintained by the Isle of 
Man, did not exist.
Despite the presence of a UK register on the island, from a legal perspective, 
the “position as far as merchant shipping control in the Isle of Man [went, was] in 
simple terms a hotch-potch” (Mann 1978, 153). Many of the island’s shipping 
regulations were based on British legislation from the late 1800s, and what updates 
had been made in Tynwald or Parliament were vague and incomplete. For example, 
as of 1979, if a shipowner wanted to appeal a surveyor’s decision on the condition of 
a vessel, Manx legislation specified that the court where such a case would be 
taken up must be run by an officer known as a water bailiff. The position of water 
bailiff, however, was abolished in the early 1900s (MacDonald 1979, 60-61). Also 
of concern was the set of regulations governing the certification of passenger ships. 
Vessels were obligated to carry certificates showing they had been examined, but 
British legislation did not authorise anyone to actually carry out these examinations 
in the Isle of Man. Thus the certificates these ships carried were essentially illegal 
(MacDonald 1979, 59).
33 All vessels must be surveyed prior to registration with a flag state and issued with certificates 
attesting to the vessel's "seaworthiness" and other characteristics.
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The Isle of Man’s archaic and ambiguous maritime legislation meant that the 
island’s shipping, in the words of one Manx representative, was “only workable 
because of the blind eye that [was] being turned.. .more than occasionally by various 
organisations,” which resulted in Manx ships being operated “to a very large degree 
on grace and favour terms and that [was] potentially dangerous” (Lowey 1979, 246). 
Thus, there was a need for the Isle of Man to find a means of applying to Manx law, 
consistently and comprehensively, the provisions required by the conventions that 
had been extended to it, which were necessary for ship safety, and to arrange for the 
conventions that had not yet been extended.34
Given the increase in international merchant shipping regulation over the past 
half-century, the UK’s responsibility for the actions of its overseas territories and 
crown dependencies, the Isle of Man’s desire to expand its shipping industry as a 
means of economic diversification, and the “mass of apparent irregularities” present 
in the island’s maritime laws, a thorough reworking of shipping-related legislation 
was needed fix the muddled legal situation facing Manx shipping (MacDonald 1979, 
59). The Manx government’s wish to meet the requirements of the International 
Maritime Organisation’s 1974 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and 1978 Standards of 
Training, Certification, and Watch-keeping (STCW), both of which came into effect 
in the early 1980s, jumpstarted the process.
The Manx Attorney General’s office collaborated with the UK Department 
of Trade and Her Majesty’s Customs on five key pieces of legislation that would, 
collectively, update and expand Manx shipping law (see Table 5.1). In addition to
34 For example, the International Convention on Load Lines had been ratified in the UK but not 
extended to the Isle of Man, and thus the regulations supporting it were not written into Manx 
legislation (Quinney 1980 419).
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enacting the legislation required to meet the obligations of the major IMO and ILO 
conventions, these new laws gave the Isle of Man increased control over its shipping 
affairs. As it was explained in Tynwald debates, the Isle of Man took “advantage” of 
the opportunity to use the new legislation assume responsibility for the inspection 
and survey requirements of its ships, and the UK “accepted” that ships operating 
from the island could be provided for by Manx authorities instead of surveyors 
brought across from the UK, as was done previously (MacDonald 1979, 59). 
Specifically, it was the 1979 Merchant Shipping (Detention of Ships) Act gave the 
Manx Harbour Board the authority to detain unsafe national and foreign vessels, 
while the 1979 Merchant Shipping (Passenger Ships’ Survey) Act provided the legal 
foundation for the Board to inspect ships and ensure that surveys were completed.
Act Main Points
1979 Merchant Shipping (Masters and Seamen) -Based on United Kingdom's 1970 Merchant Shipping Act 
covers general manning issues such as seafarers' wages,
1979 Merchant Shipping (Detention of Ships) -Allows for detention of British and foreign vessels
1979 Merchant Shipping (Passenger Ships' Survey) -Authorises Manx inspectors to board and inspect vessels
1982 Merchant Shipping (Load Lines) -Updates Manx legislation to m eet requirements for 
International Convention on Load Lines 
-Appoints Manx Marine Surveyors 
-Grants Manx register power to refuse vessels
1984 Merchant Shipping (Registration)
1985 Merchant Shipping -Authorises Harbor Board to regulate Manx shipping 
based on U.K. legislation (intended to make it easier to
1991 Merchant Shipping (Registration) -Creates Manx register of ships (as opposed to being a 
statutory post of Registrar of British Ships)
-Defines who is qualified to own vessels on Manx register 
and provides for role of representative person 
-Allows for bareboat (demise) chartering
1995 Merchant Shipping -Amends 1991 Act to allow for limited partnerships to own 
vessels on Manx register
I Source: Isle of Man Ship Registry, 2007a-e and individual Merchant Shipping Acts. I
Of the legislation developed over the next seven years, perhaps the most
important was the 1984 Merchant Shipping (Registration) Act. This act laid the 
foundation for the creation of an independent ship register on the Isle of Man by
124
enabling the government the power to refuse to register vessels, a power it
previously lacked. This provision would apply to ships transferred to the island by
the UK through Her Majesty’s Customs, unless the Manx Harbour Board consented
to the transfer. The Merchant Shipping (Registration) Act also provided for the
appointment of marine surveyors, who would be needed to carry out the technical
aspects of running the register (Quinney 1984, 460). This was a central aspect of the
updated legislation; as one former Manx surveyor explained,
our appointments. . .verified how we were formally going to take the 
conventions. Because prior to that. . .to get ships registered here, the UK 
basically looked after all the survey, they wrote the regulations. The Isle of 
Man basically adopted UK regulations. . .But they didn’t have a force here 
who could deal with it (Interviewee #9) .
Providing a legislative framework to develop its own regulations rather than
depending on UK expertise was an important move toward independence for the
Manx register. Debates in the Tynwald reveal that the objective was “to set up an
Isle of Man Register of British Ships which will be controlled largely in the interests
of the Isle of Man with the minimum of involvement of the United Kingdom, except
in terms of acting as our consultants and representing us. . .overseas” (Quinney 1984,
465). This control would include measures to ensure the Manx register be
considered to be a “quality” register, as well as mostly self-sufficient.
Despite this increased autonomy, however, these new laws did not create a
wholly independent register on the Isle of Man. While they enabled the Manx
register to independently manage some of its day-to-day operations of registering
and surveying vessels and write its own regulations, it still remained under the UK
umbrella. Yet, Tynwald debates reveal that Manx representatives were aware of the
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possibility to become autonomous and discussed what format they would prefer such 
a register to take:
Eventually, if we come to establishing a register of our own shipping under 
our own control, we will not accept absent ship operators. We will not fly the 
flag of convenience on behalf of shipping lines which are not physically here 
on the Island or operate here, physically on the Island (Mann 1978, 154).
Tynwald representatives were concerned with ensuring that ships on the register
have a tangible presence on the Isle of Man, and later legislation governing the
register, which would require that a shipmanager be based on the island, reflects this.
Manx lawmakers also ensured that the register would grow gradually and in a
controlled manner. For example, Manx representatives envisaged that the 1984
Merchant Shipping (Registration) Act would limit the type of vessels allowed on to
the register to those for which the Manx Harbour Board had the relevant technical
expertise (Quinney 1984, 461). While this provision was necessary to ensure the
safety of vessels registered on the Isle of Man, the island was also aware that it
would need to maintain a level of regulation similar to that of the United Kingdom so
that shipowners would be willing to consider transferring (Merchant Shipping
(Registration) Bill -Second reading Approved 1984).
While the Isle of Man register did gain vessels following these legislative
changes, it is not entirely clear which played a greater role in facilitating the
development of the register: the Manx government’s desire to diversify its economy
by expanding its shipping industry or shipowners’ interest in moving from the
United Kingdom to a low-cost jurisdiction. At the very least, it is suggested that the
Isle of Man’s government played a critical role in developing the shipping sector as
an economic strategy. As a former surveyor noted,
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In 1984 the Isle o f Man government was concerned about having all its eggs 
in one basket. It was dependent on a financial sector, offshore finance. The 
government at the time decided it needed to diversify the economy and that’s 
when the idea to introduce an international shipping register was developed 
(Interviewee #9).
There is also evidence from parliamentary debates to suggest that lawmakers in Isle 
of Man were aware of the niche in the market that it would fill. Following the 
passage of the Merchant Shipping (Registration) Bill, it was thought that “it would 
be very likely that the United Kingdom ship owners and managers who [sought] an 
offshore base for their operations [would] look favourably on the Isle of Man” and 
choose it, “rather than in some territory such as Bermuda if they have a good 
commercial reason for “flagging out” from the United Kingdom itself’ (Quinney 
1984, 459). This quote reveals that the Isle of Man was conscious of the possibility 
that it would draw ships that would otherwise leave the British register; whether the 
Manx register hoped to attract vessels that would otherwise remain on the British 
flag is difficult to discern. Still, this statement is an important one as it is an 
indication of the early strategy the Isle of Man would pursue to build its register, and 
demonstrates the delicate balance between poaching ships from other UK-tied 
registers and keeping ships under the Red Ensign that might otherwise have flagged 
out.
At the same time, there was a clear level of interest from shipowners in the 
changes being made to the Manx register. As early as 1979, it is mentioned in 
parliamentary debates that “the shipping industry in general is beginning to take 
more interest in the fact that we may be establishing our own shipping register. They 
are . . .looking to the Isle of Man as being a place where they can centre their
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shipping operations and, as such, we see the interest of a seafaring nation once again 
being established in the future” (Mann 1979, 249). The motivation to switch 
registers seems to have come, in part, from the dissatisfaction of UK shipowners 
with the main British register. A former Manx marine surveyor confirms that British 
shipowners approached the Isle of Man about a register because “shipowners in the 
UK at the time were, let’s put it this way, uncomfortable with the way the UK were 
running shipping matters or not running shipping matters. ” He made it clear, 
however, that the shipowners did not “really want to break out o f the British mould” 
(Interviewee #9). Thus, the Isle of Man had an early incentive to offer advantages 
over the main British register, but to otherwise appear similar. This strategy quickly 
paid off, and by 1984, the Merchant Shipping (Registration) Bill was accelerated 
through Tynwald in part because an outside company had already moved to the 
island and had started hiring crews and setting up its offices there (MacDonald 1984, 
419).
Despite its attractiveness to shipowners, the Isle of Man is unusual among 
secondary registers in that it was never intended to be a direct, or instant, source of 
profit. Instead, the objective was on creating long-term investment and employment 
opportunities on the island by attracting shipping-related business, such as ship 
management companies, banking services, and law firms. Less tangibly, it was 
hoped that an “open” Manx register would also serve as an international calling card: 
“it all goes towards building our international image as a safe haven for respectable 
private enterprise. It makes us feel different from the United Kingdom in yet another 
way” (Quinney 1984, 465).
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The Isle of Man case is also distinctive because it provides a counter-example 
to the generally accepted idea that it is the parent state that drives the creation of 
secondary registers. The response given to one Manx minister when he asked if the 
1984 legislation was forced on the island by the UK was, “No, nothing is imposed on 
us at all. We have sought this in our own interests” (MacDonald 1984, 218). In fact, 
the UK’s insistence that the Isle of Man maintain the highest standards, a goal the 
Manx register also shared, may even have slowed down the process. It seems an 
attempt in 1981 to pass legislation similar to what would be in the 1984 Merchant 
Shipping (Registration) Bill was stopped by the United Kingdom’s Customs 
department before it could reach Tynwald (Quinney 1984). By 1984, however, the 
Bill was sent to Manx parliament following a “great deal of consultation” with the 
UK’s then-Department of Trade and the Home Office, from whom the island was 
receiving “every encouragement” (Quinney 1984, 460). By that point, updating the 
Manx shipping legislation was ‘Very important not only to [the Isle of Man] but to 
the United Kingdom” (MacDonald 1984, 229).
5.2.5 Growth of the Isle of Man Ship Register 1984-2000
With the initial legislation to support the register in place and ongoing 
support of the UK, the Isle of Man was able to open the register to shipowners in 
1984. By the end of that year, 35 merchant vessels had registered in the Isle of Man 
(MacDonald 1984, 217). Although this initial new tonnage was almost entirely 
British-owned, by the mid- to late-1980s, the Isle of Man register had begun 
attracting Greek and West German shipowners (Cafruny 1987).
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Despite this early growth, Manx officials were conscious of the need to
maintain the register’s reputation. As one interviewee explained with great clarity,
“the intention. . .was quality rather than quantity. We weren ’t looking to compete
with Liberia, Cyprus, Panama" (Interviewee #9). As such, the Manx register was
developed in such a way as to distance it from just those perceived as deregulated
environments. One means by which this was accomplished was to limit the types of
ships allowed on the register to those that the register had the expertise to survey and
examine thoroughly (although there may have been differences of opinion between
the Isle of Man and the UK on the precise level of the former’s expertise). While
conventional wisdom about secondary registers would dictate that the UK would
want to encourage the Isle of Man to take on as many ships as possible, a former
Manx surveyor recalls that, “we were very restricted initially in the types o f ships we
could take. . .[the UK] were very keen that we shouldn't take oil tankers and gas
tankers, and I ’m sitting there after 24 years [of shipping experience with a major oil
corporation] saying, well, tell me why I  shouldn’t? ” (Interviewee #9).
The ships brought on to the Manx register in 1984 were mostly cargo vessels
(Mann 1984, 1347). Although other ship types were gradually added, the register
continues to refuse to take on passenger vessels or cruise ships. In addition to
limiting the register to certain kinds of ships, Manx officials also tried to shape it by
accepting or disallowing vessels based on other characteristics:
“The Isle o f Man. . .actually became sort ofprescriptive in its own right. It 
was then decided that, well, we can take any ship we want, however, a policy 
developed where they didn *t want ships over 15 years old because we were 
then coming in to the age of, has a tanker got one hull or two hulls, and they 
only wanted double hulls, and this sort o f thing” (Interviewee #9).
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By keeping the average age of the fleet down and trying to adhere to more stringent 
equipment standards over the years, the Manx register was trying to maintain high 
safety standards on its ships while still managing to attract vessels.
Figure 5.2: Gross Tonnage and Number of Ships on the Isle 
of Man Register
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This strategy eventually succeeded, although it was not until the expansion of 
the register in the early 1990s (the effects of which would be seen several years later, 
as shown in Figure 5.2) that the Manx register began to grow. The 1991 Manx 
Merchant Shipping Registration Act, which set the register apart from the main 
British register as an individual entity,35 opened the register up to shipowners from 
the European Union36 and also introduced demise charter registration37 both in and 
out of the flag, which was a unique feature among British registers at the time. This 
move appears to have been driven largely by demand from the shipping industry 
already located on the island:
35 Albeit, one still part of the Red Ensign Group.
36 Prior to this, vessels on the Manx register had to be at least 54% owned by British interests (Ward, 
1997).
37 Demise or bareboat charter registration allows foreign ships that have been leased to adopt the flag 
of their temporary owner.
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There’s quite a large German shipping community here. The two big 
operators. . .both have buildings and full technical management that operate 
out o f the Isle o f Man. So they invested a lot. . .But typically they would want 
to secure finance in Germany and then register the ships in the Isle o f Man, 
so you needed a demise charter arrangement for that, you need the powers to 
be able to do that. . .But it was brought about by private sector, [saying] this 
is what we need (Interviewee #13).
In addition to providing new opportunities for owners to register on the island, the
1991 Act represented a major move away from the auspices of the UK in that it
consolidated existing British and Manx legislation into a single piece of legislation
and created a Manx register of ships. As it is recorded in the Tynwald, “Before this
all we were was a British port of registering. In every aspect of the registration of
ships we were dependent upon British legislation. . . we depended upon British civil
servants, we were effectively in someone else’s hands. We had a titular register
only” (Orme 1991, 1818). This newfound level of autonomy differentiated the Isle
of Man register from other emerging secondary registers, such as Portugal’s MAR
and Spain’s CSR, which, despite being located on offshore jurisdictions, are still
distinctly controlled by their respective national governments rather than the territory
itself (Winchester and Alderton 2003).
Given shipping’s international scope, vessels on the Manx register are still
considered British and ultimately regulated by the UK Secretary of State (a caveat
noted in the 1995 Merchant Shipping Act). However, the UK is concerned mainly
with the safety and “seaworthiness” of Manx vessels, and the legislation developed
in the late 1980s and early 1990s authorised the Isle of Man to develop its register as
it wished. Following dialogue with shipowners (Interviewee #9), the Isle of Man
enacted the 1995 Merchant Shipping Act, which further expanded the register’s
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ownership requirements to allow the registration of ships owned by limited 
partnerships in the Isle of Man and other “prescribed countries,” including Belgium, 
Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and 
the UK. As the Manx register built itself up both in terms of the number of ships 
registered and the comprehensiveness of its shipping legislation, it gained 
increasingly more legal authority to maintain its own register, and would eventually 
function as independently as possible while still remaining part of the Red Ensign .
5.2.6 The Manx Register 2000-2006
Since 2000, the Isle of Man Ship Register has been run by the island’s 
• •  •Marine Administration, which falls under the Manx government’s Department of 
Trade and Industry. The register plays a major role in the island’s economy. Exact 
figures are difficult to obtain, but as of 2004 it was estimated that the shipping 
industry created 400 direct Manx jobs plus an additional 100 “associated” jobs on the 
island, and shipping accounted for 1.4% of the island’s GDP. It was noted by a 
current Manx marine administrator that these figures are “quite significant” for a 
territory as small as the Isle of Man and that there are further immeasurable gains: 
“The revenue benefits o f having those people employed are, the housing, the families 
being here, the spending, the tax, the VAT. . .you ve got a huge amount o f travel on 
and off the island, hotel beds. . .there’s a massive amount that having a shipping 
centre here creates. So the benefits to the economy are endless, really ” (Interviewee 
#13).
38 The Isle of Man Marine Administration recently changed its name to the Isle of Man Ship Registry. 
For this study, however, it will continue to be referred to as the Marine Administration.
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The register currently has four parts, providing for the registration of vessels 
over 24m long, small ships, fishing vessels, and ships chartered by demise. The 
U.N. Law of the Sea stipulates that vessels must have a “genuine link” (United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, Article 91) with their state of 
registration, either through ownership or management; the Isle of Man meets this 
obligation with the latter, as it requires that its ships be managed by companies 
located on the island. More than half the vessel’s ownership must be composed of 
citizens of or companies incorporated in the Isle of Man, the UK (or its 
dependencies), or nationals and companies of EU member states (Merchant Shipping 
(Registration) Act 1991). Major companies with vessels registered on the Isle of 
Man include Shell, BP, and Maersk (Lloyd’s register Fairplay 2007).
Further legislative changes to the Isle of Man register have been implemented 
in recent years to attract new segments of the market and facilitate shipowners’ use 
of the register. In 2003, the Manx register was opened to commercial yachts at the 
request of the island’s shipping industry. Yacht registration had been considered in 
previous years and the legislation to support it had been drafted, but it was ultimately 
abandoned. Then, “the companies that were operating [on the island], were dealing 
with yachts, they were financing yachts, they were settingup company formation, but 
they couldn’t close the loop, they couldn’t register the yachts here, so they said, 
we’re missing a significant slice o f the market’ (Interviewee #13). Although 
yachting is distinct from the merchant shipping industry that is the subject of this 
study, this example demonstrates the Manx register’s desire to accommodate its 
client base. More recently, the Marine Administration’s efforts have been directed at
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the 2006 Merchant Shipping Bill, which would enable the registration of vessels 
under construction39, create increased powers for representative persons on the 
island, and prepare the legislation necessary to meet the requirements of the 
International Labour Organisation’s consolidated convention, which was adopted in 
2006 (Isle of Man Marine Administration 2006). Although the date on which the 
Maritime Labour Convention will come into effect depends on the ratification 
timelines of member states, the Isle of Man is implementing it in advance of its 
ratification by the UK to allow the register’s shipowners sufficient time to meet the 
convention’s requirements.
This focus on customer service is one of the Isle of Man’s primary marketing 
points. The register’s active and flexible approach, along with its good reputation, 
familiarity in terms of language and culture, and, particularly, its Red Ensign status 
are the main reasons why British shipowners choose to flag their vessels in the Isle 
of Man when there are less expensive registers that would be more logical flags to 
move to if cost of registration is the primary concern (Cullinane and Robertshaw, 
1996). As the Isle of Man expanded the parties eligible for registration, the size of 
the register grew steadily, and as of 2005, it had 362 vessels for a total of 8,405,715 
GT. While these figures place it within the world’s twenty largest registers 
(measured by GT), the Isle of Man maintains the objective of “slow, steady growth” 
so as to preserve the quality reputation it has built over the past thirty years.
39 Prior to this legislation, vessels under construction had to initially register in another jurisdiction 
and then transfer to the Isle of Man upon their completion. (Isle of Man Marine Administration 2006).
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5.3 Conclusions
This chapter has traced the rise of the Isle of Man ship register following the 
island’s development as an offshore finance centre and the mass exodus of 
shipowners from the UK register. During the course of the 1980s and 1990s, the 
Manx register grew steadily, accepting a greater number of ship types as it updated 
Manx legislation and refined its in-house capabilities. As this discussion has shown, 
the constitutional relationship between the Isle of Man and the UK has been both 
flexible and constantly evolving. It will be particularly interesting to see how this 
relationship is affected by issues arising from the UK’s membership in the EU, as the 
latter continues to expand its membership and regulatory scope. Although the extent 
to which the Isle of Man is autonomous has generally increased over the past half- 
century, merchant shipping has implications that are at once domestic and 
international, meaning that the UK continues to have greater jurisdiction and 
oversight responsibility in this area of Manx policy as compared to others.
An important point, however, is that the development of the Isle of Man 
register was not driven by the UK but rather the island itself, which sets it apart from 
those secondary registers that were created and continue to be controlled by their 
parent states. And while Ready refers to the register as an “accident of history” 
(1998, 29), this chapter has shown that while the Isle of Man did take advantage of 
certain economic and political conditions, including its pre-existing financial centre 
and the crisis in British shipping, in establishing its register, its design, as part of a 
conscious strategy to diversify the island’s economy, was intentional.
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That the Isle of Man is not using its register as a direct source of profit is also 
interesting. Instead, it seeks to attract and retain tonnage in such a way that will 
allow its on-shore industries to flourish, and, its strategy to accomplish this involves 
ensuring that it is seen to be a highly regulated register. This can also be observed in 
its desire to organise and update its shipping legislation; indeed, one of the main 
reasons why it structured itself as an independent register was so that it could refuse 
to register substandard vessels, which it could not do when it was part of the UK 
register. The Manx register, therefore, runs counter to the notion of secondary 
registers as deregulated “havens,” which is confirmed empirically in Chapter Three’s 
analysis of port state control data. Furthermore, in this case, while the shipping 
industry does appear to influence the policies of the Manx register, the Isle of Man 
seems to control it to its advantage. Thus, rather than this being an example of 
footloose capital driving state decision-making, the Isle of Man appears to be playing 
a competitive game.
While part of this competitive strategy involves responding to the needs of 
shipowners, the Isle of Man is also careful about managing its connection to the UK. 
The Manx register needs to be “British enough” to attract shipowners who want that 
connection to the Red Ensign, but it also needs to make up for what shipowners see 
as the failings of the British national register. The implications of maintaining this 
balance, including its effect on the working relationship between the Isle of Man and 
the UK, is discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
From Dependency to Mutual Cooperation and Increased
Independence
A Case Study of the Manx Shipping Register
Part II
6.1 Introduction
This chapter continues the discussion of the development of the Manx 
register by looking at how the way in which it is perceived by and interacts with the 
administration of its parent state, the rest of the Red Ensign Group, and third-party 
actors has evolved over the years. The first section of this chapter traces the changes 
in the relationship between the Manx register and the United Kingdom since the 
1980s. The second section explores the Isle of Man in the context of the Red Ensign 
Group, noting how the functioning of the group has changed since its inception in 
1989 and examining the differences among Red Ensign members. The third section 
looks at the Isle of Man’s interactions with and influence upon international 
organisations, port state control bodies, and seafarers’ unions.
6.2 Growing Pains: Evolution of the Relationship between the Manx
Register and United Kingdom
Despite the support the UK lent to the Isle of Man as it developed its register, 
the relationship between the two maritime administrations has not always been 
simple or smooth. This section notes how the Isle of Man’s initial reliance on the 
UK for technical and administrative support developed into one of mutual 
cooperation and dependency. It also examines the way in which the UK register has 
changed, partially as a result of the Isle of Man’s success. This discussion exhibits
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the complex and dynamic relationship that can exist between a secondary register 
and its parent state.
6.2.1 Early Dependence on the United Kingdom
Although the Isle of Man register began moving towards independence over 
the 1980s, for most of that time period Manx officials generally relied on the existing 
legislative framework, shipping expertise, and good favour of their British 
counterparts. Even though the island was using shipping legislation developed by 
the UK, the latter interpreted its constitutional obligations in such a way that Manx 
officials had the chance to offer their input. For example, in Tynwald debates 
surrounding the extension of Parliament’s 1979 Provisions of Merchant Shipping 
Act to the island, it was noted that the Manx Harbour Board “were given the 
opportunity . . .  to see if there was anything in the Convention or the proposed 
Convention which we wanted amending or adjusting. Our views were forwarded, 
they were considered, and so what eventually became the Act in the United Kingdom 
was after consultation” with Manx authorities (MacDonald 1979, 104).
When the Isle of Man began creating its own shipping legislation, it appears 
that there was a need to ensure that the UK would continue to be the ultimate 
authority on maritime matters and that the Manx register would maintain comparable 
standards to its national counterpart. It was explained to a member of Tynwald that 
Royal Assent, the UK’s seal of approval, would not be granted for the 1991 Manx 
Merchant Shipping Registration Bill unless the phrase “with the concurrence of the 
Secretary of State” was included. Without Royal Assent, the legislation could not 
pass, and, it was noted, “We would be nowhere, we would be back to the shambles
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of legislation in the United Kingdom that controls our registry and our little bit of 
legislation of our own” (Orme 1991, 1819).
The UK could also withhold Royal Assent from Manx shipping legislation 
for political reasons unrelated to the island. British officials required that the 1991 
Manx Merchant Shipping (Registration) Bill be amended to remove Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand from the list of countries which could automatically 
register ships in the Isle of Man. The UK insisted upon this revision because, at the 
time, it was arguing a case before the European Court in which it claimed that 
ownership was the best determinant of the “genuine link” required to exist between a 
vessel and its register under the Law of the Sea convention(United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, Article 91) The UK felt that it would be 
“inconsistent with this position” for it to allow the Isle of Man to include these three 
Commonwealth countries, and it threatened to withhold Royal Assent to the 
Merchant Shipping (Registration) Bill (Gilbey 1991, 1817)
Given the necessity of UK approval, it was critical that the Manx register 
evolve in a way that would enable it to continue to receive that support. While 
satisfying the demands of British maritime officials could have been seen as 
burdensome and did lead some Manx representatives to question how the register 
would affect Manx independence (MacDonald 1984, 219), these ties to the UK 
actually worked as part of the Manx government’s strategy to attract shipowners to 
the island. As one Tynwald debate regarding the 1991 Merchant Shipping Bill 
shows, retaining UK support was critical, even it meant that an “independent” Manx 
register would be less than fully autonomous:
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Mr. Corrin said ‘Why can’t we do it free from British influence?’. The 
answer is we do not want to. The package that is attractive about registration 
in the Isle of Man is the financial package that we represent as a community 
offering financial services together with the remnants of the British Empire 
that exist all over the world that provide defence, diplomatic representation, 
trade representation. That is what people want. They want both those. If we 
went without the second part of the category, who would want to be a Manx- 
registered ship? It is not a question of us fighting against the British 
Government. We want to make a cooperative arrangement with the British 
Government. . .and they are prepared to allow certain matters to go so far in 
the Isle of Man (Orme 1991, K1819)
Having determined that shipowners looking to join the Manx register are doing so in
part because of its Red Ensign status, it is in the island’s interest to do what is
necessary to keep it as part of the British fleet. This would be the foundation for the
niche that the Isle of Man ship registry would carve out over the next ten years: it
would market itself as a highly-regulated register that offered the advantages of the
Red Ensign flag, but at a lower cost.
From the UK’s perspective, it is suggested that in the mid-1980s, the Manx
register was not seen as a competitor for British vessels or a rebellious territory
attempting to lower high British standards, but rather viewed with a certain amount
of indifference. One former Manx surveyor described how,
we were very much dependant on the UK at the start and they were. . .there 
was no sort o f major interference from them. They just noted what we were 
doing and patted us on the head and said, well done and we’ll look after you. 
Maybe we jl  want you to, or maybe we don’t, we 7/ see about this in the 
future (Interviewee # 7).
The use of familial descriptions, which in some way identify the UK as the adult and
Red Ensign registers, including the Isle of Man, as children, to characterise the
relationship between the two maritime administrations was common in interviews
conducted for this study. And although the Isle of Man register has become
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increasingly self-reliant, this characterisation appears to remain accurate; a current 
Manx maritime official noted that “the UK are the parent in this relationship” 
(Interviewee #8). These descriptions indicate that the UK is still recognised as 
having authority over the Manx register -  despite the latter having become a largely 
independent entity under the Red Ensign umbrella -  beyond the legal formality of 
gaining Royal Assent for its legislation.
6.2.2 Building a Cooperative and Co-dependent Relationship
Despite its reliance on the UK for support and the advantages conferred by 
Red Ensign status, the Isle of Man gradually took steps to facilitate the running of an 
“independent” register following the legislative changes made by the 1991 Merchant 
Shipping (Registration) Act. For example, in order to make it easier to change the 
list of countries eligible to own ships on the Manx register, part of the 1995 
Merchant Shipping Act amended the 1991 Act to reduce the level of UK approval 
needed. The new wording required the Manx marine administration to consult the 
British Department of Transport before revising this list, but did not oblige it to 
“seek the express concurrence of the Secretary of State for Transport,” as the 1991 
Act stated (North 1995). That the UK accepted this change was taken to be “another 
recognition of the UK Department of Transport that the Isle of Man is acting as a 
responsible marine administration” (North 1995, 7).
Another way in which the Isle of Man has asserted its autonomy regarding its 
register is in the development of legislation supporting the requirements of 
international conventions. Since 1951, the UK has required Crown Dependencies to 
have enacted the relevant legislation before extending a convention to them
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following the UK’s own ratification. In recent years, however, the Isle of Man has 
begun passing laws that meet convention conditions in advance of UK ratification. 
For example, the Labour Inspection (Seafarers) Convention of 1996 (Convention No. 
178 of the ILO), which addresses seafarers’ living and working conditions, was not 
ratified by the UK until July 2003. Still, the Isle of Man implemented the regulations 
required by the convention in November 2002, even though it was not due to be 
extended to the island until July 2004 (Isle of Man Marine Administration 2005). As 
mentioned earlier, the Isle of Man is also enacting legislation (Interviewee #13) to 
meet the requirements of the 2006 consolidated Maritime Labour Convention, even 
though the convention has not yet received the sufficient number of ratifications to 
come into force (ILO 2006).
Despite the Isle of Man’s own efforts to maintain a highly regulated register, 
the Secretary of State is ultimately responsible to the international community for the 
Manx register and its vessels, and therefore has the authority to ensure that high 
standards are being met. To this end, the UK’s Maritime and Coastguard Agency 
(MCA) conducts rolling monitoring visits to the Isle of Man, as well as the other 
Category 1 REG members, every four years. It is interesting to note that the term 
“monitoring visit” is a relatively new one. Until recently, these reviews were called 
“audits” (Interview #7). This change in terminology reflects the broader shift in the 
relationship between the two maritime administrations; the new phrase is less formal, 
and suggests that the UK is merely doing a kind of maintenance check to ensure that 
the register is running smoothly, rather than acting as an external examiner going 
through a checklist of the register’s obligations.
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If the MCA finds, whether on a monitoring visit or through another channel 
such as port-state control bodies, that a secondary register is failing to meet the 
standards the UK has set, the latter can impose penalties. Ultimately, the MCA can 
withdraw a register’s Category 1 status, effectively cutting it out of the Red Ensign 
Group. Without the Category 1 classification, a register would no longer be able to 
keep most merchant shipping vessels onto the flag and its reputation could be badly 
affected. The UK recognises the difficulties these consequences could cause to a 
register, and therefore tries to use this penalty “judiciously, and as a last resort ” 
(Interviewee #1). No Category 1 Red Ensign flags have had their membership 
revoked as of yet. Gibraltar, however, was threatened with this penalty in 1992, and 
so voluntarily suspended its membership, which prevented it from registering 
additional ships above 150 GT until 1996, when its Category 1 status was reinstated 
(Fromme 1996).
Particularly for the Isle of Man, the threat of being ejected from the REG 
works as a deterrent to any potential lowering of standards precisely because of the 
degree to which the Manx register markets itself as a part of the UK registry system. 
In outlining the benefits of the Manx register, the Isle of Man website advertises the 
register’s status as part of “British” shipping and many of the Marine 
Administration’s promotional materials feature the Red Ensign flag itself including 
one that pictures the Red Ensign flag defaced with the Manx "three legs" symbol 
over the caption "the flag of quality" (Isle of Man Ship Registry [No Date]). This 
British link, and the reputation, protection, and diplomatic privilege it represents, is 
an important factor in attracting shipowners to the register and is a major distinction
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between the Isle of Man and other low-tax flags (Cullinane and Robertshaw 1996). 
The Isle of Man, therefore has a key incentive to remain under the umbrella of the 
Red Ensign and avoid any action that might jeopardise its Category 1 status.
In turn, it is in the UK’s interest to maintain good relationships with the Isle 
of Man and other Category 1 registers and encourage them to expand. The ability to 
shape decisions made at the International Maritime Organisation is partially 
influenced by the amount of tonnage on a state’s register40, and without the sizeable 
contributions of the Isle of Man, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, and Gibraltar to the 
UK’s total, British interests would have far less leverage. Additionally, the UK 
cannot totally abdicate its responsibility to its offshore territories and crown 
dependencies. Beyond the constitutional obligation the UK has for the “good 
governance” (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2002) of these registers, they 
also represent and reflect the UK’s regulatory environment: “We can’t just cast
them adrift. Because ifyou cast them adrift, it’s like sending half our fleet out there 
as rust buckets. All they’re gonna do is get detained. And then the UK’s reputation 
in the port state world will collapse” (Interviewee #7). Such a consequence would 
lead to the UK flag being targeted by port-state control bodies, resulting in more 
inspections and potentially costly delays for shipowners, which could encourage 
them to switch registers.
For reasons of both reputation and revenue, therefore, the relationship 
between the UK and the Isle of Man has evolved into a symbiotic one. As one
40 For most conventions to enter into force, they must be ratified by a particular number of member 
states representing a certain amount of the world’s tonnage. Additionally, membership in the 
“Council,” which supervises the work of the IMO, is partially determined by having a large interest in 
providing international shipping services or in international seaborne trade (IMO [no date]).
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official in the Manx Marine Administration put it, the two registers “need each other 
to survive” (Interviewee #13). As such, although the UK remains the final authority 
over the REG, most interactions now occur as among peers. This sentiment was 
echoed by an administrator in the Department for Transport who, again 
acknowledging the familial element to the relationship, cited the benefit of having 
the UK and four secondary registers working towards the same goals, and how 
important it is to the UK to facilitate that: “there’s no doubting there ’.s at times a sort 
o f mother-daughter relationship, and that some administrations look to the UK for  
guidance and assistance and help in certain areas. But as far as possible, we ’re 
looking to promote a relationship which is o f equals in terms o f discussion o f how 
things should go forward” (Interviewee #1).
In 2007, it seems that the relationship between the Manx and British maritime 
administrations is one of mutual respect. There is a significant amount of 
cooperation and collaboration in areas where it is possible to share expertise, and the 
registers are in near-constant communication. An MCA official said that “not a day 
goes by when we don ’t exchange emails or telephone calls from at least one o f our 
members o f REG” (Interviewee #7). As a result of this close contact, the 
relationship has evolved significantly in recent years. A Manx maritime official said 
that as late as 1999, “there was probably a perception that we didn’t. . .we didn’t 
have the relationship that we have now. I t’s a much closer relationship. We work 
much more closely together” (Interviewee #13).
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6.2.3 Transformation of the British Register
One of the most interesting effects of the success of the Manx register and its 
more cooperative relationship with the UK has been upon the home register itself. 
Here we seem to have witnessed the “parent” learning from the “child.” The Isle of 
Man has always been conscious that it is operating in a competitive market One 
Manx representative was quoted in 1984 as saying “our competitors are alive to our 
success and we need to be . . . one jump ahead” (Lowey 1984, 217). The Manx 
register therefore established its niche as a highly-regulated Red Ensign flag that 
confers the additional benefit of being based in a financially attractive jurisdiction. It 
has also marketed itself as a service-orientated register, with an accessible and 
centralised marine administration (Isle of Man Ship Registry [No Date]).
Following the success of the Isle of Man and other Red Ensign flags, the UK 
register, which never fully recovered from the mass number of shipowners who left 
the flag in the 1970s, decided to alter its approach in the late 1990s. With this shift, 
the UK seemed to want to be perceived as more of a business, referring to 
shipowners as "customers" for whom the UK's relatively high regulatory regime 
would be a benefit (UK Ship Register [No date]). Furthermore, the UK instituted a 
tonnage tax to further attract shipowners as part of the 2000 Finance Act. Following 
these efforts, the number of ships and amount of tonnage registered in the UK has 
almost steadily increased (Lloyd’s Register Fairplay Ltd 2005).
What is particularly interesting about the UK’s transformation and British 
maritime officials’ relationship with their Manx counterparts is the general 
unwillingness to acknowledge that they are competitors operating in similar
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segments of the market. An MCA official acknowledged that in the period the UK 
has been rebuilding itself, not all vessels to recently join the register are newly built 
ships: “there was certainly an amount o f ship-taking from REG, ” though it was 
unintentional and “seemed to be silly. Because what was the point? ” (Interviewee 
#7). A British official from the Department for Transport was more willing to 
acknowledge the UK’s newfound competitive approach, saying ‘7  would certainly 
accept. . . that there is competition at a commercial level between the UK and other 
REG registers. . . What we ’re not trying to do and what we clearly try and avoid is 
the idea o f specifically poaching vessels from each other. And that’s a sort o f 
gentlemen’s agreement (Interview #1).
6.2.4 Conclusions
This section has shown that far from being an example of the national state 
providing a “way out” of domestic and international maritime regulations by 
supporting the creation of a secondary register, the UK sought to ensure that the Isle 
of Man maintained a similar level of regulation to that of the UK’s national register. 
These efforts occasionally led to tensions between the Isle of Man’s desire to be (and 
be seen to be) independent from the UK. However, the Isle of Man was in some 
ways dependent on its parent state both for support and due to the island’s strategy 
for attracting and retaining vessels. Over time, the Manx register gradually became 
more autonomous, although it still remained under the Red Ensign umbrella. 
Eventually, what was originally a subordinate relationship to the UK evolved into a 
co-dependent one for political and strategic reasons. The UK register further altered
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its approach and policy following the success of the Isle of Man, and other 
open/secondary registers.
6.3. Isle of Man and the Red Ensign Group
The relationship between the administration of the Manx ship register and 
that of the other Category 1 Red Ensign members -  Bermuda, Cayman Islands, and 
Gibraltar -  has evolved to one mostly of cooperation and collaboration, facilitated by 
annual REG conferences and through a shared standing in relation to the United 
Kingdom national register. However, despite sharing the Red Ensign designation, 
there are important differences between and among these registers that should be 
acknowledged. This section discusses the development of the Red Ensign group 
over the past two decades and evaluates different member flags’ involvement in it. 
This is an important continuation of the exploration of the relationship between the 
UK and the Isle of Man registers, as it provides the opportunity to assess the extent 
to which the Manx register is a unique case, and to further investigate the 
complexities of secondary registers’ interactions with their parent state.
63.1 Evolution of the Red Ensign Group 1989-2007
The changes in the functioning of the Red Ensign Group over the eighteen 
years of its existence mirror the shift in the UK’s general approach to its shipping 
industry and secondary registers. Originally, the UK acted largely as the Red Ensign 
Group’s regulatory body, focused on maintaining high levels of regulation in its 
secondary registers. By the late 1990s, however, the British register moved to a 
more businesslike approach, and saw the REG as an opportunity to improve 
efficiency through cooperation and shared knowledge.
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When the REG conferences first began in 1989, they were a series of one-on-
one meetings between the UK and its secondary registers. The British maritime
officials would brief their secondary register counterparts on recent and upcoming
issues, and the secondary registers would have the opportunity to ask questions. The
UK’s dominating presence at these meetings made them “quite scary” for the
Category 1 register (Interviewee #10). The UK seems to have been aware of this, as
an administrator for the Department for Transport agreed
I f  you were to ask the REG administrations, I  think the answer you would get 
from them is that they felt that, once a year, they were sort o f called to 
London to be told how things should be done and what they were doing 
wrong. It was a sort o f schoolmasterly relationship, being brought in front o f 
the head teacher (Interviewee #1).
One current Manx official mentioned that the Category 1 registers “used to have a
quick meeting beforehand because they knew this was going to be quite heated”
(Interviewee #10). A former Manx surveyor confirmed this opportunity for
collective action, saying it was useful “where if the UK were going down a
particular policy then the other members could talk to each other and say, well, I ’m
opposed to this.. . We could get four bodies coming up and saying, well, we don’t like
this, or we can’t do this. . . We could gang up on the UK. . .  or any particular one
who wanted to go wandering off'the party line a bit, ” although it was acknowledged
that this was not a common occurrence (Interviewee #9).
Despite this strength in numbers, in most instances the UK is the final
authority on Red Ensign policies. Even through the late 1990s, there was the
perception that the UK would, as one official put it, “bring all o f the Red Ensign into
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one forum and tell them how it’s gonna be, this is the policy line, this is what we’re 
going to do, this is what you will do ” (Interviewee #13).
Since the late 1990s, however, the conference has changed to a more open 
format where individual meetings with the UK are available upon request of the 
secondary register, but the main event serves as a “talking shop” in which all 
members have the opportunity to submit papers beforehand and discuss how to 
approach common issues (Interviewee #14). This collaboration is useful in that it 
creates feelings of parity among the individual REG members, but it is also 
necessary due to the sheer volume of work resulting from recent international 
agreements at the ILO and IMO. For each convention that is ratified (or soon will 
be), individual flag states must determine how to translate the convention’s 
requirements into national legislation with which the register’s shipowners must 
comply. Since all REG members are implementing the same set of international 
conventions (with the exception of those adopted by the EU), it makes sense for 
them to work together at REG conferences to interpret the conventions and create the 
relevant legislative frameworks. As one MCA official said, “Why reinvent the wheel 
when we can build the wheels together? ” (Interviewee #7). Another MCA official 
confirmed this, saying that “there’s a lot more dialogue [that] goes on between the 
years. . .It’s more general discussion and agreement. (Interviewee #11).
However, the opportunity for greater participation has not necessarily 
resulted in individual members becoming more involved in the REG conference or 
the group itself. One MCA official reported, “We try each year to have a theme for  
conference and try and encourage them to take part in the conference. I t ’s like
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pulling teeth, it’s like being a dentist (Interviewee #7). Another MCA administrator 
acknowledged that he sends papers to the REG conferences every year to update 
members on developments within the IMO and EU, but gets very little response.
6.3.2 Sharing a Flag but Little Else
Secondary registers, and those in the Red Ensign Group in particular, are 
frequently classified together, despite the major differences that exist between and 
among them. For the REG, specifically, understanding these differences and why 
they occur can inform discussions regarding the functioning of both the Manx 
register and secondary registers more broadly.
The extent to which individual registers involve themselves in the Red 
Ensign Group is one of the major differences among the four Category 1 and eight 
Category 2 member flags. One explanation for why some registers, those in the 
Category 1 group, in particular, are more willing to participate in the REG than 
others concerns their relative sizes: “the Isle o f Man and Cayman and Bermuda and 
Gibraltar are very active members in it because they ’re big boys, they’ve got big 
ships, they’ve got lots o f issues to bring to the table (Interviewee #7). The Category 
2 registers, on the other hand, consist primarily of small commercial ships, fishing 
vessels, and pleasure craft, and thus the international regulatory issues that are the 
focus of much of the REG discussions are likely to have less of an impact on them. 
Another suggested reason for the variation in participation level has to do with the 
nature of different REG members’ constitutional relationship with the UK. As an 
MCA official explained, “Gibraltar, Bermuda, the Caymans. . . these come under 
the. . .Foreign Office, not the Home office so they have a different outlook,
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perspective, and everything like that” (Interviewee #9). As Home Territories, which
are overseen by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, they have a more robust
constitutional link to the UK than the Isle of Man, and are less autonomous. This
could affect their participation in a group like the REG, although whether it would
lead to more involvement (in order to have greater influence over UK decisions,
which they would be bound by) or less (because they have to conform to the UK
position) is unclear.
Further distinctions among Red Ensign Group members emerge when
considering interactions between the maritime administrators of the secondary
registers and the UK. An MCA official acknowledges that “we would like to think
that we treat Isle o f Man, Bermuda, Cayman, Gibraltar, similarly. But not the same.
Because we've got differences with each one (Interviewee #7). Gibraltar, for
example, is part of the European Union and therefore the UK oversees the territory’s
implementation of EU directives. Interviews conducted suggest that the Manx
register’s level of autonomy is its defining feature, and affects the manner in which
the UK treats it. As one Department for Transport official explained,
There's always been a willingness on the part o f the UK to provide technical 
assistance as necessary. And I  would say that in the time that I've been 
working in shipping, the Isle o f Man has always had a very well-developed 
maritime administration, and a very independent administration . . .1 think 
the Isle o f Man would always want to be seen to be running their own 
register in their own way. So, assistance is at a technical and, probably, 
largely informal level. With other registers that have been developing their 
capabilities over the years, there’s maybe been greater and more formal 
input (Interviewee #1).
In other words, the UK recognises both the Manx register’s demonstrated
professionalism and its desire to be self-sufficient, and therefore treats it accordingly.
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Additionally, the Category 1 registers tend to fill different market niches. The 
Cayman Islands’ focus is on yachts and Bermuda’s on cruiseships, while the Isle of 
Man has a large proportion of oil tankers (Interviewee #10). Each register, therefore, 
has different technical and regulatory needs with which it might need assistance.
Geography is another factor that appears to play a role in explaining why 
some of the UK’s secondary registers are more active in REG than others. As an 
MCA administrator pointed out, Bermuda and Cayman Islands are a long way from 
European waters and “distance does make a difference ” in terms of the issues these 
registers concern themselves with and their level of involvement (Interviewee #14). 
In contrast, representatives from Isle of Man frequently join the UK delegation that 
attends IMO meetings, which are held in London (Interviewee #14), while the 
Gibraltar register sends officials to EU conferences and IMO meetings, albeit to a 
lesser extent than the Isle of Man (Interviewee #14). This suggests that proximity to 
the UK affects a secondary register’s level of participation in events and issues 
beyond the annual REG conference, which changes location each year so that the 
same registers do not have to travel long distances repeatedly.
6.3.3 Conclusions
Since its inception, the Red Ensign group has evolved and the relationship 
among its members has changed. Initially the group was seen to be a way for the 
UK to monitor its offshore counterparts, whereas it has now developed into an 
opportunity for shared knowledge and expertise. This shift, however, has not meant 
a reduced level of regulation for these secondary registers. In fact, as individual 
REG registers gained the expertise necessary to meet the commitments of
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international conventions, it could be argued that the collaborative efforts at annual 
conferences permitted better understanding or more comprehensive application of 
maritime legislation than would have occurred had it just been the UK taking the 
lead.
Additionally, the four secondary registers do contribute differently to the 
REG as a whole. For reasons of geography, basic constitutional relationship with the 
UK, and individual interests, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, and Isle of Man 
all vary in their participation within the REG depending on the issue at hand. For 
Isle of Man and Gibraltar, in particular, it seems that physical proximity to mainland 
Europe and political membership in the EU, respectively, are the driving forces 
behind their involvement.
6.4 Isle of Man’s Relationship with Inter- and Non-Governmental 
Institutions: International Organisations, Port-State Control, and 
Unions
In general, secondary registers are represented by their national counterparts 
to external groups, including international regulatory bodies, port-state control 
groups, and seafarers unions. Where possible, however, the Isle of Man is 
increasingly interacting directly with these other bodies or otherwise attempting to 
influence the UK’s dealings with them. Insights into the level of practical 
independence the Isle of Man has from the UK on shipping-related matters can be 
obtained by examining this interaction. Of particular interest is the extent to which 
the Isle of Man involves itself in the policies presented to international organisations 
by the UK, works with port state control inspectors, and negotiates (or avoids doing 
so) with seafarers’ unions, and the extent to which they respond. The Isle of Man’s
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participation in and direct interaction with these third party actors can also be seen as 
evidence that, externally, it is increasingly viewed as an independent, self­
determining register rather than a subsidiary of the UK.
6.4.1 Participation and Representation in International Organisations
Despite being represented by the UK in its external affairs, the Isle of Man is 
playing an increasingly active role in the creation of international agreements. The 
British Department for Constitutional Affairs outlines British officials’ obligations, 
suggesting that “departments and agencies leading for the United Kingdom in 
international conferences should bear in mind the interests of the Crown 
Dependencies. Whenever appropriate, consideration should be given to arranging for 
Island representation, either as a member of the United Kingdom delegation or as an 
observer” (Dept for Constitutional Affairs 2002). To this end, the MCA and DfT 
invite members of the Red Ensign Group to attend a series of internal meetings prior 
to IMO and ILO conferences, and offer them the chance to participate in working 
and inter-correspondence groups. Most REG members choose not to become 
involved unless there is an issue that is of particular interest to them, in which case 
they will attend the relevant meetings or submit a paper to be considered. Generally, 
however, as one MCA official observed, REG flags are “encouraged more and more 
and more [to contribute their opinions on international issues], and you get less and 
less support ” (Interviewee #7).
The Isle of Man is largely an exception to this rule. Since the legislative 
changes to the Manx register in the 1980s, the island’s marine administration has 
taken an increasingly active interest in these meetings. Although the Isle of Man
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does not have independent voting rights at the IMO or ILO conferences, it can attend 
as part of the UK’s delegation,41 through which it can and does take an active role in 
the proceedings. For example, the previous head of the Manx Marine 
Administration was one of the main authors of the recent ILO consolidated 
convention.
On both ILO and IMO treaties, the UK must take into account a potentially 
wide range of views, including those of REG members, shipowners, and other 
government actors, such as environmental or trade departments. If a fundamental 
difference of opinion between UK officials and their REG counterparts emerges in 
one of the pre-meetings, the UK view usually prevails, and the British delegation that 
appears at the international conference presents a unified policy position. One MCA 
official acknowledged that “we might have, within the family, a free and frank 
exchange o f views on things, but . . .my experience o f both the Isle o f Man and 
Gibraltar, the ones I ’ve seen at IMO and who have been part o f our delegation, are 
generally positive ” (Interviewee #14). This smooth running could be due in part to 
the fact that the British and Manx marine administrations generally hold similar 
opinions on particular international regulations due to their shared objective of 
maintaining high standards, albeit for potentially different reasons. As one Manx 
official explained, “if our interests were different from the UK, it would be rather 
odd. We really should be singing from the same hymn sheet. The only difference o f 
course is the EU membership, and there’s nothing we can do about that” 
(Interviewee #8).
41 The ILO does allow the Isle of Man to attend conferences listed separately from the UK as an 
“other country,” but for all intents and purposes it participates as a UK delegate, representing the 
British position (Interview #14).
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A key characteristic of the Manx register relates to the fact that while the Isle 
of Man is part of the UK and Europe, and tends to serve European interests, the 
island is neither a member state nor an associate member of the EU. Instead, like 
other Crown Dependencies, the Isle of Man has limited status under Protocol 3 of the 
UK’s Treaty of Accession to the European Community, which allows them to 
participate in the free trade of goods among EU member states. This status does not 
include free movement of persons and services, access to EU funds, or any 
obligation to implement EU directives (Department for Constitutional Affairs [No 
Date b]).
This ability to avoid EU legislation is a primary benefit of the Isle of Man’s 
limited status under Protocol 3. It means that the Manx register can avoid any extra 
directives the European Commission adds to ILO or IMO conventions (which could 
potentially increase shipowners’ operating costs), thus giving it a competitive 
advantage over the registers of EU member states like the UK and Gibraltar. 
Additionally, EU membership would reduce the island’s autonomy, something the 
Isle of Man values. Being subject to EU directives, “takes away a lot o f discretion, 
which, why would you want to give that up? Certainly from a legislation point o f 
view, I  can’t see the benefit. . .it’s easier to be out of it than it is to be in, for 
us "(Interviewee #8). The main drawback to the Isle of Man’s Protocol 3 status is 
that it does not allow Manx-registered vessels access to EU cabotage, which may 
force some shipowners who would otherwise flag their ships in the Isle of Man to go 
elsewhere.
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Many of the officials interviewed for this study feel that the decisions made 
by maritime Europe in the next five to ten years, particularly in relation to wage rates 
for residential workers and the way in which that residency is established, will be 
critical in shaping the future of the Red Ensign. Should the European Commission 
rule that seafarers serving on the vessels of EU member states are required to be paid 
at those states’ wage rates, regardless of nationality -  a move which would 
invariably increase shipowners’ operating costs -  then the UK and Gibraltar could 
potentially lose many of their vessels to non-EU registers. As the European Union 
expands, this and other EU resolutions, which have the capacity to disproportionately 
affect the comparative advantages of some Red Ensign registers, will likely be a 
source of much debate.
6.4.2 Recognition by Port State Control Bodies
Another arena in which the Isle of Man is increasingly demonstrating its 
independence from the UK is in that of port state control. As the Manx register 
evolved, it gradually expanded its administrative capabilities, which in recent years 
has allowed it to take direct responsibility for vessels that port state inspectors have 
detained or found to have deficiencies (previously this information would first be 
sent to the UK, which would forward it on to the Isle of Man). Beyond the 
implication that the Isle of Man is now holding itself even more accountable for the 
reputation of its flag, these direct interactions between Manx maritime officials and 
foreign port state control bodies suggest a greater recognition by the latter of the 
Manx register’s autonomy from the UK.
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Until 2003 or 2004, foreign port state control officials, upon finding 
deficiencies on or detaining a Manx ship, would follow procedure to notify the 
vessel’s flag state. However, since the ship would be flying the Red Ensign and 
therefore considered to be “British,” the body that would be contacted was the UK’s 
MCA (Interviewee #2). When the MCA would send this information on to the Isle 
of Man, it would occasionally be accompanied by a reprimand: “odd letters used to 
arrive from the MCA, you know, ‘It was reported last month one o f your ships was 
detained in such and such a port, such and such a country ’ and, basically, ‘We fail 
to understand what is happening, and what are you doing about it? ’ ” (Interviewee 
#2). While the Manx marine administration has always valued its good port state 
control reputation, until recently, the MCA felt the need to hold the Isle of Man 
accountable for its underperforming ships.
In recent years, however, the Isle of Man has begun receiving direct 
notification of detained or deficient vessels from some foreign port state control 
bodies. As one Manx official explained, “Now what’s also started happening more 
often is that the more well-known flag states. . . at least do come to us directly. You 
know, they ’re more aware about who the Isle o f Man is ” (Interviewee #2). This shift 
can be interpreted to suggest that foreign authorities increasingly recognise the extent 
to which the Isle of Man register operates independently from the UK.
Additionally, in 2004 the Manx marine administration created a position 
within the administration that would specifically address port state control matters. 
To some extent, this demonstrates that the Manx register takes port state control and 
the regulatory reputation of its register seriously. However, there are limits to what
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the MCA is willing to allow the Isle of Man to deal with independently. When the
Manx marine administration enquired as to the possibility of sending an employee to
the Netherlands to be trained to deal with port state control issues, the emailed reply
was also sent to the MCA:
“they copied in the message to the UK because they thought, well, [Isle o f 
Man is] part o f the UK, and in the next instance we had the . . .Red Ensign 
liaison group were on the phone to the former boss here. . . ‘how dare you 
think about sending your men up here, you know, if  you want any training 
doing, it’s got to be done down here’ in Southampton (Interviewee #2).
Similarly, should a Manx vessel have serious problems with a European inspection 
where an appeal to the Paris port state control authorities would be required, Isle of 
Man marine administrators would need to go through the MCA rather than try to 
resolve the issue directly (Interview #2). These examples demonstrate the 
overlapping areas of responsibility between the individual Red Ensign registers 
(particularly the Isle of Man, given its increasing autonomy) and the UK agency 
responsible for their external affairs.
6.4.3 Relationship with Seafarers’ Unions
In contrast to the Isle of Man’s involvement with international organisations 
and port state control bodies, (which is coordinated with or conducted through the 
UK), the Manx register has, from the outset, addressed crewing issues directly with 
the two national unions that represent British seafarers since the register sets its own 
crewing requirements. Since the late 1980s, the Isle of Man has hosted an annual tri­
partite forum to which shipowners, the National Union of Rail, Maritime and 
Transport Workers (RMT), the ratings’ union, and the National Union of Maritime,
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Aviation, and Shipping Transport Officers (NUMAST),42 the officers’ union, are 
invited. Given the Isle of Man’s political position -  it claims that it cannot 
discriminate in favour of British seafarers -  and register regulations that permit 
appropriately certified seafarers of any nationality to crew Manx vessels, its past 
relationship with these two unions has been complex, and occasionally contentious.
There are major differences in how the two unions perceive the Manx 
register. The ratings’ union, RMT, has threatened to have the Manx register declared 
a Flag of Convenience since the mid-1990s (Osier 1996). It adopted this position 
formally in a paper presented to the International Transport Workers’ Federation in 
1999, which argued that British ratings were being replaced by foreign seafarers on 
Isle of Man ships, and that certain Manx vessels fit the FOC criteria of lacking a 
“genuine link” to the flag territory because they were neither beneficially owned in 
the Isle of Man nor covered by ITF collective bargaining agreements (RMT 2000).
Despite the widespread support the RMT position received from other 
European unions, formally designating the Manx flag an FOC would require the 
support of both national affiliates, and NUMAST, the British officers union, was not 
willing to endorse RMT’s campaign. NUMAST’s response to the RMT paper 
maintained that the Isle of Man’s requirement that there be a locally based ship 
manager constituted a “genuine link” (NUMAST 2000). NUMAST also argued that 
an FOC designation for the Isle of Man could actually result in fewer jobs for British 
seafarers as shipowners would change registers and “retaliate” against the unions by 
hiring even fewer British nationals; at the extreme, a successful ITF FOC campaign 
would be counterproductive because it could damage the Manx register’s reputation
42 NUMAST changed its name to Nautilus UK in 2006.
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to the extent that the register would collapse due to the number of shipowners 
flagging out to non-FOC flags (Interviewee #12). Alternatively, since the Isle of Man 
is generally considered to be a “serious, responsible flag operating to the highest 
standards” (NUMAST 2000), the FOC label would weaken the ITF’s broader 
campaign: “rather than actually [label the Isle o f Man an FOC], because the impact 
could be severe, there’s also the danger that there is no impact. And then you ve 
fired your bloody gun, and you haven’t achieved anything and everybody knows then 
your weapon isn’t a weapon at all” (Interviewee #12).
Although there has been a reduction in calls for the Isle of Man to be 
designated a Flag of Convenience in recent years, RMT and NUMAST have 
continued to maintain their respective positions. Despite this fundamental 
disagreement, however, both unions agree that the Isle of Man’s small size and 
geographic location are two specific characteristics that affect their approach to and 
treatment of the register. Because of the small numbers of British ratings employed, 
and the relatively small size of the register, RMT has not found it worthwhile to 
mount campaigns on Manx vessels, and has not participated in the register’s annual 
tri-partite meetings for several years (Interview #15). For NUMAST, however, the 
Isle of Man’s small size is an advantage as it makes the register less bureaucratic and 
more accessible than its national counterpart: “can’t think o f any examples where the 
UK would ring me up and say, hey by the way, we ve just kicked this ship off, terrible 
conditions on board. . .in the Isle o f Man, you can have that level o f contact” 
(Interviewee #12).
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The seafarers unions also have a different level of interaction with the Isle of 
Man than with other Category 1 Red Ensign registers. This is partially because 
Bermuda, Cayman Islands, and Gibraltar have all been declared Flags of 
Convenience, and are therefore the remit of the ITF rather than the national unions 
[Interviewee #12]. However, other factors also affect this. Explaining that the 
organisation's efforts focused mainly on the UK and Isle of Man, the NUMAST 
representative said, “Bermuda, Gibraltar. . .they are as foreign to us as Panama and 
Liberia. We do have contact with Bermuda, who are quite receptive to dialogue and 
discussions and sometimes ring us up and ask for our opinions. But I  think that 
geographical distance affects the mental approach towards it. (Interviewee #12).
6.4.4 Conclusions
This section examines the Isle of Man’s increasing participation in 
international organisations through the UK, and its expanding interactions with port 
state control bodies and seafarers’ unions. The Manx register’s involvement in 
determining the UK’s positions at IMO and ILO meetings demonstrates that the 
register is taking an increasingly greater interest in influencing the regulatory 
standards to which it will be held by the UK. It is clear, however, that the UK is the 
ultimate authority in dealing with international organisations, as it is responsible both 
for the Manx register’s external affairs and the ultimate quality of its vessels. The 
Isle of Man, however, already interacts directly with port state control bodies and 
seafarers unions, which indicates that these groups see the Manx register as an 
independent entity.
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6.5 Conclusions
Together with Chapter Five, this case study of the Isle of Man has traced the 
development of the Manx ship register from the mid-1980s to today, and shown how, 
over this same period, the UK maritime authorities gradually allowed the Manx 
Marine Administration increased latitude and eventually reformed the way it dealt 
with its secondary registers through the Red Ensign Group.
The Isle of Man’s incremental development as a register belies several broad 
trends regarding the island’s relationship with the UK, the rest of the REG, and 
outside organisations. First, much of what the Isle of Man has been able to achieve 
has been predicated on its status as a Crown Dependency. This unique constitutional 
relationship and the permissive approach taken by the UK have allowed the island to 
develop its ship register in ways that might not otherwise have been possible. Had 
the UK retained greater control over the Manx register, or should the Isle of Man 
become subject to EU directives, some of aspects of the register that are central to its 
competitive strategy could be lost. Second, an important feature of the Isle of Man is 
its geographical proximity to the UK. For shipowners and managers, union leaders, 
and officials within the UK’s Marine and Coastguard Agency or Department for 
Transport, quick transport links between Douglas and London facilitate the 
development of close relationships with Manx administrators. Finally, it was 
through a series of legislative moves and subsequent developments, both intentional 
and unintentional, that the Isle of Man is increasingly viewed and treated as an 
independent register rather than a UK subsidiary by third parties, including port-state 
control bodies.
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This case study of the Isle of Man has particular significance for the ongoing 
secondary register debate within shipping literature. On the surface, the Manx 
register does seem to embody usual secondary register arguments in that it was 
created as an outlet for British shipowners wanting to escape the high costs of the 
UK flag. Upon closer examination, however, the Manx example refutes many of the 
common notions regarding secondary registers.
The impetus to create the Isle of Man ship register came not from the UK 
wanting a way to preserve its fleet, but from a combination of shipowners’ requests 
and a desire by the Manx government to diversify its economy. Furthermore, 
although the UK was supportive of the Isle of Man’s efforts, it never pushed the 
register to take on more ships or reduce its standards as an incentive. On the 
contrary, the UK actually tried to limit the Isle of Man register’s fleet to what the 
island administration had the capability to oversee without tarnishing the reputation 
of the Red Ensign. Additionally, the Isle of Man register is not seeking to gain a 
direct profit from the register, but rather attract shipping-related business to the 
island. To this end, the Manx strategy has always been focused on maintaining a 
high level of regulation of its ship register and being selective about the vessels that 
it allows to join. Finally, the Isle of Man is constantly checking its standards and 
practices against those of the UK, looking to be at least as “good” as its mainland 
counterpart. In some instances, such as signing the voluntary agreement with 
NUMAST and forging ahead on the ILO Consolidated Convention, it appears that it 
may even be exceeding this.
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Ultimately, the Isle of Man example does much to inform not only debates 
about the shipping industry, but also those about states and markets more generally. 
This case study shows that spatial and temporal contingencies can do as much to 
further a state’s competitive interests as the most carefully constructed strategies. 
Had the Isle of Man not benefited from the deregulation of financial markets in the 
1970s at the same time as the British shipping empire was crumbling, the foundation 
to establish itself a centre of shipping could not have been more easily set. The 
success of the Isle of Man in shipping and other financial industries, despite there 
being more “attractive” jurisdictions elsewhere, also shows that geography is still 
relevant.
This examination of the Isle of Man also manages to turn the conventional 
paradigm of offshoring on its head. Indeed, open registers have been identified by 
Palan (2003) as a central aspect of the deregulated, offshore phenomenon, but the 
detailed analysis in this chapter shows that the rise of the Manx ship register has, 
from the start, clearly been orientated towards creating and maintaining an effective 
regulatory regime. In fact, the register’s success has depended on its ability to 
maintain a reputation as fully complying with and enforcing international 
regulations.
Jessop (2002; citing Hudson 2000 and Palan 1998) notes that “offshore 
economies can be an element in [the competition state’s struggle] insofar as they are 
sponsored (or tolerated) by onshore states to secure competitive advantages” (96). 
The Isle of Man is an example of an offshore jurisdiction that resists this 
conceptualization. True, the Isle of Man works within boundaries set by the UK, and
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British shipowners (and others) have benefited from the island’s fiscal and political 
climate, but it cannot be said that the UK “sponsors” these activities as the Isle of 
Man has pursued them of its own accord; nor can it be argued that the UK merely 
“tolerates” them.
Ultimately, however, the case of the Isle of Man is about states and state 
strategy. It seems that the Isle of Man acts as a kind of “competition micro-state.” 
Jessop argues the competition state “prioritizes the pursuit of strategies intended to 
create, restructure or reinforce -  as far as it is economically and politically feasible to 
do so -  the competitive advantages of its territory, population, built environment, 
social institution and economic agents” (200, 296). Though not an externally 
autonomous state, the Isle of Man has turned its constitutional relationship with the 
UK to its advantage and has constantly adapted its industries to meet the needs of 
global business, maintaining the high standards of the Red Ensign. In doing so, to go 
back to Captain Greenhalgh, the Manx register is demonstrating that Douglas will 
use to its advantage whatever “Britishness” it is perceived to have.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusions
Although international shipping is an inherently global industry, it has been 
affected by the pressures of globalization in profound ways. With the advent of open 
registers in the last half-centuiy, shipowners have been able to reduce their operating 
costs by flagging out of relatively costly national registers. As shipowners moved to 
open registers, the merchant vessel fleets of embedded maritime states declined. In 
response, the first secondary registers, DIS and TAFF, were created by Denmark and 
France, respectively, in the 1980s. These flags grew steadily over the following two 
decades, and more secondary registers were created. As of 2005, approximately 
7.5% of the world’s tonnage was flagged on secondary registers. While this may 
appear to be a relatively small proportion of vessels, these registers represent a major 
effort by embedded maritime states to both retain and regain their national shipping 
industries. No full account of these secondary registers yet exists; this study is an 
attempt to address this deficiency. In addition to exploring the variation among 
different secondary registers, this thesis examines how secondary registers compare 
to their national counterparts with regard to regulation and crewing, and determines 
where they fit into the registry system as a whole.
The first two chapters of this thesis examine the relevant theoretical literature 
and explore existing secondary registers. In Chapter One, different accounts of 
globalization’s effects on state sovereignty are analysed as groupings of three distinct 
approaches. The most useful approach is found to be the one that focuses on the
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dynamic reconstruction of state sovereignty amid globalizing forces. The chapter 
then proceeds to discuss sovereignty in the context of international shipping, and 
provides an overview of the historical connection between a flag state and the vessels 
on its register. The need for further inquiry into the secondary register phenomenon 
is also established.
In Chapter Two, a classification system for existing secondary registers is 
developed as a means to understand the results of later analysis. The chapter sets out 
the different forms of variation among ship registers -  including their administration, 
location, level of openness, crewing restrictions, and relationship to the national 
register -  and then describes these characteristics for each secondary register 
included in the study. It is determined that the most appropriate classification system 
for this research is one that is based first on whether a flag state is controlled 
primarily by its parent state, or by the offshore territory on which it is located. Those 
registers in the former group are further categorised based on whether they are 
located within the mainland boundaries of the state or offshore. The registers are 
categorised in the following way:
• Controlled by register territory: Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Isle of 
Man, and Netherlands Antilles.
• Controlled by parent state and located within mainland boundaries o f state: 
DIS, NIS, and GIS.
• Controlled by parent state and located on offshore territory: CSR, MAR, and 
TAFF.
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Chapter Three considers the regulatory regime present on flag states using the 
proxy variable of port state control records. This discussion is framed in the context 
of debates regarding globalization and the harmonisation of international standards. 
It was hypothesised that secondary registers would have higher detention rates 
(meaning they were detained more frequently, and, presumably, operate in a more 
permissive regulatory environment) than their national counterparts, but remain 
below the regional average detention rate. It was also hypothesized that the average 
detention rate of secondary registers as a group would be higher than that of national 
registers but lower than that of open registers. These hypotheses are generally 
confirmed by the data, although, surprisingly, secondary registers have a lower 
average detention rate than the other two register types. The reason for these results 
is unclear as precise causal relationships are difficult to determine, but it appears that 
some secondary registers are employing the port state control process strategically. 
Also, it appears that the existence of secondary registers is not necessarily 
contributing to a downward harmonisation of standards, as these registers maintain a 
relatively high level of regulation compared to other flag states.
In Chapter Four, the labour costs associated with flagging on different 
registers are explored through an examination of seafarer nationality patterns. It was 
hypothesised that the proportion of national citizens employed on secondary registers 
would be less than that of national registers but greater than that of open ones, and 
that any replacement of national with non-national labour would first occur at the 
ratings level, followed by the junior officer level. It was also hypothesised that non­
national labour sources would originate in Southeast Asian and Eastern European
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states. Data analysis generally confirms these hypotheses, although results are most 
notable for the lack of consistent labour patterns, either between individual national 
and secondary pairs, or among secondary registers as a group. These findings 
indicate the need for a more sophisticated analysis of secondary registers.
Chapters Five and Six are in-depth explorations of the Isle of Man ship 
register. Chapter Five traces the development of the Manx register since 1984. It 
explains that, contrary to many accounts about secondary registers, the Isle of Man 
register was not created by the UK but rather the island itself, which sought to take 
advantage of particular political and economic factors to diversify its economy 
through the creation of a ship register. In so doing, it argues that the Manx flag state 
is playing a competitive game in which it balances compensating for the 
disadvantages of the UK register with being similar enough to it, particularly 
regarding level of regulation, to attract shipowners wanting to flag on a “British” 
register.
Chapter Six continues this discussion of the Isle of Man register, examining 
the evolution of its relationship with UK maritime administrators, the UK’s other 
secondary registers and third-party actors since the 1980s. It notes the extent to 
which the relationship between the Isle of Man and the UK has evolved from one of 
dependence to mutual cooperation and collaboration, and points to important 
differences between the Isle of Man and other Red Ensign flag states that affect the 
way they are perceived by third-party actors and participate in external affairs. In 
this discussion, key spatial and temporal considerations, including its geographical
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proximity to the UK and special status within the EU are seen to contribute to the 
Manx register’s success and strategy.
Taken together, the results of this thesis inform three broader conclusions that 
have implications beyond the shipping industry. First, results indicate that offshore 
ventures are not necessarily deregulated “havens”. This can be seen in port state 
control data, where secondary registers that are located in offshore territories are, as 
a group, detained less frequently than national or open registers, and , individually, 
are detained less frequently than the average flag, which suggests a comparably high 
level of regulation relative to other flag states. A further example is present in the 
Isle of Man register, which not only maintains equivalent regulatory standards to the 
United Kingdom, but emphasises that equivalency as one of its selling points.
Second, the national level appears to still be relevant as one scale of many, 
challenging the notion that globalization and its associated studies necessitate 
upscaling to the exclusion of the national scale. While it is clear that there are forces 
acting at multiple scales, particularly the supranational, that trigger the practices of 
secondary registers, a full understanding and explanation of the secondary register 
phenomenon requires the consideration of, and a grounding in, national-level 
activities.
Finally, the research conducted here demonstrates the need to ground 
theoretical discussions in empirical analysis. Accounts of secondary registers tend to 
be overlooked or oversimplified in broader discussions of open registers and their 
effect on embedded maritime states. This register group has previously been 
invoked as exemplifying deregulated offshoring and regulatory races to the bottom.
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However, the results of this investigation have shown such divergent patterns among 
individual secondary registers that the most robust conclusion that can be drawn is 
that there is a need for even more sophisticated analytical treatment of this register 
group than was possible in this thesis. Furthermore, this thesis reveals that such 
treatment, whether of secondary registers or other globalization-related themes, 
should take care to avoid the potential pitfalls of reductionism. As we have seen, 
there are elements of the secondary register phenomenon that cannot be discerned 
with exclusively quantitative or qualitative methods, or with exclusive focus on a 
particular scale.
To bring this research’s empirical findings back to the literature outlined in 
the first chapter, of the three sets of accounts of globalization’s effects on state 
sovereignty, the third set, or the re-imagined competitive state, holds the most 
explanatory power with regard to secondary registers. It appears that some states are 
consciously manipulating their secondary registers (which are, in and of themselves, 
a deliberate response to the consequences of international economic competition) in 
reaction to global forces. For example, states have been shown to alter their registers 
to receive more favourable port-state control results or by facilitating access to new 
sources of crewing labour. In this way, states are adapting to processes beyond their 
control in a way that confers benefits for their national industries, without fully 
abdicating the states’ regulatory functions or priorities.
Indeed, the Isle of Man, whose secondary register receives the greatest 
attention in this study, is specifically reminiscent of Jessop’s “competition state,” 
amending his definition to allow for the fact that the Isle of Man is not an
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independent, sovereign state. The Manx register’s success is based on the island’s 
exploitation of its status as a financial centre with critical ties to the United 
Kingdom. As its register has grown, the Isle of Man has sought greater influence 
within British and international decision-making spheres with regard to maritime 
issues. Thus the Isle of Man has acted in a manner consistent with a kind of 
“competition micro-state”.
However, it is difficult to discern whether Jessop’s “competition state” or 
“competition micro-state” theory can account for all of the secondary registers 
explored in this thesis. As has been noted, the Manx register is unique among 
secondary registers for several reasons, including, primarily, its relationship with the 
United Kingdom. It might be anticipated that the other secondary registers in its 
analytic category (those that are controlled by the register’s territory itself, including 
Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, and the Netherlands Antilles) can be similarly 
described; that all of these secondary registers are in competition with their parent 
state’s national register, while at the same time subject to restrictions on their 
territories’ autonomy imposed from or limited by their “home” state, might lead 
them to act in similar ways (although not always to similar ends, as a comparison of 
the Manx register with other Red Ensign registers has shown).
Whether this conclusion holds for the other analytic categories of secondary 
registers -  those that are controlled by their parent state and located within the 
mainland boundaries of that state, or those that are controlled by their parent state 
and located on an offshore territory — is more difficult to say. This thesis has 
demonstrated a lack of consistent patterns among parent state-secondary register
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pairs on both regulatory and crewing issues. These divergent patterns could be the 
result of different processes and priorities by different states; given the fundamental 
differences among secondary registers, both in terms of their structure and the 
characteristics explored in the course of this research, it is difficult to reach any more 
definitive a conclusion without further case studies of the type that form the basis of 
Chapters Five and Six.
Thus the key limitation of this study is its lack difficulty in generalizing from 
specific conclusions about the Manx register to other secondary registers, and 
“offshore” developments in general. In order to rectify this, at minimum a further 
two case studies, one from each of the other analytic categories would need to be 
conducted. Such an examination of the decision-making processes and development 
of different register bodies in relation to their parent state would hopefully confirm 
or refute the conclusions that have been reached regarding the Manx register and 
what it represents in terms of state sovereignty in a globalized world.
A second limitation concerns this study’s lack of explanatory power 
regarding how and why secondary registers function the way that they do. While 
this thesis has made an important contribution in demonstrating critical differences 
among different secondary registers and their relationships to their parent states, 
causal effects cannot be ascribed. Why, for example, has a particular secondary 
register’s port state control detention rates declined while another’s have not? Is it 
due to pressure from the parent state, industry, or the register itself? What is causing 
shipowners on one secondary/national register pair to have similar crewing patterns 
while others do not? By asking particular questions that follow on from the
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differences illuminated, here, these causal relationships can be explored and the 
secondary register phenomenon better understood.
Finally, there is far more work to be done on analysing secondary registers’ 
basic role and characteristics. There are several key questions that have not been 
answered in the course of this dissertation. First, which ships are using secondary 
registers? Are they actually serving to regain or retain the parent state’s national 
vessels, which is the stated objective of many of these secondary registers? 
Examining patterns of vessel registration for ships coming onto or leaving secondary 
registers is essential in determining exactly “whose” ships utilise these flag states. 
Second,' what do these registers represent in the context of other inducements -  
including tax breaks and other subsidies -  that states offer as inducements to 
preserve vessels? In order to fully understand how states are responding to loss of 
their national fleets, it is necessary to consider the other incentives shipowners are 
offered to remain on the national or secondary register. Finally, an extension of the 
data on seafarer nationalities and port state control inspections, considering 
additional years and at a more subtle scale (such as examining the type of 
deficiencies found or accounting for vessel age, type, and size), would also be 
conducive to gaining a fuller picture of secondary registers.
In many ways, this study is more exploratory than revelatory. Given that it is 
the first account to specifically treat secondary registers and their relationship to their 
parent state, this thesis has attempted first to provide a framework by which to 
understand and analyze secondary registers, and, second, to highlight the 
complexities inherent in this seemingly homogenous register group. These registers
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are currently significant players in the international registry system, and it is likely 
that they will become even more so in the years to come, particularly given the 
expansion of the European Union and its regulatory scope.
That secondary registers have not previously been the subject of careful 
inquiry is symptomatic of the broader ignorance of the maritime industry as a whole. 
High profile events, such as a sinking ship or a vessel captured by pirates, make 
headlines and are indeed indicative of some of the issues facing the modem merchant 
fleet. However, behind those headlines are day-to-day regulatory processes and 
international seafaring crews whose oversight, or lack thereof, is the responsibility of 
a vessel’s flag state. As long as secondary registers continue to feature in the 
international registry system, their policies and practices have implications for all 
those concerned with the oceaps, and the ships that sail upon them.
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Appendix A 
Frequently Used Acronyms
DfT Department for Transport (formerly DoT, “Department of Transport”)
EU European Union
FOC Flag of convenience
GT Gross Tonnage
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMO International Maritime Organisation
ITF International Transport Workers Federation
MCA Maritime and Coastguard Agency
NUMAST National Union of Marine, Aviation, and Shipping Transport Officers 
(now known as Nautilus)
PSC Port state control
REG Red Ensign Group, which consists of the UK’s secondary registers
RMT National Union of Rail, Maritime, and Transport Workers
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APPENDIX B
List of Registers
Secondary Reaisters National Reaisters ODen Reaisters
Bermuda Algeria Lithuania Antigua and Barbuda
Canary Islands (CSR-Spain) Austria Luxembourg Bahamas
Cayman Islands Azerbaijan Malaysia Barbados
Denmark (DIS) Bangladesh Maldives Belize
France (TAFF) Brazil Morocco Bolivia
Germany (GIS) Bulgaria Myanmar Cambodia
Gibraltar Chile Netherlands Comoros
Isle of Man China Norway Cyprus
Madeira (MAR-Portugal) Colombia Pakistan Equatorial Guinea
Netherlands Antilles Croatia Philippines Honduras
Norway (NIS) Denmark Poland Hong Kong
Ecuador Portugal Jamaica
Egypt Qatar Lebanon
Estonia Romania Liberia
Ethiopia Russian Malta
Finland Saudi Arabia Marshall Islands
France South Africa Mauritius
Georgia Spain Mongolia
Germany Sweden Panama
Greece Switzerland Saint Vincent
India Syrian Sao Tome & Principe
Indonesia Taiwan Singapore
Iran Thailand Tonga
Ireland Tunisia Tuvalu
Israel Turkey Vanuatu
Italy Ukraine
Japan United Arab Emirates
Korea, North United Kingdom
Korea, South United States
Kuwait Viet Nam
Libya
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APPENDIX C
Differences Between Published and Collected Port State Control Data 2004
| Published* | Collected**
PSC-Listed Registers No. No. Deten. No. No. Deten.
Register Included InsDec. Deten. Ratef%) InsDec. Deten. Rate(%)
Denmark Denmark (nat'l) _ - - 4 0 0.00
DIS - - - 409 4 0.98
Total 407 6 1.47 413 4 0.97
France France (nat'l) - - - 14 0 0.00
TAFF - - - 57 1 1.75
Wallis & Futuna - - 7 0 0.00
Total 78 1 1.28 78 1 1.28
Netherlands Netherlands 992 26 2.62 1030 26 2.52
Netherlands Netherlands
Antilles Antilles 240 14 5.83 245 10 4.08
Norway Norway (nat'l) - - 152 3 1.97
NIS - - - 780 18 2.31
Total 919 23 2.50 932 21 2.25
Portugal Portugal (nat'l) - - - 4 0 0.00
MAR - - - 189 7 3.70
Total 185 6 3.24 193 7 3.63
Spain Spain (nat'l) - - - 21 0 0.00
CSR - - - 95 3 3.16
Total 105 2 1.90 116 3 2.59
UK UK 494 5 1.01 508 6 1.18
Bermuda Bermuda 85 1 1.18 85 1 1.18
Cayman Islds Cayman Islds 140 5 3.57 140 5 3.57
Gibraltar Gibraltar 229 16 6.99 240 15 6.25
Isle of Man Isle of Man 243 3 1.23 250 4 1.60
* Published in Paris MOU Annual Report 2004 (Paris MOU 2005)
** Collected from Paris MOU Inspection Database available at 
http://www.parismou.org/ParisMOU/Inspection+Database/xp/menu.3973/default.aspx
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Differences Between Published and Collected Port State Control Data 2005
Published* Collected**
PSC-Listed Registers No. No. Deten. No. No. Deten.
Resister Included InsDec. Deten. Rate(%) InsDec. Deten. Ratef%)
Denmark Denmark (nat'l) - _ 11 0 0.00
DIS - - - 393 8 2.04
Total 416 8 1.92 404 8 1.98
France France (nat'l) - - - 19 0 0.00
TAFF - - - 58 0 0.00
Wallis & Futuna - - - 6 0 0.00
Total 78 0 0.00 83 0 0.00
Netherlands Netherlands 991 20 2.02 994 23 2.31
Netherlands
Antilles
Netherlands
Antilles 253 9 3.56 253 9 3.56
Norway Norway (naf 1) - - - 160 1 0.63
NIS - - - 748 10 1.34
Total 911 10 1.10 908 11 1.21
Portugal Portugal (nat'l) - - - 1 0 0.00
MAR - - - 198 2 1.01
Total 198 2 1.01 199 2 1.01
Spain Spain (nat'l) - - - 18 0 0.00
CSR - - - 69 1 1.45
Total 87 1 1.15 87 1 1.15
UK UK 551 8 1.45 552 8 1.45
Bermuda Bermuda 93 1 1.08 93 1 1.08
Cayman Islds Cayman Islds 129 3 233 129 3 2.33
Gibraltar Gibraltar 252 8 3.17 253 8 3.16
Isle of Man Isle of Man 281 3 1.07 1 281 3 1.07
* Published in Paris MOU Annual Report 2005 (Paris MOU 2006)
** Collected from Paris MOU Inspection Database available at 
http://www.parismou.org/ParisMOU/Inspection+Database/xp/menu.3973/default.aspx
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APPENDIX D 
Raw Significance Levels for Quantitative Data Analysis
Chi-square test for significance for Seafarer Nationalities by Crew Level*
Denmark/
DIS
France/
TAFF
Netherlands/ 
Netherlands Antilles
Norway/
NIS
UK1 
Bermuda
UK/Cayman
Islands
UK1 
Gibraltar
UK/Isle 
of Man
Total Crew .047 .155 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Senior Officers .097 .401 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Junior Officers .150 .041 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Ratings .874 .286 .002 .000 .004 .000 .001 .000
*For those tests which had at least one cell with an expected count of less than five, 
p-values are italicised.
183
APPENDIX E
States by Regional Category for Seafarer Nationality Analysis
European Union Eastern Europe (cont) Middle East (cont)
Austria Republic of Moldova Kuwait
Belgium Romania Lebanon
Denmark (includes Russian Federation Malta
Faeroe Islands)
Finland Slovakia Oman
France Slovenia Palestinian Territory
Germany Ukraine Qatar
Greece Yugoslavia Saudi Arabia
Ireland Sudan
Italy Far East Syrian Arab Republic
Luxembourg Brunei Darussalam Turkey
Netherlands China Yemen
Spain Dem People’s Republic of Korea
Sweden Fiji Latin America
United Kingdom Hong Kong (Chinese Admin 
Region)
Argentina
Indonesia Bahamas
Other OECD Kazakhstan Barbados
Australia Kiribati Belize
Bermuda Malaysia Bolivia
British Virgin Islands Papua New Guinea Brazil
Canada Philippines Cape Verde
Cayman Islands Republic of Korea Chile
Gibraltar Samoa Colombia
Iceland Singapore Costa Rica
Japan Taiwan Cuba
New Zealand Thailand Dominican Republic
Norway Tonga Ecuador
Portugal Tuvalu El Salvador
Switzerland Viet Nam Guatemala
United States Guyana
South East Haiti
Eastern Europe Bangladesh Honduras
Albania India Jamaica
Azerbaijan Myanmar Maldives
Belarus Nepal Mexico
Bosnia and Pakistan Nicaragua
Herzegovina
Bulgaria Sri Lanka Panama
Croatia Peru
Czech Republic Middle East Saint Lucia
Estonia Cyprus St Vincent & the Grenadines
Georgia Egypt Suriname
Hungary Iran, Islamic Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
Latvia Irag Uruguay
Lithuania Israel Venezuela
Poland Jordan
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APPENDIX F
Data Included in Analysis of Crewing Costs
No. of No. of No. of Seafarers
SECONDARY REGISTERS Vessels Seafarers w/Nationality Data
Bermuda (UK) 14 311 311
Cayman Islands (UK) 48 1096 1096
CSR (Spain) 1 23 23
DIS (Denmark) 84 1388 1388
Gibraltar (UK) 25 325 325
Isle of Man (UK) 51 946 946
MAR (Portugal) 0 0 0
Netherlands Antilles (Netherlands) 34 463 463
NIS (Norway) 171 3715 3715
TAFF (France) 21 413 413
No. of No. of No. of Seafarers
OPEN REGISTERS Vessels Seafarers w/Nationality Data
Antigua and Barbuda 232 2724 2721
Bahamas 185 3717 3715
Barbados 9 127 127
Belize 12 185 185
Cambodia 99 1453 1438
Comoros 2 18 18
Cyprus 6 4670 4641
Equatorial Guinea 1 9 9
Honduras 22 272 272
Hong Kong 103 2466 2415
Jamaica 2 45 45
Lebanon 8 100 100
Liberia 382 8485 8485
Malta 362 7587 7575
Marshall Islands 71 1605 1605
Mauritius 2 .41 41
Panama 811 17003 16927
Saint Vincent & Grenadines 86 1556 1556
Sao Tome & Principe 4 64 64
Singapore 97 2035 2035
Tonga 20 220 212
Tuvalu 1 6 6
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No. of No. of No. of Seafarers
NATIONAL REGISTERS Vessels Seafarers w/Nationality Data
Algeria 4 98 74
Austria 2 24 24
Azerbaijan 7 149 149
Bangladesh 2 35 34
Brazil 5 107 82
Bulgaria 28 615 615
Chile 1 27 27
China 64 1710 1680
Colombia 1 10 10
Croatia 9 178 178
Denmark 8 145 145
Ecuador 4 96 96
Egypt 13 366 336
Estonia 8 88 83
Ethiopia 1 26 26
Finland 11 144 144
France 5 110 110
Georgia 18 275 275
Germany 144 2455 2413
Greece 151 3550 3550
India 103 604 497
Indonesia 35 648 648
Iran 13 374 374
Ireland 4 46 46
Israel 16 333 333
Italy 69 1442 1441
Japan 6 408 408
Korea, North 6 113 113
Korea, South 17 379 379
Kuwait 6 183 183
Libya 1 32 32
Lithuania 8 112 112
Luxembourg 25 426 400
Malaysia 95 2042 2031
Maldives 1 27 27
Morocco 9 165 97
Myanmar 10 325 325
Netherlands 187 2021 1995
Norway 10 180 180
Pakistan 2 82 82
Philippines 36 768 768
Poland 4 71 71
Portugal 17 203 203
Qatar 2 58 58
Romania 11 194 194
Russia 187 2658 2632
186
No. of No. of No. of Seafarers
NATIONAL REGISTERS (con't) Vessels Seafarers w/Nationality Data
South Africa 4 154 154
Spain 9 138 120
Sweden 35 496 496
Switzerland 3 38 38
Syrian 53 793 793
Taiwan 23 417 417
Thailand 33 669 669
Tunisia 4 101 71
Turkey 122 2204 1599
Ukraine 72 1193 1174
United Arab Emirates 2 56 56
United Kingdom 59 1005 1003
United States 50 1060 1060
Viet Nam 15 373 373
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APPENDIX G
Methodology
Introduction
The main objective of this study is to examine how globalization has affected 
the shipping policies of embedded maritime states, focusing specifically on the 
phenomenon of secondary ship registers. It attempts to determine how these 
registers can and should be understood in the context of a globalized shipping 
industry, as well as the extent to which these registers fulfil the economic and 
political needs of their respective parent states. In order to accomplish these 
objectives, there is a need to ascertain how these registers compensate for what 
shipowners perceive to be the disadvantages of their respective national registers 
and, more broadly, determine where these registers fit into the broader system of 
vessel registration. Given that a desire to escape the costs associated with the 
relatively strict regulatory environment and inflexible crewing requirements are 
among the main reasons43 why shipowners “flag out” from national registers to open 
ones (Ready 1998), these are two key elements of secondary registers that need to be 
explored.
In order to address these research areas, it is necessary to analyse secondary 
registers individually in relation to their national counterparts (the parent state’s 
national register), as well as collectively, in order to determine what niche, if any, 
they are filling in the global registry system. In order to accomplish this, this thesis 
employs a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, as the former could
43 Others include avoiding high levels of taxation and retaining anonymity (Ready 1998).
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be used to establish general trends, within which there would almost certainly be 
variation that would require the latter for a more detailed level of analysis. The first 
section of this appendix explains the selection of secondary registers used as cases in 
this study, while the second section outlines the methodological approach taken. The 
third section describes the research process in order to communicate the means by 
which research decisions were made, including descriptions of the various data 
sources and the reasoning behind the choice of case study.
Selection of Cases
As noted in the introduction to this thesis, the earliest “designer” secondary 
registers were France’s TAFF (French Austral and Antarctic Territories) register and 
the Norwegian International Ship Register (NIS), created in 1986 and 1987, 
respectively. Following these early examples, second and international registers 
continued to proliferate through the 1990s. Many states -  both those with a strong 
maritime tradition and those without -  have considered establishing an additional 
register. These ventures have had varying degrees of success. In 1999, legislation 
governing the creation of a secondary tax-free ship register had reportedly found a 
congressional sponsor in the United States, but it appears the register never came to 
fruition (International Ship Registry Review, 1999). A potential Russian secondary 
register has been “painfully inching its way into existence” since 1995 (Second 
Russian Register Getting Closer Yet is Still So Far Away 2005). Recent previous 
research provides a comprehensive list of established and functional second and 
international registers.
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Established Secondary Registers
Parent State Secondary Registers No. SMds* GT*
Brazil Registro Especial Brasileiro no data available
China Hong Kong 1,058 26,085,134
Macao 2 2,321
Denmark DIS 421 7,284,769
Faeroe Islands 156 158,956
Faeroe Islands (FAS) 10 22,233
Finland Aland Islands no data available
France French Antarctic Territory (TAFF) 126 3,524,865
Wallis and Futuna Islands 4 74,754
Germany GIS no data available
Italy Second register no data available
Netherlands Netherlands Antilles 214 1,661,631
New Zealand Cook Islands 52 26,108
Norway NIS 656 15,416,521
Portugal Madeira (MAR) 119 1,143,306
Spain Canary Islands (CSR) 188 1,823,323
Turkey International register no data available
United Kingdom Anguilla 3 701
Bermuda 122 6,166,162
British Virgin Islands 14 2,520
Cayman Islands 156 2,608,796
Channel Islands 8 1,470
Falkland Islands 29 50,453
Gibraltar 170 1,142,448
Isle of Man 333 7,168,533
Turks and Caicos 5 975
*As at December 2004. Source: Lloyd's Register Fairplay Ltd 2005. 
Source: ILO 2004.
Despite the characterization of each of these registers as second or 
international, not all of them are appropriate to include as cases in this study. Given 
that this research centres on states’ relatively recent efforts to maintain viable 
industries in the face of global competition, it is necessary to exclude some of the 
cases listed above. There are historical differences. For example, Hong Kong’s 
register was under British control until 1999, and therefore does not accurately
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reflect China’s shipping policies. There is also the question of size of activity. As 
this study seeks to examine those registers that are viable alternatives to national or 
open ones, there is a need for all cases considered to be both “active” and of a large 
enough size to have an influence on the shipping industry. As such, only registers 
having a minimum of 50 vessels totalling least 500,000 gross tons44 are included in 
this study. These requirements ensure that the registers examined are responsible for 
overseeing more than just local fishing vessels (which are significantly smaller than 
other types of merchant ships). It should also be noted that the figure of 500,000 
gross tons (GT) is not entirely arbitrary. There is a natural break in the tonnage data 
between the Faeroe Islands (156 ships, 158,956 GT) and Gibraltar (170 ships, 
1,142,448 GT) or Portugal (119 ships, 1,143,306 GT); all second and international 
registers fall to one side or the other of this tonnage band. As a result, several more 
secondary registers, including those of Brazil, Finland, Italy, Turkey, and New 
Zealand, as well as several of the United Kingdom’s secondary registers, are 
excluded. Thus the final list of cases to be examined in this study is as follows.
44 Unless otherwise stated, figures for register size and number of ships used in this study represent 
data from World Fleet Statistics (Lloyd’s Register Fairplay, Ltd) as at December 2004.
Selected Secondary Registers
Parent State Secondary Register(s)
Denmark
France
DIS
French Antarctic Territory (TAFF) 
GIS
Netherlands Antilles 
NIS
Madeira (MAR)
Canary Islands (CSR)
Bermuda 
Cayman Islands 
Gibraltar 
Isle of Man
Germany
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
United Kingdom
Methodological Approach
This study aims to examine specific characteristics regarding secondary 
registers in order to draw conclusions about how they operate, both as a group and in 
relation to their national counterparts. Given the nature of the research questions and 
the fact that little empirical work exists on this topic, a large component of this study 
involves the manipulation of quantitative data with the aim to provide a “big-picture” 
analysis of the place of secondary registers within the industry and relate this to 
contemporary debates on the role of the state.
Quantitative research, however, does have limitations, including a failure to 
address elements of why secondary registers were created and structured the way that 
they are, and how a secondary register interacts with its parent state. In other words, 
what it achieves in breadth, it lacks in depth. In order to resolve these issues, a case 
study combining a variety of qualitative techniques is employed, which means that a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods is used in order to sufficiently 
address the research questions previously outlined.
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Mixing quantitative and qualitative methods within the same study is 
growing increasingly common in the social sciences (Bryman 2004). The need to 
address different kinds of research questions in order to investigate different aspects 
of the same phenomenon, as was the goal in this study, is an acceptable way to 
approach multi-strategy research (Bryman 2004). Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) 
suggest that there are four critical points to consider if using mixed methods: 
priority, implementation, integration, and theoretical perspective. Taking each in 
turn, in this study, equal emphasis (priority) is placed on both method types. In 
terms of implementation, the majority of the quantitative data analysis was 
completed first so that any particularly interesting or unexpected results could be 
explored further in the case study. With regard to integration, the qualitative data is 
used to address those questions that the analysis of quantitative data left unanswered 
or that it could not answer. Theoretically, the quantitative data helps test specific 
hypotheses relating to the general status of secondary registers. However, these leave 
specific questions relating to state strategy and the motives of policy makers 
unanswered. These are explored though interviews and other qualitative data. Thus 
results of the two methods overlapped, but the aim is to gain information about 
multiple aspects of single phenomenon, rather than triangulation.
Quantitative Data
Quantitative data analysis is useful in answering broad research questions 
about the secondary register phenomenon. However, given the scope of this research 
topic and the limitations of an M.Phil study, it is appropriate to consider secondary, 
rather than primary, data sources. As Bryman (2004) notes, secondary data analysis
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has cost and time benefits, can be based on high quality data, allows the opportunity 
for longitudinal studies, and enables subgroup analysis. More generally, analysing 
existing data permits far more comprehensive data collection for a greater sample 
size than would be possible to attempt individually.
Fortunately, two of the primary variables that are of interest -  a register’s 
regulatory regime and crewing costs -  have proxies readily available in existing 
databases.45 Other sources of quantitative data include Lloyd’s World Fleet 
Statistics (listing data on the number of ships and gross tonnage of individual 
registers) and Lloyd’s Register of Ships (which tracks vessels’ histories, including a 
listing of all flags a ship has been on). Data from these different publications were 
input in to SPSS, and values for the secondary registers compared to those of their 
parent states’ national registers and subjected to statistical tests of significance where 
appropriate. On key variables, secondary registers as a group are compared to 
national registers and open registers, to discern where secondary registers fit into the 
international registry system.
Measuring a Register’s Regulatory Regime
There are several ways that the level of regulation on a particular register 
could be measured. One approach, used by DeSombre (2006), involves comparing 
the number of maritime-related international conventions a state has ratified. While 
this method reveals the extent to which a state is willing to commit to international 
norms, it would be difficult to discern the extent to which these norms are actually 
being enforced. Alternatively, a state could implement domestic legislation with
45 All statistical databases used in this study are publicly available, except for one listing seafarer 
nationalities, which was compiled by the Seafarers’ International Research Centre.
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similar or more stringent requirements than the international convention, but choose 
not to participate in the relevant international agreement because of sovereignty 
concerns or for political reasons; in this instance, non-participation would not 
accurately reflect the level of regulation. Alderton and Winchester’s (2003) 
classification system is useful, but reproducing the analysis for those secondary 
register flag states that the authors did not include is beyond the constraints of this 
thesis. Another approach (Bemfeld 2004) encompasses domestic legislation as well 
as international obligations by using existing labour and environmental indicators 
and comparing states’ scores, but this would not satisfactorily account for any 
shipping-specific differences in state regulation.
There is, however, an existing data source that circumvents these issues: port 
state control. Port state control (PSC) is the process by which foreign vessels are 
inspected when visiting national ports to ensure that the ship is fulfilling certain 
minimum international regulations. Vessels that are seen to be sub-standard are cited 
for deficiencies or, more seriously, detained in port until faults are addressed. 
Repeated detentions by vessels on the same register can lead to that flag being 
targeted for future inspections. Since ensuring that a vessel is maintaining safe 
operating and crewing standards is the responsibility of the state where the vessel is 
registered, the results of a port state control inspection can be considered to be a 
reflection of that state’s regulatory regime with regard to safety and environmental 
standards. DeSombre (2006) has used port state control data in this way.
Port state control is administered by regional groups governed by 
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). These groups allow for coordinated
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inspections and shared information, and each has its own system of inspecting 
vessels and determining which flags to target, although the standards that must be 
met to avoid detention are generally similar. There are currently nine MOUs 
encompassing all international waters, and the United States Coast Guard runs its 
own separate program of inspections and targeting. Several of these organisations 
publish comprehensive reports regarding the number and result of inspections of 
individual flag states. The Paris MOU has, for 2002-present, an online database of 
every inspection conducted and lists detailed results. Although the MOU reports 
frequently group inspection data for a particular state’s secondary and national 
register together (for example, the data listed for “Portugal” would include 
inspections for both Portuguese national- and MAR- registered vessels), the Paris 
MOU database includes IMO numbers for each vessel inspected; these numbers can 
be cross-referenced with Lloyd’s Register o f Ships database, which tracks vessels’ 
histories and includes a listing of all previous flags a ship has been registered with, to 
determine whether the ship was flagged to the national or secondary register. Once 
broken down in this way, this data can be used to assess and compare the detention 
rates of secondary registers to that of their parent states, and each other. The results 
of such comparisons illustrate the relative regulatory environment vessels on 
different secondary flags are subject to.
Measuring a Register’s Crewing Costs
Attempting to gain information about specific crewing expenditures for 
vessels on a particular register is made difficult by the variations in crew 
compositions under different shipowners and shipping companies. A useful proxy for
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wages, however, is the nationality of the seafarer, since his or her country of 
citizenship is the “most important determinant” of the pay that is received (ILO 
2004, 111). Some vessels on registers that have been designated Flags of 
Convenience are covered by collective bargaining agreements with the International 
Transport Federation, in which minimum wage rates and working conditions are 
jointly set by union representatives and shipowners, and pay is, theoretically, 
determined by job performed rather than nationality. However, as of 2004 only 
6,811 ships (ITF 2004), or about 35% of FOC vessels and 7.5% of the world fleet, 
were covered by such agreements. The relatively large percentage of vessels not 
holding ITF agreements means that seafarer nationality can still be a useful analytic 
tool for investigating wage rates, particularly for ships on non-FOC registers.
Taxes and social security contributions can also vary depending on the 
nationality of the seafarer and his or her vessel’s flag state. Thus, by examining 
whether crews are comprised of nationals or non-nationals, and breaking the analysis 
down to look at nationalities at different crew levels (whether a rating or more 
highly-trained officer), it is possible to get a sense of relative labour costs on 
different registers. The existing SIRC Global Labour Market Survey (SIRC 2002) is 
a database composed of crew lists of thousands of vessels; each list includes details 
such as each seafarer’s nationality, gender, and age, as well as information, including 
flag, about the vessel. As with the port state control data, a breakdown of the 
different seafarer nationalities crewing vessels on secondary registers versus that of 
their parent states gives an indication of the relative crewing costs on different flags. 
Case Study
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The case study is a crucial component of this research project. While the 
quantitative methods outlined above address important questions about the 
characteristics of secondary registers, one of the primary limitations of current 
academic work on shipping and secondary registers is that these flag states are 
classified for use in broad empirical analysis without a concrete understanding of 
what they represent or how they actually function. In order to address this issue, it is 
necessary to examine secondary registers qualitatively; a case study offers the 
opportunity to focus these types of methods on a single subject. Ideally, a series of 
case studies looking at individual parent-secondary register relationships would have 
been conducted. Given the time constraints of this study, however, it was only 
possible to carry out one case study.
Case Study Research Methods
It is possible to incorporate nearly any research method, qualitative or 
quantitative into a case study, so long as they converge “upon an intensive 
examination” of the subject in question (Bryman 2004, 49). On the basis of my 
research questions, however, which sought a historical and informational 
understanding of a particular secondary register, two methods were determined to be 
particularly useful: informational interviews and document analysis.
Interviews provide the opportunity to gain information from relevant 
maritime administrations and other maritime officials regarding the register’s 
development and current functioning, and to further understanding of the decision­
making processes and how the relationship between the secondary register and the 
parent state works. In choosing among structured, semi-structured, and open
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interviews, semi-structured interviews are the most logical option as the interviewer 
can ask specific questions, but allow for a flexible discussion. Rubin and Rubin 
(1995, 89) note that, in a case study, “the interviews will appear to be guided 
conversations rather than structured queries. In other words, although you will be 
pursuing a consistent line of inquiry, your actual stream of questions.. .is likely to be 
fluid rather than rigid.” The advantage of a semi-structured interview over an open 
one is that, by asking my interviewees similar questions in a similar order, I am more 
likely to gain a comprehensive picture of the register in question.
Document analysis is necessary to further complete this picture. According 
to Gillham (2000), documents “provide a formal framework to which. . .to relate the 
informal reality” (21). Examining newspaper articles, legislative debates, and 
literature produced by or related to the register provides a context with which to 
analyse and understand answers to my interview questions, as well as the case itself. 
Document analysis is preferred over quantitative content analysis because the goal is 
not “[quantified] content in terms of predetermined categories. . .in a systematic and 
replicable manner” (Bryman 2004) but rather a teasing out of the underlying 
structure and development. Document analysis can also verify or challenge 
information gained in the interviews. Yin suggests that, “for case studies, the most 
important use of documents is to corroborate and augment evidence from other 
sources. . .If the documentary evidence is contradictory rather than corroboratory, 
you need to pursue the problem by inquiring further into the topic” (2003, 87). 
Selecting the Case
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Research design literature outlines several approaches by which to select a 
case for a case study. Yin (2003), for example, notes three main types of cases: the 
critical case selected on the basis of strong hypotheses; the unique case, which is an 
extreme example; and the revelatory case, conducted on a rarely studied subject. 
Bryman (2004), however, indicates that “much case study takes place on. . .the 
exemplifying case. Cases are often chosen not because they are extreme or unusual 
in some way but because they will provide a suitable context for certain research 
questions to be answered” (51).
Given the dearth of research on secondary registers and subsequent difficulty 
in identifying one that might be considered an “extreme” case, selecting an 
“exemplifying” case is the most suitable approach. Characteristics that are known to 
be shared by many secondary registers included being open to vessels with foreign 
ownership, run by the state rather than an outside company, and based in a 
jurisdiction (whether offshore or not) that offers other fiscal advantages. Since the 
primary concern of the case study is not generalizability but rather increased insight 
into the processes by which a secondary register developed and functions today, any 
secondary register included in this study that meets the above criteria could be an 
appropriate case to choose.
However, there is one case that was potentially more useful than others. The 
Isle of Man ship register fits the criteria above, but also offers increased 
opportunities for comparison since the UK has three other secondary registers 
(Bermuda, Cayman Islands, and Gibraltar) in the same regulatory category. 
Additionally, Ready lists the Isle of Man as being one example of several offshore
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registers that “emerged as a result of an accident of history” (1998, 29). Furthermore, 
the island has easily accessible and comprehensive records of its shipping history 
and policies, conducts its business in English, and is a realistic destination for first­
hand research.
The Research Process
Having explained the reasoning underlying the way in which this study has 
been approached, the following sections explain the research processes and 
analytical methods used. They also describe in detail the data sources that are 
employed, and outline the challenges faced at different stages in the project.
Crewing Costs and the Global Labour Market Survey
This study uses data collected in the 2002 SIRC Global Labour Market 
Survey, which was part of a large-scale effort to collect time-series data on the global 
labour market for seafarers.46 The Seafarers International Research Centre asked the 
ports of five states -  Panama, Rotterdam, Singapore, Genoa, and the United States -  
to collect crew lists from all vessels visiting in one calendar month (March, 2002). 
Gross numbers of crewsheets collected per port are not available, but in total, 
crewsheets covering 98,715 seafarers crewing 5,375 vessels were received. Once the 
data was cleaned, and incomplete and duplicate entries removed, searchable, 
anonymous crew lists from 4,984 ships were available.
While this dataset is the most comprehensive source of information on 
seafarer nationality, it does present a few issues that should be acknowledged. First, 
since analysis is conducted at both the unit of vessel and of flag state, there are some
46 Data from 2002 rather than 2003 is used because only the former dataset has been anonymised and 
cleaned.
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instances of small sample sizes (in some cases, data for only one ship was available 
for a particular flag), and this in turn limits the statistical claims that can be made 
about fleet as a whole. However, individual flags are only excluded if they are part 
of a secondary-national register pair for which either register has fewer than five 
cases listed in the dataset since these are the only registers that were considered 
individually. The rest of the registers (open and remaining national) are grouped for 
all levels of analysis.
Additionally, it is important to note how a “national” seafarer is defined, 
particularly for states such as the United Kingdom, which have overseas territories. 
For the purposes of this study, a “national” is taken to be a citizen of any country 
including its overseas territories or crown dependencies. For example, all British 
citizens crewing vessels on the Manx register are considered “nationals,” as are any 
seafarers from the Netherlands Antilles serving on the Netherlands national register. 
By not further restricting the “national” category, this study is potentially more 
accurate that it would otherwise be, since seafarers’ nationalities are self-reported 
and responses may not consistently demonstrate whether the seafarer is from an 
overseas territory or its parent state. From an analytical perspective, this way of 
defining “national” also allows the argument that secondary registers are 
synonymous with a loss of jobs for national seafarers to be evaluated in a way that 
would not be possible if nationalities are further differentiated.
Regulatory Environment
This study uses port state control data collected directly from the online 
inspection database of the Paris MOU for 2004 and 2005. For each inspection listed
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in those years for cases included in this study, identifying information about the 
vessel, including IMO number and vessel name, is collected along with the date of 
inspection and inspection result (no deficiencies, deficiencies, or detention). If the 
vessel was found to have deficiencies or was detained, then the number of 
deficiencies, number of deficiencies warranting detention, and length of detention 
are also noted. Once this information is collected from the Paris MOU database, it is 
possible to cross-reference the vessel identifying information with the “Ship History’ 
feature in the Lloyd’s Register o f Ships (2007) database to determine whether the 
vessel was on the secondary or national flag at the time of inspection. A complete 
listing of inspection and detention data collected can be found in Appendix C.
Case Study
The first step in the case study investigation is to collect information on the 
Isle of Man and UK registers in order to obtain background information on the 
registers, identify potential contacts for interviews, and locate any interesting or on­
going debates that should be explored in the interviews. Sources used include 
shipping-related news publications such as Lloyd’s List, the registry websites, and 
recent volumes of the Manx Hansard (record of parliamentary debates), which are 
available online. Then, a week-long trip to the Isle of Man was arranged to visit the 
ship register, conduct interviews, and visit the Tynwald (Manx parliament) Library 
to go through older copies of Hansard and any other publications of interest.
In the end, five organisations were selected for in-person, semi-structured 
interviews: the Isle of Man Marine Administration, which runs the Manx ship 
register; the UK’s Department for Transport (DfT) in London, whose Shipping
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Division is responsible for maritime policy; the Maritime and Coastguard Agency 
(MCA) in Southampton, which implements the DfT’s policies, ensures that British 
vessels comply with these policies, oversees the UK’s national register, and is the 
home of the Red Ensign Group Secretariat; and the National Union of Marine, 
Aviation, and Shipping Transport officers (NUMAST) and the National Union of 
Rail, Maritime, and Transport workers (RMT), the UK’s two national seafarers, 
union groups, which are both based in London.
In choosing which individuals to interview at these organisations, I was 
primarily concerned with finding people involved in the making of policy or who 
were directly interacted with representatives from the maritime administrations of 
the UK or the Isle of Man. Where these individuals could not be identified, the 
organisation was contacted to direct me to the appropriate official. Interviews were 
conducted with only one interviewee whenever possible; however there were 
occasionally two or three people interviewees present due to interviewees’ time 
constraints. Additionally, some interviewees identified further contacts, which 
resulted in two additional, unplanned interviews.
In total, twelve interviews were conducted with sixteen interviewees: four 
from the Isle of Man Marine Administration; one former surveyor on the Manx 
register; one Manx government worker in the External Relations Division, which 
liaises with the UK government; three people in the Commercial Shipping Policy 
division of the Department for Transport; four individuals in the Maritime and 
Coastguard Agency, including two who work on Red Ensign Group issues, one
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involved in evaluating safety standards, and one involved with liaising to 
international institutions; two officials from RMT; and one official from NUMAST.
Stake suggests that a list of flexible “topical questions” that cover “the 
anticipated needs for information” be written early in the research process (1995, 
26). Thus, while the precise questions I asked varied by interviewee, the two general 
interview schedules remain the same. The first, used at interviews conducted on the 
Isle of Man, opens with questions about the history of the register and its relationship 
with the UK, Red Ensign Group, and international organisations, and then moves 
into questions about specific legislation, policy, or issue areas. Similarly, 
interviewees from the other organisations were asked about the history and nature of 
their relationship to the Manx Marine Administration as compared to the UK and 
other Red Ensign Group members, as well as the processes by which policy is made. 
These questions are designed to obtain information about how and why the Isle of 
Man developed, explore how its administration interacts with the relevant divisions 
of the UK government and third-party actors, and determine what role, if any, it 
plays in making UK or international maritime policy. Consent was obtained from all 
interviewees, who were told that they would remain anonymous, that physical and 
digital data would be destroyed once the study was finished, and that they could 
withdraw their participation at any point. On average, interviews lasted just over one 
hour and were recorded with a Sony digital Dictaphone. They were subsequently 
transcribed in full. The process of analysis used was to first utilise the interview 
questions as broad categories by which to group interviewee responses, and then, as
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patterns of different topics begin to emerge, review the transcripts again for any 
salient information. This process was repeated several times.
I did anticipate having difficulty gaining access to some interviewees due to 
their “elite” status, but, with the exception of minor scheduling issues, I found most 
of them to be incredibly accommodating and helpful. In fact, in the end, my main 
difficulty was in handling the amount of data I was able to collect. A few of my 
interviewees were so forthcoming that I gained much interesting information, but 
had no way to corroborate some of it with other sources, which was necessary to 
ensure accuracy. Furthermore, I had to balance the information I received from a 
particular interviewee with the mission of his or her organisation. If I felt I was 
receiving stock answers to questions, I would re-phrase the question several times 
throughout the interview to see if the response would differ, or, occasionally, gently 
“push” the interviewee on a particular point if I thought he or she would not respond 
badly.
Perhaps my greatest challenge, however, was transforming the mountain of 
data — interview transcriptions, copies of shipping-related legislative debates in the 
Manx parliament, and organisations’ publications -  into an accurate and inclusive 
account of the Isle of Man ship register. I have strived to achieve the objective stated 
by Gilbert (2001, 223) of providing the “audience with a comprehensive, detailed 
and understandable account of the findings of the research” while balancing 
“organising the material so that it is understandable to the audience and ensuring that 
it continues to provide a sympathetic reflection of the complexities of the social 
world(s) being researched” (223).
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